Kim Schofield

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay between the laying of charges and the scheduled trial date.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the total delay of approximately 36.5 months, subtracting periods attributable to defence waiver, inherent time requirements, and defence delay.

After these deductions, the net delay was calculated at approximately 18 months and one week.

The court found limited prejudice to the accused and emphasized the seriousness of the charges involving large-scale marijuana production.

Balancing the factors, the court concluded the delay did not warrant a stay of proceedings.

The accused, charged with producing and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, applied to exclude evidence obtained from a general warrant and a subsequent CDSA warrant, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The accused argued the police lacked reasonable grounds for the general warrant and misled the issuing judge.

The court found the investigating officer had reasonable grounds based on a confidential informant's tip corroborated by hydro records and police investigation, and acted in good faith.

The court concluded there was no s. 8 Charter breach and, alternatively, that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order his surrender for extradition to the United States, and appealed the committal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister reasonably addressed the relevant factors in the Cotroni assessment and properly considered the applicant's personal circumstances.

The appellant appealed a committal order related to drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the committal order, including direct evidence from two accomplices and circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the individual engaged in the trafficking.

The Crown brought an application to admit certified copies of a recognizance and court information into evidence pursuant to sections 23 and 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The defendant was charged with obstructing a peace officer, failing to comply with recognizance (two counts), and theft over $5,000.

The Crown served a Notice of Intention to produce the documents on April 24, 2012, more than seven days before trial.

The court found that the notice was deficient in specificity and content, failing to adequately identify the recognizance or information at issue.

The court also found no evidence that the defendant had been served with copies of the actual documents through disclosure.

The application was dismissed and none of the documents were admitted into evidence.

The accused were charged with possession of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking after police stopped their vehicle, detained them, conducted a perimeter search of a residence, and entered the house where a drug laboratory was discovered.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of all evidence under s. 24(2), alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the investigative detention was arbitrary because officers lacked reasonable suspicion, and that the accused were not promptly informed of the reasons for detention or their right to counsel.

The court also held that the warrantless perimeter search and entry into the residence were unlawful and that the seizure of identification constituted an unreasonable seizure.

Given the seriousness and multiplicity of Charter breaches, including misleading testimony and investigative conduct based on a mere hunch, the court excluded the accused’s roadside statements, identification evidence, and the drug laboratory evidence.

The accused applied for a bail review under s.520 of the Criminal Code after a justice of the peace ordered detention on all three grounds under s.515(10).

The accused faced charges including attempted murder with a firearm, assault with a weapon, pointing a firearm, and robbery with a firearm arising from a planned armed robbery connected to a drug transaction.

The defence argued that there were material changes in circumstances, including a closer relationship with proposed sureties and a stricter supervision plan involving house arrest.

The court reviewed the strength of the Crown’s case, the accused’s criminal history, flight risk, alleged gang associations, and the adequacy of the proposed sureties.

Concluding that the Crown’s case had strengthened and that the sureties lacked sufficient influence or ability to control the accused, the court found detention remained justified on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The applicant in an extradition proceeding brought a motion for the production of documents, to cross-examine the certifying U.S. attorney, and to examine her prior counsel.

The applicant sought to explore an allegedly untruthful statement in the Record of the Case regarding her history of drug trafficking in Canada, arguing it constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no air of reality to the assertion that the requesting state deliberately attempted to mislead Canadian courts.

The court also found no basis to order the examination of prior counsel regarding an allegation of ineffective assistance.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy and in excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy while babysitting at the premises.

However, the court found the trial judge failed to make clear findings on police misconduct and the impact of the breach on the accused's Charter interests under the pre-Grant Collins test.

As the court could not conduct the required Grant analysis, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of production of marijuana and bribery.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) due to the respondent's language difficulties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of evidence for the marijuana charge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bribery charge, holding that the statements offering money to police constituted the actus reus of a new offence and did not flow causally from the Charter breaches.

A new trial was ordered for the bribery charge.

The Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario held a pre-hearing teleconference regarding a Notice of Proposed Order to revoke the registration of the registrant as a gaming assistant.

The Board ordered both the registrant and the Registrar to provide mutual disclosure, including witness lists and evidence summaries, ten days prior to the hearing date.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges related to impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The trial judge found the accused was driving while impaired but had a reasonable doubt as to whether the impairment caused the complainant's bodily injury and whether the accused knew he had been in an accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were grounded in the evidence and not based on speculation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown's case formidable and the guilty verdict entirely reasonable.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the sentence was within the appropriate range and that the fresh evidence offered on appeal did not constitute the rare circumstances required to justify a conditional sentence for this type of offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of proceeds of crime and laundering proceeds of crime.

The trial judge found the appellant knew money was hidden in the trucks but failed to address whether the appellant knew the money was proceeds of crime, a necessary element of the offences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial based on this error.

The Court also noted that the Crown's expert evidence regarding typical excuses given by drug dealers at the border went beyond appropriate bounds.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, pleaded guilty to offences arising from a sophisticated counterfeiting operation and was sentenced to 21 months' incarceration.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by rejecting a conditional sentence and failing to credit his strict pre-trial bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err regarding the bail conditions, as they did not impose undue hardship.

However, the Court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the appellant's youth, rehabilitation efforts, and the paramountcy of specific deterrence for youthful first offenders.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to 21 months conditional.

The Registrar issued a Notice of Proposal to suspend the liquor licence of Hoang Viet Billiards.

The parties submitted an Agreed Statement of Facts admitting that a fight occurred on the premises and that police and inspectors were delayed entry due to locked doors while patrons were inside.

The Board accepted the joint submission, ordering a 14-day suspension of the licence and adding a condition that doors remain unlocked while patrons are inside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of marijuana and theft of electricity.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal rejected the unreasonable verdict argument but agreed that the trial judge erred by requiring the appellant's exculpatory testimony to satisfy a balance of probabilities standard, rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt as required by R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her sentence for her involvement in a marijuana grow operation, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to explain why a conditional sentence could not serve the goals of deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the appellant's temptation to reoffend and the prevalence of grow operations in the community.

The court held that the short jail term, which allowed the appellant to maintain employment, was fit and that this was not a rare case where a conditional sentence would be appropriate.

The appellant appealed the sentence entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentence that justified intervention and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed their convictions related to a marijuana grow operation, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The trial judge found that both appellants knew the house contained a grow operation, secured the door upon leaving, and were present to care for the plants.

The appellants argued their presence might have been for general house maintenance, raising a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the maintenance theory and concluding the verdict was not unreasonable.