K. Scott McLean

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing that no contract was formed as alleged by the plaintiff, or alternatively, that the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment in his favour, asserting a binding agreement for shares or a portion of sale proceeds.

The court granted the defendants' motion, finding that the parties were never bound to a legally enforceable agreement beyond the initial employment contract, which contained an "entire agreement" clause.

The court concluded there was no "meeting of the minds" on subsequent compensation arrangements and that the limitations period issue was moot given the lack of a discoverable claim.

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) moved to dismiss Best Theratronics Ltd.'s breach of contract action and set aside an injunction preventing The ICICI Bank of Canada from disbursing funds under a Standby Letter of Credit (SBLC).

Best Theratronics Ltd. cross-moved to extend the injunction.

The court found that a forum selection clause in the contract granted exclusive jurisdiction to South Korean courts for the main action between Best and South Korea, leading to a stay of those proceedings in Ontario.

However, the court extended the temporary injunction against The ICICI Bank of Canada, noting that the SBLC was governed by Ontario law and the Bank was not bound by the forum selection clause.

The injunction was continued on terms to allow Best to pursue remedies in South Korea, with provisions for its eventual termination.

The plaintiff, Richcraft Homes Ltd., initiated an action against several defendants, including Urbandale Corporation, Urbandale Construction Limited, and Lawrence Weinstein, seeking declaratory relief for oppressive conduct, breach of contract, and punitive damages related to land development projects.

The defendants brought motions under Rule 21 to strike Richcraft's claims, arguing they failed to plead material facts supporting a reasonable prospect of success.

The court granted the motions, finding that Richcraft did not demonstrate compensable injury or a likelihood of threatened oppressive conduct, nor an independent actionable wrong for punitive damages.

Leave to amend was denied due to the absence of proposed amendments or supporting evidence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for permitting an uninsured motor vehicle to be operated contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The vehicle was driven by her domestic partner without her explicit permission while the insurance had expired.

The trial judge convicted her on the basis that she failed to exercise due diligence.

On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, finding that the appellant's implied consent to the driver's use of the vehicle was established by circumstantial evidence, including their domestic relationship, shared residence, shared child, the driver's history of sporadic use of the vehicle, and the accessible location of the keys.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal and reduced the fine from $7,500 to $3,500, finding the original sentence was unfit given the appellant's lower moral culpability compared to deliberate offenders and the absence of aggravating factors.

Following an eight-day trial where the Ottawa Convention Centre Corporation (OCCC) succeeded on its claim and treefort Hip Productions Inc.'s counterclaim was dismissed, the court addressed the issue of costs.

OCCC sought substantial indemnity costs of over $400,000.

The court found that while OCCC's pre-litigation offer demonstrated reasonableness, it did not, by itself, warrant substantial indemnity costs.

However, treefort's unsubstantiated allegations of bad faith, fraud, and dishonesty against OCCC and its senior executives were deemed serious enough to fall into the "special and rare" category justifying substantial indemnity costs, limited to the costs of attending at trial.

The court awarded OCCC costs of $320,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The court was tasked with determining the fair market value of Thomas Scullion's 50% shareholding in the Munro & Scullion group of companies as a remedy for corporate deadlock and oppression.

The parties had agreed that Paul Munro would purchase Scullion's interest at fair market value, which was to be established by the court.

While the parties generally agreed with a court-appointed valuator's mid-range valuation of $4,348,800, Scullion sought to increase this based on three specific issues: bonding, catch basin revenues, and property valuations.

The court rejected Scullion's arguments, finding his claims speculative or based on flawed appraisal methodologies, and ultimately accepted the original valuation.

The Ottawa Convention Centre Corporation (OCCC) sued treefort Hip Productions Inc. (treefort) for an unpaid balance from the 2015 Ottawa Wine and Food Festival, and treefort counterclaimed, alleging OCCC breached long-term contractual obligations regarding hosting, scheduling, and booking protection.

The court found that the contractual relationship was limited to annual license agreements, which contained entire agreement clauses.

OCCC's repeated warnings that dates were not guaranteed, and the asset purchase agreement's terms, negated treefort's claims of implied long-term covenants.

The court dismissed treefort's counterclaim and granted OCCC judgment for the outstanding balance plus interest.

The applicants, representing taxi drivers and plate holders, sought to quash the City of Ottawa's 2016 Vehicle-for-Hire By-law, which created a separate regulatory regime for Private Transportation Companies (PTCs) like Uber.

The applicants argued the by-law was enacted in bad faith, granted an illegal bonus to PTCs, and was ultra vires.

The court dismissed the majority of the application, finding the City conducted extensive consultation, acted within its broad regulatory powers, and did not grant an undue advantage.

However, the court severed and quashed two specific provisions that were added to the by-law without notice to the stakeholders.

The defendant, Renfrew Power Generation Inc. (RPG), brought a motion to decertify a class action alleging trespass due to shoreline erosion caused by a raised lake level.

The original certification was based on the understanding that a 107.5 Contour Line defined all class members' property boundaries.

New survey evidence, obtained after certification, revealed that many class members' boundaries were not defined by this contour line, but by metes and bounds or other methods, and that RPG acquired flooding rights through various means not uniformly affecting all properties.

The court found that the common issue, as certified, was no longer necessary or a substantial ingredient for each class member's claim, as individual property boundary determinations were required.

The motion to decertify was granted.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim based on the expiration of the limitation period.

The plaintiff alleged misappropriation of software and breach of non-disclosure agreements and fiduciary duties.

The court applied the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding that the plaintiff did not discover its claim until September 11, 2009, when it confirmed the defendants authored the disputed software.

Consequently, the action, commenced on September 9, 2011, was within the two-year limitation period.

The court dismissed the limitation defense, granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff.

Secondary issues regarding discovery were adjourned or left to the trial judge.

This decision addresses a dispute over costs following a successful motion.

The Applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the Respondent requested that costs be reserved to the trial judge.

Applying Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles from *Intercontinental Forest Products SA v. Rugo* and *Rogers Cable TV Ltd. v. 373041Ontario Ltd.*, the court found that a trial was a virtual certainty and that the Applicant would not be substantially prejudiced by a delay.

Consequently, the court reserved the award of costs, including the basis of indemnity, to the trial judge.

The moving party, operator of an annual wine and food festival, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the responding party convention centre from licensing its venue to other parties during the first two weekends of November in 2016 and 2017.

The parties had failed to conclude a licensing agreement for 2016 due to a dispute over unpaid invoices from the 2015 event.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any increased costs or reduced revenues from holding the festival at an alternative venue would be compensable in damages.

The balance of convenience also favoured the responding party, who had already booked other events for the disputed dates.

The court determined costs following the disposition of a civil proceeding.

After considering the parties’ written cost submissions and the relative success of the parties, the court found that the plaintiff had been more successful than the defendants.

Applying the principle that costs should reflect the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs.

The defendants were ordered to pay costs of $13,000 plus HST and disbursements of $585.25.

Following a motion in which the defendants sought to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim, the court addressed the quantum of costs.

The plaintiff was substantially successful in resisting the primary relief sought, although the defendants succeeded in striking certain remedies and a declaration for breach of contract, and in dismissing a minor abuse of process motion.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success, proportionality, and the reasonable expectations of the losing party.

Given the divided success, the plaintiff’s entitlement to costs would be reduced.

The court directed the parties to exchange written submissions and a bill of costs regarding the quantum.

A former corporate director sought an order requiring the corporation to prepay legal expenses incurred in defending a civil action brought by a shareholder alleging non‑payment of promissory notes and related debt.

The applicant relied on a broad indemnity agreement providing indemnification and advancement of costs incurred by reason of acting as a director or officer.

The court held that, assuming the pleadings to be true, the legal proceedings against the applicant could have arisen from corporate disputes and attempts to force his resignation as chair of the board.

Because the indemnity agreement contemplated advancement of expenses unless bad faith was established and no such finding was made, the applicant was entitled to prepayment of reasonable legal costs subject to later repayment if indemnification was ultimately denied.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, which alleged breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate director.

The court struck the claims for a declaration of breach of contract, divesting the defendant of shares, and removing the defendant as a director, with leave to amend.

However, the court refused to strike the core claims for breach of fiduciary duty, disgorgement, and general damages, finding it was not plain and obvious that these claims would fail at trial.

In a class proceeding, the plaintiffs sought directions for a modified trial procedure to determine the first certified common issue concerning the interpretation of licences of occupation and whether they established a fixed property boundary through a contour line.

The defendant argued the issue should proceed by way of a summary judgment motion supported by affidavits and expert reports.

The court considered the “full appreciation” test for summary judgment and the anticipated need for contested expert survey evidence.

Concluding that summary proceedings would not allow adequate assessment of the expert evidence, the court directed that the common issue proceed by a modified trial procedure with expert reports, an agreed statement of facts, limited discovery, and viva voce expert testimony.

Case management conferences were ordered to establish timelines and further procedural directions.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after a motor vehicle collision on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The defendant struck the rear of another vehicle while momentarily taking her eyes off the road to grab her purse, which contained a sentimental glass object that was slipping out.

The court found that while the defendant's conduct fell below the standard of a prudent driver, it constituted only inadvertent negligence rather than conduct deserving of punishment.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving was either reckless or indicative of indifference to the safety of others.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant sought costs following a motion that combined a motion to strike the statement of claim and a motion for summary judgment.

The court had previously indicated the original pleading disclosed no viable cause of action and permitted the plaintiff to file a fresh amended statement of claim with costs thrown away.

The defendant claimed over $115,000 in costs, arguing the amended pleading introduced entirely new causes of action and rendered extensive preparation for the summary judgment motion wasted.

The court held that the costs relating to the summary judgment motion should be treated as costs in the cause because it was unclear whether the motion would ultimately have succeeded or whether it had been premature under the principles articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch.

Costs for the successful motion to strike were fixed and ordered payable immediately, while the balance relating to summary judgment was deferred pending the outcome of the action.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge was laid on May 17, 2010, and the trial was not completed until September 17, 2012, a period of 28 months.

The court applied the four-factor test from Regina v. Morin to assess whether the delay was unreasonable.

After allocating various periods of delay to different categories (inherent time requirements, actions of the accused, and institutional delay), the court determined that the institutional delay of approximately 9 months and 23 days fell within the constitutionally tolerable range of 8 to 10 months established in Morin.

The court found no evidence of prejudice to the defendant's liberty, security, or fair trial interests.

The application was denied.