LaForme

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault arising from a gunfight on Yonge Street that resulted in the death of Jane Creba by a stray bullet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on how armed persons conceal firearms, by inadequately instructing the jury on the mutual gunfight theory of causation, and by refusing to leave self-defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that self-defence lacked an air of reality.

The Crown appealed an order granting the respondent state-funded counsel of choice (a Fisher order) for his first-degree murder trial.

The application judge had conditionally stayed the charge until the state negotiated compensation with the respondent's chosen counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to produce sufficient evidence to meet the narrow exceptions established in Peterman for state-funded counsel of choice.

The order was set aside, though the Crown had agreed to fund the chosen counsel regardless of the appeal's outcome.

The appellant condominium corporations sought a declaration that they owned a clubhouse within their development and that a mortgage granted by the respondent developer was void or subordinate to their interests.

The developer had retained legal title to the clubhouse, but the disclosure statements provided for its future conveyance to the appellants once the developer no longer owned any lands in the project.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the disclosure statements did not constitute an executory contract of purchase and sale.

Consequently, the appellants did not have an equitable interest in the clubhouse capable of registration under the Land Titles Act, and the developer was entitled to mortgage the property.

The parties entered into an agreement where the respondent would solicit new customers for the appellant in exchange for a 5% commission.

After the appellant terminated the agreement, a dispute arose over whether commissions were owed for ongoing sales to customers brought in by the respondent.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, finding the agreement required ongoing payments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's contractual interpretation, rejecting the defence of non est factum because the appellant failed to read the agreement, and finding no denial of procedural fairness regarding the appellant's equitable set-off claim.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering it to repay approximately $2.3 million in loans to the deceased's estate.

On appeal, the appellant argued for the first time that the action was statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act, and that the trial judge erred in finding the limitation period was restarted by its acknowledgment of the debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain the new Trustee Act argument and finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's correspondence and partial payments restarted the limitation period.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

At the close of the Crown's case, the trial judge initiated an in-chambers discussion with counsel, in the absence of the accused, suggesting a plea bargain to a lesser offence.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding this meeting and held that the discussion violated the accused's right to be present during his trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the trial judge's actions compromised trial fairness and the presumption of innocence, rendering the curative proviso inapplicable.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a motion judge's decision that allowed an Ontario supervisory judge to sit outside the province with judges from British Columbia and Quebec to hear motions regarding a national class action settlement, without requiring a video link to an Ontario courtroom.

The Court of Appeal held that while superior courts have the inherent jurisdiction to conduct hearings outside their home province, the open court principle under section 135 of the Courts of Justice Act requires a video link to a reasonably accessible Ontario courtroom.

The appeal was allowed to amend the order to require a video link.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

During the hearing, the Court of Appeal discovered the Crown had proceeded summarily at trial, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction.

Because the court had already publicly dismissed the appeal on its merits, a panel judge was authorized under s. 13 of the Courts of Justice Act to sit as a Superior Court justice to hear the matter as a summary conviction appeal.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but the sexual assault count was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the SOIRA order was varied to 10 years.

The appellant, an 18-year-old first offender, appealed his 10-year sentence for manslaughter arising from a home invasion robbery where his partner shot the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made two errors in principle: failing to properly consider the appellant's rehabilitative potential, and failing to address his level of culpability regarding foresight of the risk that the gun would be used.

The Court found the appellant had objective, but not actual, foresight of the risk, representing a lower level of culpability.

The sentence was reduced to 7 years, resulting in an effective sentence of 3 years and 8 months after pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of touching for a sexual purpose, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding delayed disclosure and alleged recovered memories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully scrutinized the evidence, properly accounted for the historical nature of the offences, and made no palpable and overriding error in finding the complainant credible and reliable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were responsive to the defence's argument that the complainant attempted to frame the appellant.

The Court also declined to admit the fresh evidence, concluding it could not reasonably undermine the complainant's credibility on material issues.

The appellant appealed his sentence of eight years' imprisonment for firearms offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and the denial of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 enhanced credit for 433 days of pre-trial custody because minor institutional misconduct did not justify an inference that the appellant would be denied statutory release.

However, the court upheld the eight-year sentence, finding it appropriate for a repeat offender whose conduct fell at the 'true crime' end of the spectrum, regardless of the trial judge's reliance on an unconstitutional mandatory minimum.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing it should be reduced to under six months to avoid significant immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis of an error in principle but found that a sentence of six months was well outside the appropriate range given the appellant's serious criminal background and numerous violations of court orders.

As immigration consequences cannot justify a sentence outside the appropriate range, and the appellant had already served the sentence, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers.

The appellant was granted 1.5 to 1 credit for all pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 5 months of credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge failed to make a finding of causation regarding whether the complainant's wounds were caused during a swarming in a parking lot or by flying glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the inescapable inference from the trial judge's reasons was that the wounds were caused during the parking lot assault, consistent with the Crown's theory and the complainant's accepted testimony.

In an addendum to a previous decision allowing the appeal and restoring the Ontario Labour Relations Board's decision, the Court of Appeal clarified the timeline for an estoppel period.

Responding to a letter from the respondent's counsel, the court confirmed its intention that the new two-year estoppel period originally set by the OLRB would start again on the date of the court's decision.

The applicant, convicted of preventing electors from voting in the 2011 federal election and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his sentence appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would surrender into custody but argued the appeal was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding the sentence appeal raised arguable issues given the novelty of the offence, and that the public interest favoured release to ensure the appeal would not be rendered moot before it could be heard.

The respondent perfected a construction lien and set the action down for trial within the two-year limitation period under s. 37(1) of the Construction Lien Act.

However, the respondent failed to file a defence to the appellant's counterclaim before setting the action down, contrary to Rule 48.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant moved to discharge the lien, arguing the setting down was a nullity.

The Court of Appeal held that setting the action down while pleadings were open was a procedural irregularity curable by Rule 2.01.

Curing the irregularity did not have the effect of extending the strict two-year limitation period, as the action was factually set down within the required timeframe.

The appellant unions appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board ruling.

The Board had admitted a photocopy of the 1958 Sarnia Working Agreement into evidence as a business record and ancient document, finding it created province-wide bargaining rights binding the respondent employer.

The Board also found the unions were estopped from enforcing the agreement for two years due to representations made in 2000.

The Divisional Court ruled the document inadmissible and substituted a permanent estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court failed to show deference to the Board's evidentiary rulings and remedial discretion, restoring the Board's original decision.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing the action against the respondent vehicle owner.

The driver, who was impaired and caused a fatal accident, admitted he did not have the owner's consent to drive the vehicle.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by applying a purely subjective test for implied consent and by not directing a trial of the issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered all evidence and credibility, and correctly concluded he could resolve the dispute on summary judgment.