Laurence A. Pattillo

The applicant sought orders requiring the respondents, Srul Erlich and Tamara Erlich, to undergo capacity assessments and to prevent them from dissipating trust property or their cottage.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable grounds to believe that either Srul or Tamara were incapable or that assessments were required, giving weight to existing medical opinions and the respondents' wishes.

This costs endorsement followed a discharge motion for an interim receiver.

The Interim Receiver and Fasken, Martineau DuMoulin LLP sought substantial indemnity costs against Nyaz Jethwani, who had opposed the discharge and fee approvals.

The court found Jethwani was not a public interest litigant and was responsible for costs incurred due to his opposition.

However, the offers to settle did not meet Rule 49 requirements, and Jethwani's conduct, while causing unnecessary costs, was not reprehensible enough for substantial indemnity.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Interim Receiver ($75,000) and Faskens ($54,000), plus $2,500 each for the costs motion itself.

The applicants sought to vary a previous judgment regarding the valuation of BitRush shares for cancellation due to misappropriation and to obtain additional relief including a buyout of the respondents' shares or cancellation of shares for unpaid costs.

The court allowed the amendment to the share valuation, reducing it from $0.09/share to $0.005/share for the purpose of compensating BitRush for misappropriated funds, thereby increasing the number of shares to be cancelled.

The court dismissed the requests for a buyout of the respondents' remaining shares and for the cancellation of shares to satisfy the costs order, but ordered that the respondents could not vote their remaining shares until costs were paid.

The applicant, the common-law spouse of the deceased, brought a motion for interim support under the Succession Law Reform Act pending the final determination of her dependant's support application.

The deceased was a wealthy real estate developer who left his entire estate to his estranged wife and daughters.

The court rejected the applicant's budget of over $93,000 per month as unsubstantiated and overstated, instead awarding $30,000 per month in interim support.

The court dismissed the applicant's requests for interim legal fees, HST indemnification, and production of the deceased's estate planning files.

The court also granted the estate's cross-motion in part, imposing restrictions on the applicant's use of the estate-owned condominium, including a 15-person guest limit and a ban on posting interior photos on social media.

The applicant invested in three commercial properties structured as trust arrangements with the respondents.

Following an Ontario Securities Commission investigation into the respondents for trading unregistered securities, the respondents were ordered to rectify deficiencies.

The respondents unilaterally terminated the applicant's investment agreements and purported to divest his units using a formula that did not provide fair market value, claiming this returned him to his pre-investment position.

The applicant sought relief for breach of contract and oppression under the Business Corporations Act.

The court found that the respondents breached the agreements and acted oppressively by unfairly prejudicing the applicant's interests.

The court ordered the respondents to pay fair market value for the units as of the date the applicant stopped making payments, and established a valuation process.

The applicant sought to appoint a receiver over the respondents and approve a stalking horse sale process for their jointly owned properties.

A third party, NASG, opposed the vesting orders, claiming a constructive trust over the properties due to alleged scrap metal theft.

The court found NASG's contingent claim did not prevent a vesting order, as monetary damages would be adequate and the receiver would hold net sale proceeds.

However, the court refused to approve the stalking horse agreement because the proposed $500,000 break fee and $150,000 overbid fee were excessive and unjustified.

The court appointed the receiver but required the applicant to revise the sale process.

The bankrupt appealed a Master's order dismissing his application for discharge from bankruptcy.

The Master had found the bankrupt failed to disclose his financial affairs and met several criteria under s. 173(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act for refusing a discharge.

On appeal, the bankrupt sought to introduce fresh evidence, claimed cross-examination by the creditor's counsel was an abuse of process, and alleged factual errors by the Master.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence failed the Palmer test, the cross-examination was procedurally fair, and the Master made no palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed his application alleging racial discrimination and reprisal against a newspaper, a hospital, and a press council.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success was reasonable.

The Court also dismissed the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness, reasonable apprehension of bias, and systemic oppression against self-represented litigants.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The respondent, an Anishnaabe elder, commenced a human rights application alleging that the use of the 'Cleveland Indians' team name and logo at the Rogers Centre constituted discrimination.

The applicant brought a motion challenging the tribunal's jurisdiction, arguing the matter fell under federal trademark law.

The tribunal issued an interim decision dismissing the motion.

The applicant sought judicial review of this interim decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review as premature, finding that it did not raise a true question of jurisdiction and there were no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the administrative proceedings.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) upholding a Hearing Officer's penalty requiring her to resign or face termination.

The applicant had pleaded guilty to discreditable conduct and deceit for submitting 15 fraudulent massage therapy benefits claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the OCPC reasonably applied the standard of review, properly deferred to the Hearing Officer's weighing of the Krug factors and usefulness test, and reasonably concluded that the penalty of dismissal was within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellants, minority shareholders of an insolvent corporation, appealed a motion judge's order granting partial summary judgment dismissing their claims for damages for oppression, breach of contract, and tort.

The motion judge found no evidence that the respondents' alleged wrongful conduct caused the appellants' damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the dismissal of the damages claims, confirming that causation and compensable injury are required for an oppression claim under the Business Corporations Act.

The court made a minor amendment to the order to correct an accidental error regarding declaratory relief, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed an order expunging a secretly recorded transcript of a without-prejudice meeting from their judicial review application record.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a 'hint of compromise' is not an essential element of the test for settlement privilege, particularly for oral communications in a meeting convened to resolve a dispute.

The court also found that the public interest exception did not apply, as the appellants' desire to use the communications to bolster their allegations did not outweigh the public interest in encouraging settlement.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also denied.

Apotex brought an action against MDS (now Nordion) for breach of contract and negligence arising from bioequivalence studies conducted by MDS for Apotex's generic drug applications to the FDA.

The FDA refused to accept the studies due to MDS's failure to comply with U.S. regulatory requirements, forcing Apotex to repeat or certify the studies and delaying the launch of its drugs.

The court found MDS breached the Master Laboratory Services Agreement and its duty of care.

The court rejected MDS's defences regarding standing and the limitation period.

Apotex was awarded over $11.3 million in damages for the costs of repeating/certifying the studies and for lost profits due to the delayed market entry.

The applicant, a self-represented lawyer, brought a motion within his application for judicial review regarding adoption disclosure.

He sought orders requiring the respondent Children's Aid Society to file a proper response to a Request to Admit, file a complete Record of Proceedings, permit him to file his own affidavit, and permit a 45-page factum.

The court dismissed the motion except for allowing the applicant to file his own affidavit, finding the respondent's 'not relevant' responses to the Request to Admit were proper and the Record of Proceedings was complete.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision denying her request to convert her non-economic loss (NEL) benefit from a lump sum to a monthly payment retroactive to 1993.

The applicant argued that her cumulative NEL awards exceeded the statutory threshold for monthly payments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's interpretation of section 42 of the Workers Compensation Act—that the threshold applies to the amount of compensation as it is awarded, rather than cumulatively—was reasonable.

The applicants sought relief under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act, alleging that the respondent Werner Boehm, as CEO and directing mind of MezzaCap Investments Ltd., engaged in oppressive conduct.

This included failing to secure technology rights for BitRush, misappropriating company assets (AdBit subsidiary and funds), and refusing to certify financial statements, leading to a cease trade order.

The court found Boehm's conduct oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, and in breach of fiduciary duty.

Remedies granted included declarations of oppression, orders for specific share transfers from MezzaCap Investments to Dr. Kalcher and HSRC Investments Pte.

Ltd. to rectify unfulfilled agreements, and cancellation of MezzaCap Investments' shares equivalent to misappropriated funds.

Other requested relief, such as cancellation of all remaining shares based on pre-RTO misrepresentations, was dismissed.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario regarding the respondent insured's entitlement to income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Director's Delegate had upheld the arbitrator's award of income replacement benefits but remitted other issues for re-hearing due to inadequate reasons.

The insurer argued the Director's Delegate breached procedural fairness and provided inadequate reasons by not remitting all issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness and concluding that the Director's Delegate's reasons were adequate and reasonable.

The moving party school board brought a motion before a single judge of the Divisional Court to dismiss the responding party union's application for judicial review for delay.

The underlying application sought review of arbitration awards concerning a wrongful dismissal grievance.

The single judge held that unless the determination of a motion to dismiss for delay is so clear as to leave no doubt, it should be decided by the full panel hearing the application.

Finding the issues were not clear enough for a single judge to determine, the court adjourned the motion to the full panel.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to attend an examination in aid of execution, arguing the Master erred because she had filed for bankruptcy two days prior, triggering an automatic stay under s. 69.3(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent argued the underlying default judgment declared the debt survived bankruptcy under s. 178(1).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that s. 178(1) applies to discharge, not the automatic stay, and the Master erred in granting the order while the stay was in effect.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her wrongful dismissal claim.

She was terminated during her six-month probationary period for failing to comply with a scent-free policy and altering patent applications contrary to instructions.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient to explain that the employer acted in good faith, and there was no palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence.