James Wilson

The plaintiff, who travelled from Ireland for a pre-trial conference regarding a motor vehicle accident, sought costs after the conference failed to result in a settlement.

The defendant maintained a 'no liability' position contrary to their stance at mediation, without communicating this change in advance.

The court found the defendant's behavior obdurate and the pre-trial conference substantially a waste of time.

Pursuant to Rule 50.12 and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's out-of-pocket travel expenses and counsel fees, as well as the fees of the other defendants' counsel in the cause.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from driving contrary to section 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed a vehicle with a disqualified owner enter a dealership parking lot and detained the defendant standing beside the vehicle.

Without informing the defendant of the reason for detention or his right to counsel, the officer obtained admissions that the defendant had no driver's licence and had been driving that day.

The court found that the detention was lawful based on reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence, but the officer breached sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to advise the defendant of the reason for detention and his right to counsel before questioning.

The court excluded the defendant's statements under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the defendant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

With the Crown's essential evidence excluded, the charge was dismissed.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $6,156.71 following the dismissal of the appellant's motion for a stay.

The appellant argued that as a public interest litigant, no costs should be awarded, noting it had ultimately obtained the interim remedy from the Environmental Review Tribunal.

The court agreed with the appellant and ordered no costs for the motion.

The appellant meat processing company sued the respondent energy retailer for rescission of a fixed price electrical contract and damages for negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the respondent had fully explained the contract terms, including the risk that the appellant would pay more if electricity prices dropped, and that the respondent had not misled the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

The Ontario Energy Board appealed a decision that had required it to apply a mandatory prudence framework when assessing Ontario Power Generation compensation costs in rate-setting.

The majority held tribunal participation in defending its own decision was proper in this regulatory context and found no impermissible bootstrapping on appeal.

The Court held the governing statute did not require a single prudence methodology and permitted the Board to use a mixed approach for costs that were partly committed and partly subject to managerial discretion.

The Board’s disallowance of $145 million in compensation costs was found reasonable, and its original decision was reinstated.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the auditors’ appeal and confirmed that an expert witness must be able and willing to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan assistance to the court as a threshold admissibility requirement, with remaining concerns about independence generally addressed at the gatekeeping weighing stage.

The appellant, Barclays Bank PLC, appealed a trial judgment finding its Notice of Early Termination of a complex asset-backed commercial paper transaction invalid and the respondent Devonshire Trust's Notice of Early Termination valid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that Barclays' notice was invalid due to its fraudulent misrepresentation, bad faith, and the principle that a party cannot benefit from its own wrong, as Barclays' failure to make liquidity payments contributed to Devonshire's insolvency.

The Court also upheld the validity of Devonshire's notice.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the calculation of Barclays' Settlement Amount, substituting a figure of $264 million for the trial judge's $12,000 valuation, subject to deductions for mitigation.

The self-represented applicants brought a motion for an extension of time to file their Notice of Appeal.

The court found that the applicants had served a Notice of Appeal within the prescribed time limits but failed to file it with the court.

Despite a lengthy delay, the court was satisfied that the applicants intended to proceed with the appeal and that the respondent would not suffer undue prejudice.

The motion was granted, with strict timelines imposed for perfecting the appeal.

The self-represented applicants brought a motion for an extension of time to file their Notice of Appeal.

The court found that while the delay was lengthy, the applicants had served the Notice of Appeal within the prescribed time limits but failed to file it with the court.

Finding no undue prejudice to the respondent and that the appeal was not entirely without merit, the court granted the extension of time and set a strict timetable for perfection.

Following a prior decision staying a motion for summary judgment pending discovery, the court addressed costs of the motion.

The responding party sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the motion had been unreasonable and premature, while the moving parties requested partial indemnity costs payable in the cause.

The court considered Rule 20.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the circumstances surrounding the premature motion.

Although the motion had disrupted the orderly discovery process, the court concluded that much of the work product would remain useful in the continuing litigation.

The court exercised its discretion to award a fixed costs amount rather than substantial indemnity or costs in the cause.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of non-competition and non-solicitation agreements.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it was premature as the defendants had failed to produce relevant documents and there were significant credibility issues between the key affiants.

The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that the motion was premature and could not be disposed of without full discovery and the exchange of affidavits of documents.

The motion for summary judgment was stayed pending the completion of these steps.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims for malicious prosecution and defamation against the police services board and several officers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the claims were not properly pleaded until 2002 and were therefore statute-barred under the applicable limitation periods, including the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.