Kim Crosbie

The Crown appealed an acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury and entered an acquittal because the Crown failed to explicitly ask the complainant where the incidents occurred, and the trial judge denied the Crown's application to re-open the case to establish territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the offences occurred in Ontario.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the Crown to re-open its case under the non-controversial exception, as there was no prejudice to the unrepresented accused.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of fraud after acting as a solicitor in transactions that defrauded banks.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, and his sentence, arguing he should have received a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's own acts and declarations proved him guilty as a party to the frauds.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle in imposing a custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed her five-month custodial sentence.

The Crown acknowledged that this was an exceptional case where the appellant had turned her life around since the offence, and incarceration would not serve the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the custodial sentence, and substituted a five-month conditional sentence, leaving the probation and restitution orders in place.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge failed to resolve inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and misused prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence, resolved inconsistencies using a common sense approach, and correctly used the prior consistent statements to explain delayed disclosure and rebut a motive to fabricate.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his statement to the arresting officer, excluding the officer's opinion about that statement, and restricting cross-examination of the complainant regarding a statement of claim and under the Seaboyer framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the appellant's statement had little probative value, its admission caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by using rehabilitation as a reason for imposing a custodial sentence.

The majority held that a custodial sentence was still appropriate but reduced it to time served (53 days) plus an additional six months in custody, with probation unchanged.

The dissenting judge would have reduced the sentence to time served due to the two and three-quarter years the appellant spent on bail pending the appeal.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by importing the requirement of an additional offence into section 430 of the Criminal Code.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to undertake the appropriate analysis under section 429(2) to determine whether the act was done with legal justification, excuse, or colour of right.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was directed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and sexual assault against his domestic partner.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework and that the forcible confinement conviction was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that locking the naked, battered complainant in an unheated tool room in December constituted forcible confinement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the total sentence of 2.5 years was fit given the appalling domestic violence and the appellant's record.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's finding that his statement was voluntary and arguing that police conduct regarding his status as a confidential informant constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and that the alleged police misconduct post-dated the statement and did not affect trial fairness.

The court also declined to make a non-publication order, noting the appellant's status had been public record for years.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching and sexual assault against his 13-year-old sister-in-law and sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering his youth record for sexual assault, contrary to s. 45 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed this was an error in principle.

However, upon reassessing the sentence, the Court found that actual imprisonment remained the most appropriate disposition given the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding the validity of an 'alert' demand.

The appellant argued that the officer making the demand must know or believe the person was operating or in care and control of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming prior authorities that such knowledge or belief is not required for an officer to make an 'alert' demand.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the conduct of Crown counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while Crown counsel's sarcastic questions reflected badly on him, they did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court also found no prejudice resulting from the trial judge's instructions, noting the lack of objections to the charge.

The appellant, a young person represented by counsel, sought to waive the reading of charges at his first appearance in youth court.

The justice of the peace refused the waiver and read the charges, asserting a residual discretion to do so.

The appellant's application for certiorari was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that while a represented young person may waive the reading of charges under s. 12(2) of the Young Offenders Act, the presiding judicial officer retains a residual discretion to order the charges read to ensure the young person understands them and to control the court's process.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence in the form of two psychiatric reports indicating that the appellant's risk of re-offending was much lower than the trial judge had concluded, and that his post-conviction counselling was effective.

Based on this fresh evidence, the Court varied the sentence to a 10-month conditional sentence, while upholding the weapons prohibition order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, which was based on an alleged attempt to have anal intercourse with the complainant without her consent.

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge and counsel had not referred to this incident during the trial, and the only evidence supporting the conviction came from the appellant himself.

The Court concluded that there was no evidence of intent, rendering the conviction unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence for sexual assault were set aside, and an acquittal was entered.