Laurence A. Pattillo

The appellant bank appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for constructive dismissal.

The respondent, a senior manager, was relieved of his supervisory duties following employee complaints and offered reassignment options, which he declined.

The trial judge found he was constructively dismissed and had no duty to mitigate by accepting the new positions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the Evans test, as returning to the bank would have subjected the respondent to an atmosphere of embarrassment or humiliation.

The appellant appealed four orders striking out his Statements of Claim against the City of Hamilton and the Government of Ontario.

The claims involved allegations of failure to fund employment assistance programs, failure to ensure a competitive job market, and requests for the legislature to enact laws addressing alleged abuses of power.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judges that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action or were outside the purview of the courts.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its negligence claim against the respondent electrician, alleging the respondent damaged an armoured cable during installation, causing a fire.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's denial of severely abusing or yanking the cable, which rebutted the presumption of negligence suggested by the jointly retained expert.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or the adequacy of his reasons, and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with robbery after presenting a demand note to a bank teller and taking approximately $400.

He admitted committing the robbery but argued he acted under duress, claiming an unknown armed individual in a vehicle forced him to carry out the offence and threatened to shoot his friend if he refused.

The court held that s. 17 of the Criminal Code excludes the defence of duress for robbery and that, absent a constitutional challenge, the statutory exclusion remained operative.

In the alternative, the court assessed the common law defence of duress and rejected it, finding the accused’s testimony not credible and concluding that the alleged threats were fabricated and unsupported by the evidence.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the robbery voluntarily.

The appellant bank appealed an order enforcing a settlement under Rule 49.09.

The motion judge had concluded that the parties agreed to a reduced mortgage payout of $357,000 based on two letters between counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a reversible error by failing to read the correspondence in the context of the entire negotiation history.

An objective reading of the full correspondence demonstrated there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term of the mortgage payout amount, and therefore no settlement was reached.

Sentencing decision following convictions for sexual interference involving a minor where the offender had developed a relationship of trust with the child’s family.

The court conditionally stayed related convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation under the Kienapple principle because they arose from the same factual circumstances as the sexual interference counts.

The offender had abused a position of trust over a period of several months, resulting in significant psychological harm to the complainant and her family.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for sexual offences against children.

A global sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody and orders for DNA sampling and sex offender registry compliance.

The appellant appealed a judgment that effectively granted default judgment on a motion that only sought a writ of possession.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that an earlier default judgment had been set aside and not reinstated, and that the materials filed in support of the motion were inadequate to support the relief requested.

The judgment and writs of possession were set aside.

The appellant contractor commenced an action more than two years after the last work was completed and more than two years after a reasonably-timed invoice would have been sent and payment made or refused.

The motion judge concluded the action was barred by the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision and dismissed the appeal.

The parties resolved the matter in terms of a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs in accordance with the settlement.

In an extradition committal hearing, the moving party sought an order committing the responding party for extradition to face drug conspiracy prosecution in the United States.

The court held that the responding party's affidavit evidence was inadmissible because it largely advanced defence evidence and did not establish manifest unreliability in the requesting state's record.

Applying the Extradition Act committal test, the court found sufficient evidence on each essential element of the corresponding Canadian offence and found identity established on a balance of probabilities.

The court rejected challenges to identification reliability as matters for trial and ordered committal for extradition.

Following a summary judgment decision where the plaintiffs successfully obtained a declaration that the primary insurer was required to advance defence costs under a D&O policy, the court determined costs and pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiffs were awarded full indemnity costs against the primary insurer due to the breach of the duty to defend.

The court declined to issue a Bullock or Sanderson Order, finding it was the plaintiffs' decision to continue their claim against the excess insurers, who were awarded partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiffs.

Following settlement of a medical negligence action arising from a patient’s stroke while recovering from neurosurgery, the hospital pursued a cross‑claim for contribution under s. 2 of the Negligence Act against a nurse and her staffing agency employer.

The court found that the primary care nurse failed to properly assess neurological deterioration, failed to recognize hemiplegia, inadequately documented patient status, and failed to escalate concerns to obtain timely physician assessment.

The charge nurse also breached the standard of care by failing to properly assess the patient and failing to ensure that physicians were promptly paged and attended.

Applying the “but for” test with a robust and pragmatic approach to causation, the court inferred that earlier diagnosis and treatment of vasospasm would likely have reduced the extent of neurological injury.

Because the respective degrees of fault between the two nurses could not be determined, liability was apportioned equally under the Negligence Act.