Kim Schofield

The applicants brought a motion under s. 8 of the Charter challenging the installation of police video surveillance cameras in the hallways of their condominium buildings.

The police had installed some cameras with the consent of condominium management prior to obtaining a general warrant, and failed to disclose these prior installations when applying for the warrant.

The court held that the warrantless installation based on management's consent did not violate s. 8, as there is a diminished expectation of privacy in condominium hallways.

While the failure to disclose the prior installations breached the duty of full, fair and frank disclosure, the court found the omission was not material to the issuance of the warrant.

The motion was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of producing methamphetamine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking after a chemical fire at a makeshift laboratory.

Police seized over 500 grams of methamphetamine with a significant street value.

The Crown sought 5 to 8 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 4 to 5 years, noting the offender's strict bail conditions and lack of evidence regarding his specific role in the operation.

The court sentenced the offender to 4.5 years imprisonment, balancing the need for denunciation and deterrence with the offender's rehabilitative prospects and time spent under strict bail conditions.

The applicant, charged with trafficking methamphetamine, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

The court found that the Crown's decision to prosecute the applicant jointly with other co-accused in a larger investigation unnecessarily complicated and delayed his straightforward case.

Applying the frameworks from both Morin and Jordan, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable and directed a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, a target in a large-scale illegal gambling investigation, was subjected to a ruse traffic stop by police who had reasonable grounds to arrest him for possession of proceeds of crime.

The police concealed the true reason for the stop to protect their ongoing investigation, instead claiming he was stopped for traffic violations and searched due to alleged gang affiliations.

A large sum of cash was seized from his vehicle.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude the evidence, alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no breach of ss. 8 or 9, as the applicant was under a lawful de facto arrest and the search was incident to that arrest.

The court found breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) because the applicant was misled about his true jeopardy.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith based on existing case law permitting such ruses to protect ongoing investigations, and the breach had minimal impact on the applicant's protected interests.

The appellant was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle and subsequently blew over the legal limit.

At trial, she was convicted of having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired, failing to rebut the presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly assessed her credibility against a reasonable person standard.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and no material error was made.

The accused, Tuan Duc Pham, was charged with producing and possessing methamphetamine and possession of chemicals for drug production after a fire at an industrial unit revealed a clandestine drug laboratory.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including Pham's fingerprint on a pop can found on the ground floor, and a cellular phone found on the mezzanine (where the lab was located) containing personal information linking it to Pham, as well as photographs of drug production equipment, including a hydrogen chloride cylinder identical to one found at the scene.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence established Pham's involvement in methamphetamine production and possession beyond a reasonable doubt, convicting him on those two counts, but acquitting him on the charge of possession of chemicals for future use.

The accused, Hai Thi Pham, was convicted of producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

She challenged the two and three-year mandatory minimum sentences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found both mandatory minimums grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable hypothetical scenarios involving licensed production and mistakes of law, and thus unconstitutional under s. 12 and not saved by s. 1.

Consequently, the court imposed a 10-month custodial sentence, followed by 18 months probation, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and forfeiture of grow-op equipment, considering aggravating factors (large commercial operation, public safety hazard, property damage) and mitigating factors (first offender, family, mental health issues, sentencing delay).

The accused applied for judicial interim release following a preliminary inquiry where he conceded orders to stand trial on serious charges including possession of prohibited firearms with ammunition, careless storage of weapons, possession of prohibited weapons and over-capacity magazines, possession of firearms obtained by commission of an offence, forcible confinement, kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and drug trafficking offences.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused proposed release on a substantial recognizance secured by his parents with electronic monitoring via ankle bracelet.

The court denied the application, finding that the accused had not shown cause for release on both secondary and tertiary grounds, citing concerns about the sureties' ability to supervise, the accused's demonstrated disrespect for court orders, and the serious nature of the offences.

The Crown prosecuted two defendants for offences related to a marijuana grow operation discovered in the basement of a residential property at 50 Ravenscrest Drive in Toronto.

Arin Hwang was charged with producing marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of dried marijuana found in a suitcase, and theft of electricity.

Van Da Do was charged with producing marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity.

The court acquitted Do of all charges due to unreliable eyewitness identification evidence and insufficient circumstantial evidence linking him to the premises.

Hwang was convicted of simple possession of the dried marijuana found in the suitcase but acquitted of the remaining charges, as the Crown failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he exercised the requisite control over the basement grow operation.

The accused were involved in a large-scale marijuana trafficking operation.

Following guilty findings based on Agreed Statements of Fact, the court proceeded to sentencing.

The primary sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation were emphasized, particularly given the commercial nature and significant profits involved.

The court rejected arguments to delay sentencing based on anticipated changes to marijuana laws, affirming the rule of law.

State misconduct in the investigation, while acknowledged, was deemed to have negligible impact on sentencing.

Credit was given for onerous bail conditions and the efficient conduct of the trial through Agreed Statements of Fact.

Conditional sentences were deemed inappropriate, with penitentiary sentences warranted for all accused.

The offender pleaded guilty to cultivating marijuana and theft of electricity.

He voluntarily surrendered into custody prior to sentencing and sought a conditional discharge to avoid deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court denied the discharge, finding it would be a custodial sentence in disguise and would improperly circumvent Parliament's intent regarding immigration consequences.

The court also denied enhanced credit for the voluntary pre-sentence custody.

However, applying R. v. Pham, the court imposed a sentence of 5.5 months (less 10 weeks credit) to preserve the offender's right to appeal any inadmissibility finding.

The Attorney General applied for civil forfeiture of a residential property under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, alleging it was the proceeds and an instrument of unlawful activity (marihuana trafficking).

The respondent property owner argued she was a legitimate and responsible owner who purchased the property with an inheritance.

The court rejected the respondent's evidence, finding the property was acquired with proceeds of unlawful activity and used as a marihuana distribution centre.

The court held the respondent was not a legitimate or responsible owner and that forfeiture was not clearly against the interests of justice.

The application for forfeiture was granted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to wilfully and without lawful excuse injuring a dog contrary to section 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and failing to comply with a house arrest condition of his recognizance.

The defendant threw his girlfriend's small Yorkshire terrier violently up a flight of stairs, causing bilateral scleral hemorrhage to the dog's eye.

The court imposed a sentence of 60 days custody (already served), three years probation with conditions prohibiting ownership or possession of animals, and a four-year section 447.1 order prohibiting contact with animals.

The court emphasized the defendant's extensive history of violent criminal conduct as the primary aggravating factor.

The accused was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine and phencyclidine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, unlawful possession of cocaine and cannabis, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that police conducted an investigative detention without reasonable grounds based on a dated intelligence report and observations that revealed no criminal behaviour.

The police blocked in the vehicle, demanded drugs "right now" without advising the occupants of the reason for detention or their right to counsel, and obtained drugs through compulsion.

The court further found that the accused was denied access to counsel for approximately nine hours while being questioned, and that information obtained during this period was included in the Information to Obtain a search warrant.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter violations and dismissed the charges.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police stopped his vehicle for a traffic infraction and discovered heroin in the car.

The defence argued that police orchestrated the traffic stop and planted heroin on the vehicle’s console to justify a warrantless search.

The court conducted a blended voir dire addressing the admissibility of the seized drugs under s. 8 of the Charter.

After identifying serious credibility issues and collusion in police testimony, the court concluded that the heroin visible on the console was planted to create a pretext for the search.

The search was found to violate the accused’s Charter rights and the drug evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The defendant was charged with production of marijuana, possession of marijuana over 3 kilograms for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of hydro under $5,000 following a police raid on a grow operation.

The defendant admitted possessing 14.9 kilograms of wet marijuana in his van but claimed it was refuse destined for disposal.

The court found the defendant not guilty of production and theft charges, but guilty of simple possession.

However, the defendant held a valid Health Canada authorization to possess up to 3,960 grams of dry marijuana for medical purposes.

Upon agreement of counsel regarding the dry weight conversion of the wet marijuana, the possession charge was dismissed as the quantity fell within the defendant's authorized limit.

The defendant was charged with production of marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking following a break-in at a licensed medical marijuana grow operation.

The defendant, employed as a security monitor and cleaner, called 911 to report the break-in and cooperated fully with police.

He claimed he honestly believed the entire operation was authorized under the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) based on production licenses displayed at the facility and assurances from his employer.

The Crown argued either that the defendant knew the operation exceeded authorized limits or, alternatively, that any mistaken belief was one of law rather than fact.

The court found the defendant's belief in his immunity from criminal liability was honestly held but constituted a mistake of law, as the licenses authorized only 30 plants while over 1,500 were present.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with unlawfully producing cannabis contrary to section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Following a voir dire on a Garofoli application and Charter challenge, the court admitted evidence from a search warrant executed at the accused's residence.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised knowledge and control over a sophisticated marijuana grow operation discovered at the premises, based on surveillance evidence showing the accused's repeated attendance at the house, his use of a remote garage door opener to gain access, the extended periods he spent inside the house, and the sophisticated nature of the grow operation.

The court found the accused guilty.

The defendant was charged with production of marijuana and related offences.

He applied under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to quash search warrants that led to the discovery of marijuana plants.

The defendant held a production license allowing him to produce marijuana for personal medical purposes.

Four search warrants were issued for different units in a warehouse plaza—two licensed units (17 and 18) and two unlicensed units (15 and 16).

The licensed units were authorized for a combined total of 294 plants.

The defendant challenged whether the warrants had sufficient reasonable grounds to believe there was an "overgrow" in the licensed units and whether the unlicensed units were operating as a grow operation.

The court found that after excision and amplification of the Information to Obtain, the warrants were supported by reasonable grounds and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking following a search warrant executed at a family home where police seized over 148 grams of heroin from a basement refrigerator and bedroom.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish constructive possession, asserting that the accused used the basement area where the drugs were found.

The defence argued that the basement was a communal space used by multiple family members and that the Crown failed to prove the accused’s knowledge and control of the drugs.

The court found significant evidentiary gaps, including unreliable police surveillance evidence, absence of forensic evidence linking the accused to the drugs, and evidence that other individuals had access to the locations where the drugs were discovered.

Applying the principles governing constructive possession and reasonable doubt, the court held that the Crown’s theory required conjecture and did not exclude other reasonable possibilities.