La Forest

Appeal from an order staying the public hearings of a provincial inquiry into a fatal mine explosion while criminal proceedings against certain mine managers were pending.

The Court held that the inquiry served a legitimate and pressing public purpose, and that the accused managers were compellable witnesses subject to constitutional protections against use of their testimony and derivative evidence.

The Court rejected a broad stay as the appropriate remedy for anticipated prejudice, emphasizing that fair trial concerns from publicity ordinarily should be addressed through narrower measures such as publication restrictions and by the commissioner in the first instance.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of the public hearings was set aside.

The respondent leased two helicopters to Pegasus Helicopters under agreements containing an option to purchase at fair market value.

The leases were not registered under the Conditional Sales Act.

When Pegasus defaulted on its bank loans, the appellant bank appointed a receiver.

The respondent claimed priority to the helicopters, arguing the leases were not conditional sales.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the leases contained true options to purchase, giving the lessee the unilateral right to compel a sale, and therefore fell within the definition of a conditional sale under the Act.

Because the leases were unregistered, the respondent's reservation of title was void against the appellants.

The appellants, who were either charged or suspects in connection with an explosion and fire, were subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiries of other accused persons separately charged with the same offence.

The appellants applied to quash the subpoenas, arguing that compelling them to testify would violate their right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants were compellable witnesses and that section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act does not infringe section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found no evidence that the subpoenas were a form of pre-trial interrogation or otherwise objectionable, noting that the witnesses would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination at any subsequent proceedings against them.

The appellant, who was charged with first degree murder, was subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiry of another individual separately charged with the same murder.

The appellant sought to quash the subpoena, arguing that compelling his testimony would violate his right to silence and protection against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, treating the appellant's application as tantamount to a certiorari application under the Dagenais framework.

On the merits, the Court held that the appellant was compellable, as the predominant purpose of the subpoena was not to incriminate him, and he would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination in his own subsequent proceedings.

The British Columbia Securities Commission commenced an investigation into a company following a report disclosing questionable expenditures.

The appellants, two officers of the company, were served with summonses compelling their attendance for examination under oath and requiring them to produce records pursuant to s. 128(1) of the Securities Act.

The appellants challenged the summonses, arguing that s. 128(1) violated their rights against self-incrimination under s. 7 and their right against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the predominant purpose of the inquiry was regulatory rather than penal, and thus did not violate s. 7.

The Court also held that the compelled production of documents did not violate s. 8, given the lower expectation of privacy in a highly regulated industry.

The appellant drove his boat through a known swimming area at considerable speed without keeping a proper lookout, striking and fatally injuring a swimmer.

He was convicted of dangerous operation of a vessel.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the trial judge applied the proper test for the offence as set out in R. v. Hundal.

The majority held that although the trial judge erred by applying a stricter subjective mens rea test rather than the modified objective test, no miscarriage of justice occurred given the strong evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed using the curative proviso.

The appellant and a co-accused were jointly tried and convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, each blamed the other.

The appellant testified, but had not given a pre-trial statement to the police.

The co-accused did not testify but had given a pre-trial statement.

Counsel for the co-accused cross-examined the appellant on his pre-trial silence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could consider the appellant's silence in assessing his guilt.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a co-accused may cross-examine an accused on pre-trial silence to make full answer and defence and attack credibility, the jury must be strictly instructed that such silence cannot be used as positive evidence of guilt.

The trial judge's instructions were fatally flawed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for theft and fraud to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal in a brief oral judgment, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's convictions.

As no prejudice was argued, the Court found no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that reversed his acquittal on a charge of obstruction of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant undertook to advise police officers when they would be needed as witnesses.

The Court held that the appellant did not make a false statement to the court or withhold information he was legally obliged to disclose, although his conduct was ethically inexcusable.

The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in sentencing on the most aggravating factual basis when the jury's verdict was supportable on any one of three factual bases and was not particularized.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to depart from the established law regarding sentencing.

The appellant appealed a substituted conviction on an over-80 charge arising from erratic driving and breathalyzer readings of 180 mg.

The central issue was whether evidence that the accused consumed alcohol while waiting for breath testing was 'evidence to the contrary' under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that s. 258(1)(c) creates a temporal presumption of identity, distinct from the presumption of accuracy, and that rebuttal evidence need only show the blood alcohol level at driving differed from the level at testing, not that it was below the legal limit.

Because the Crown led no other evidence to establish the blood alcohol level at the time of the offence, the acquittal was restored.

The accused was charged with sexual offences.

The complainant sued the provincial government, alleging a social worker negligently ignored her complaints.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that the Department of Justice was in a conflict of interest because it employed both the Crown prosecutor in the criminal case and the government counsel in the civil action.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had not established any conflict of interest or appearance thereof that would affect his right to a fair prosecution.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to traffic in narcotics, challenging the validity of a wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, substantially agreeing with the lower court's reasons regarding the lawful obtaining of the first authorization and the police's use of the 'resort to' clause.

One justice would have dismissed the appeal solely on the basis of the curative proviso in section 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that overturned a trial judge's order staying proceedings.

The trial judge had granted the stay because the Crown failed to produce the original statement and tape, providing only copies and a transcript.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown fulfilled its disclosure obligations by producing copies and explaining the absence of the originals, which did not reveal any misconduct.

The Court also found no merit in the appellant's argument regarding a violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused stabbed and killed the deceased during an altercation.

At trial for second degree murder, the accused claimed self-defence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the self-defence justification under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code was not available if the accused was the initial aggressor, reading in the words 'without having provoked the assault' from s. 34(1).

The accused was convicted of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 34(2) is clear on its face and is available to an initial aggressor.

The Court emphasized that ambiguous penal provisions must be interpreted in the manner most favourable to the accused.

The appellants were charged with break and enter and theft.

Prior to trial, they requested the Crown to disclose whether they were targets of any wiretap authorizations unrelated to the current charges.

The Crown confirmed there were no wiretaps pertaining to the current investigation but refused to confirm or deny the existence of other authorizations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where the Crown disputes the existence of requested material, the defence must establish a basis to conclude that potentially relevant material exists before the Crown is required to justify non-disclosure.

As the appellants' request was purely speculative, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and respondents held competing claims to mineral rights in a parcel of land under the Torrens system.

The appellant claimed priority through a lease caveated in 1976, which he acquired by assignment in 1979.

The respondents claimed through a chain of interests originating from an agreement of sale caveated in 1969, but that caveat had lapsed in 1978.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the lapse of a caveat results in the loss of priority for the underlying interest vis-à-vis other encumbrancers.

Furthermore, the appellant, as an assignee, stepped into the priority position of the original 1976 caveat, undiminished by the respondents' intervening caveats.

The appeal was allowed and the non-suit order was quashed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 11(3) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal and the trial judge's interpretation of the provision.

The decision of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the trial judge's order was restored.

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that an unfortunate reference during the jury recharge to inadmissible evidence tendered on a voir dire so affected the verdict on all three counts that a new trial was required, particularly because credibility was crucial to all charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule and the doctrine of reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that while the trial judge erred in the hearsay instruction, the error did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The jury must have accepted the credibility of a key witness, meaning the verdict would necessarily have been the same even with proper instructions.