R. v. Lord, 1995 CanLII 127 (SCC), [1995] 1 SCR 747

R. v. Lord, 1995 CanLII 127 (SCC), [1995] 1 SCR 747

Derek Christopher Lord Appellant

v.

Her Majesty The Queen Respondent

and

The Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General for Ontario Interveners

Indexed as: R. v. Lord

File No.: 23943.

1995: February 21.

Present: Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L'Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Cory, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia

Criminal law ‑‑ Evidence ‑‑ Hearsay ‑‑ Co‑conspirator's exception to hearsay rule ‑‑ Trial judge erring in charge with respect to the co‑conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule ‑‑ Verdict would have been same even absent error ‑‑ No substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

Cases Cited

R. v. Carter, 1982 CanLII 35 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 938.

APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (1993), 1993 CanLII 485 (BC CA), 36 B.C.A.C. 223, 58 W.A.C. 223, dismissing an appeal from conviction by Fisher J. sitting with jury. Appeal dismissed.

Donald R. Martin, for the appellant.

William F. Ehrcke, for the respondent.

S. David Frankel, Q.C., and Valerie L. Hartney, for the intervener Attorney General of Canada.

Renee M. Pomerance, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario.

//Sopinka J.//

The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by

1Sopinka J. ‑‑ We see no reason to depart from the jurisprudence of this Court that the co‑conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule applies to substantive offences in which evidence is introduced that acts were done or words spoken in furtherance of a common design to commit the offence.

2The application of the exception is authoritatively described in R. v. Carter, 1982 CanLII 35 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 938. With respect to its application here, we agree with Wood J.A., speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeal, that, although the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury with respect to the co‑conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, the error did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. Evidence directly admissible against the appellant to which resort could be had in order to invoke the exception was dependent on the credibility of Amanda Cousins. We agree with Wood J.A. that the jury must have accepted the evidence of Cousins and, therefore, had the proper instruction been given, the verdict would necessarily have been the same.

3We also agree with Wood J.A. and his reasons that, in the circumstances, there was no error with respect to the instructions to the jury on the doctrine of reasonable doubt.

4The appeal is dismissed.