Laurence A. Pattillo

The appellant law firm appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim against the respondent.

The appellant had sued the respondent for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation (later characterized as defamation) over a disputed document report the respondent authored under a pseudonym, which the appellant's former client allegedly used to accuse the appellant of forgery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of a causal connection between the report and the former client's actions.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy and ordering her eviction after her sons were arrested in the unit for possessing an illegal handgun and drugs.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness when the Board proceeded with the hearing in her absence after she left to seek medical attention for a toothache without waiting for a ruling on her adjournment request.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of natural justice in proceeding in her absence and no error in the Board's conclusion that possessing an illegal handgun impaired the safety and reasonable enjoyment of other tenants.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to strike a jury notice and granting the respondent's motion for late delivery of a jury notice in a consolidated action involving a denied life insurance claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered the test for late jury notices, including the circumstances of delay and lack of prejudice.

The Court also upheld the finding that the respondent's claim, while framed as seeking a declaration of entitlement to a $400,000 death benefit, was in pith and substance a claim for monetary damages, and therefore a jury notice was permissible.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her discrimination complaint against the Regional Municipality of Peel.

The HRTO had dismissed the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding that the substance of her complaint regarding social assistance eligibility and shelter allowance had already been appropriately dealt with by the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The Divisional Court held that the HRTO's decision was reasonable and that the applicant's benefits were assessed based on her own application and a reasonable interpretation of the regulations, not discrimination.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The Interim Receiver, A. Farber & Partners Inc., moved for approval of its fees and disbursements, and those of other professionals, incurred over a 15-year receivership, along with its discharge and other related orders.

The plaintiff, Nyaz Jethwani, opposed the motion, primarily objecting to the quantum of fees and certain actions of the Interim Receiver.

The court found the Interim Receiver's fees and actions to be fair, reasonable, and commercially prudent, dismissing all of Jethwani's objections.

The court approved the fees, discharged the Interim Receiver, and ordered reimbursement for personal payments made by Farber.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court judgment awarding them a reduced amount for motor vehicle storage charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review cannot be used as a surrogate right of appeal where the legislature has expressly restricted appeal rights for Small Claims Court decisions under $2,500 pursuant to section 31 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff shareholder brought a motion to appoint an interim receiver-manager for the defendant corporation, alleging oppressive conduct by management and the board of directors.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the oppression action.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding he failed to establish a strong prima facie case of oppression, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured the appointment.

The court also dismissed the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff raised serious issues requiring a trial and that the claims were not clearly statute-barred.

The plaintiff, Schroeder & Schroeder Inc. (SSI), and the defendants, Stewardship Ontario (SO) and Canadian Stewardship Services Alliance Inc. (CSSA), brought cross-motions for summary judgment.

SSI claimed damages for breach of the Copyright Act, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and breach of contract related to the sub-licensing of an enterprise information software system (EIS System) it helped implement for SO.

SSI asserted intellectual property rights in the system.

The defendants sought dismissal of the action, arguing SSI had no intellectual property rights in the EIS System, which they contended belonged to SAP.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the issues, particularly regarding SSI's copyright in the EIS System and the technical aspects of its configuration, required a trial and could not be resolved on the existing evidence.

A credibility issue regarding discoverability of the sub-license also precluded summary judgment on the limitations defence.

Liberty Silver Corporation sought indemnification from Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. for legal costs incurred by its officers and directors during an investigation by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).

Liberty Insurance denied coverage, arguing the investigative order and subpoenas did not constitute a "Claim" against an "Insured Person" for a "Wrongful Act" and that Liberty Silver was no longer "legally obligated to pay" due to an assignment agreement.

The court found the investigative order was a "formal regulatory investigation" and thus a "Claim" and that a holistic interpretation of the policy meant "Wrongful Act" included matters giving rise to such an investigation.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the assignment agreement and statute of limitations.

The application for indemnification was allowed, and Liberty Silver's proposed allocation of defence costs was accepted.

The Vria Parties (defendants by counterclaim) moved to strike the Fresh as Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim against them, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action or was frivolous/vexatious.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was procedurally barred because the Vria Parties had already filed a defence to the original counterclaim, which contained the same causes of action.

The court also found the motion was not brought promptly, as required for Rule 21.01 motions, especially in a complex, case-managed proceeding.

The plaintiff, a former dental student, sued the University of Toronto and individual professors for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty following her withdrawal from an Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery and Anaesthesia program due to substandard academic performance.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction over academic matters, the plaintiff had resolved the dispute by voluntarily withdrawing from the program without academic penalty, and the claim was statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action on all three grounds.

It found that the essential character of the plaintiff's claims related to academic evaluation, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the University's internal appeal process.

Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiff's acceptance of the offer to withdraw without academic penalty constituted a binding agreement to resolve her academic dispute, precluding a subsequent action.

Finally, the court held that the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the facts to commence her claim by June 2009 at the latest, making her September 2011 action outside the two-year limitation period.

The respondents moved to stay or dismiss the applicants' oppression remedy application under the Business Corporations Act, challenging the Ontario court's jurisdiction and arguing *forum non conveniens*.

They also sought to set aside service and argued the application was frivolous or vexatious.

The court found Ontario had jurisdiction due to the corporation's domicile and the exclusive jurisdiction of s. 248 of the OBCA.

The *forum non conveniens* argument was rejected as no alternate forum could hear the OBCA claims.

Service was deemed proper, and the frivolous/vexatious argument was dismissed.

The Trustee of WF Canada Ltd. applied under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) to recover $411,000 from Rocky Racca and Jessica Agostino, alleging transfers at undervalue.

The application proceeded as a trial of an issue.

The court found that Racca received $389,000 in transfers at undervalue from WF Canada Ltd. after Liquid Capital became a creditor, and ordered him to repay this amount to the estate.

The court dismissed the application against Agostino, finding she was neither a party nor privy to the transfers, as she was not involved in the loans or the operation of the joint account into which the funds were deposited, and received no benefit.

The Third Parties, Jimmy K. Sun and Sun Partners, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' Third Party Claim for contribution and indemnity.

The motion was based on the expiry of the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that Section 18 of the Act establishes an absolute two-year limitation period from the date the first alleged wrongdoer was served with the claim, and that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to extend this period.

The Third Party Claim was commenced more than two years after the defendants were served with the Statement of Claim.

The applicant sought an order approving the sale of its assets to a purchaser under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The transaction was a credit-bid that would result in the continuation of a substantial portion of the business, saving jobs and stores.

An unsecured creditor objected because the transaction did not treat all unsecured creditors equally, as the purchaser assumed only certain critical supplier liabilities.

The court approved the transaction, finding that under s. 36 of the CCAA, there is no requirement that all creditors be treated equally in a sale, and the transaction was more beneficial than a liquidation.

The applicant, a certified general accountant, sought judicial review of decisions by the Professional Conduct Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal finding him guilty of professional misconduct, revoking his membership, and imposing fines and costs.

The Divisional Court held that the Appeal Tribunal lacked standing to argue the merits of the application.

On the merits, the Court found the Liability Decision unreasonable because it lacked adequate reasons and relied on purely formulaic, conclusory credibility findings without analyzing the evidence.

The decisions were set aside and the matter remitted for a rehearing before a differently constituted panel.

The applicant sought interim dependants' support of $45,000 under the Succession Law Reform Act, claiming she was the common law spouse of the deceased.

The respondents, the deceased's daughters and family, disputed the relationship, providing conflicting evidence that the deceased did not cohabit with the applicant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that due to the conflicting affidavit evidence and lack of independent corroboration, the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case or special circumstances justifying interim funding.

The appellant appealed an order confirming a worldwide Mareva injunction against him, arguing that an Ontario court cannot grant such an injunction when the defendant has no assets in the jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court's in personam jurisdiction allows it to grant a Mareva injunction even if the defendant has no assets in Ontario, provided it is just and convenient.

The court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to accept an undertaking as to damages from a foreign corporate non-party.

The defendant general contractor brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff subcontractor's action, obtain default judgment on its counterclaim, and cancel a lien bond.

The plaintiff had abandoned the action after its counsel was removed from the record.

Another subcontractor opposed the cancellation of the lien bond, arguing it should be pooled to cover its own costs and interest.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, granted default judgment on the counterclaim, and ordered the lien bond cancelled, finding that the pooling provisions of the Construction Lien Act did not apply where all liens had been bonded off.

The court fixed costs for the Estate of Robert MacNeil and an individual personally at $75,000, to be paid by the respondent.

The costs were allocated $55,000 to the Estate and $20,000 to the individual personally.

The court directed that the respondent's share of townhouse proceeds ($24,624.42) be paid to his counsel for fees and a mediator's invoice, and the remaining costs be paid from the respondent's 5% interest in the Estate.

The court declined to recognize the respondent's counsel's claim for a charging order.