Kim Crosbie

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his convictions for impaired driving causing death and related offences, as well as his sentence.

The delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to institutional difficulties at the penitentiary where he was incarcerated.

The Crown conceded the applicant had a bona fide intention to appeal and a reasonable explanation for the delay, but argued the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal applied the Menear test, finding that the appeal was not hopeless and that the interests of justice favoured granting the extension.

The appellant, a private citizen, sought to lay an information before a justice of the peace in Toronto for offences allegedly committed in another administrative region.

The justice refused to receive the information, citing a lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The appellant's application to compel the justice to receive the information was dismissed by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that 'territorial jurisdiction' in section 504 of the Criminal Code refers to the entire Province of Ontario, not administrative regions.

The appeal was allowed, and the justice was ordered to receive the information.

The respondent was released on a promise to appear and an undertaking.

The Crown failed to lay an information 'as soon as practicable' under s. 505 of the Criminal Code, rendering the promise to appear invalid.

The respondent was subsequently charged with breaching a condition of his undertaking.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court acquitted the respondent, holding that the invalidity of the promise to appear also nullified the undertaking.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that an undertaking serves a different purpose than a promise to appear and remains in force as long as the underlying charges are before the court.

Convictions were substituted, but proceedings were stayed due to delay.

The appellant appealed his 7.5-year global sentence for sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, and threatening death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's analysis.

The court noted the extreme seriousness of the crimes, the appellant's commission of similar crimes while on bail, and psychiatric evidence indicating a moderate to high risk of sexually violent recidivism.

The court agreed that the protection of society was the overriding sentencing consideration.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault after the trial judge found he was in a state of non-mental disorder automatism (sexsomnia) at the time of the offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the condition should have been classified as a mental disorder leading to a not criminally responsible (NCR) verdict.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for disease of the mind by failing to properly consider the risk of recurrence and the internal causes of the condition.

Concluding it lacked jurisdiction to substitute an NCR verdict on an appeal from an acquittal, the Court ordered a new trial limited to determining whether the automatism should result in an acquittal or an NCR verdict.

The Crown appealed the sentence of four years' imprisonment (less 32 months' credit for pre-sentence custody) imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breach of probation.

The respondent had pled guilty to these offences.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the sentencing judge carefully analyzed the evidence, applied appropriate principles, and considered mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, youth, difficult upbringing, and rehabilitative potential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a long-term offender, was convicted of breaching a condition of his long-term supervision order that required him to report any relationships entered into with females.

He had engaged in a 90-minute conversation with a woman at a laundromat and gave her his phone number, which he did not report to his supervisor.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was meant to capture relationships with some mutual level of involvement, not casual encounters or unsuccessful attempts to initiate a relationship.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for manslaughter by criminal negligence in connection with the death of a foster child.

The child died from blunt force trauma inflicted by the appellant's spouse.

The appellant was acquitted of a second count of manslaughter by failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The Court of Appeal held that the two verdicts were inconsistent and unreasonable because the evidence and legal elements underlying both charges were inextricably wound up, relying on the same failure to protect the child.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge erred in denying a two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in denying the enhanced credit, noting the appellant served his pre-trial custody in segregation at his own request and had not engaged in rehabilitative programs.

The court upheld the sentence length given the offender's extensive record and high risk of re-offending.

However, based on a concession by the Crown, the court varied the parole eligibility period to half of the balance of the sentence imposed.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision granting a young person's application for certiorari and mandamus, which had directed the youth court to order publicly funded legal aid.

The young person, charged with uttering a threat, was refused legal aid and sought a court order for funded counsel at his first appearance while considering extrajudicial sanctions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under section 25(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, a young person is only entitled to apply for publicly funded counsel at specific stages of proceedings, such as a trial or a hearing related to custody, and not at a first appearance.

The unrepresented appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the Crown's cross-examination was improper and that the trial judge failed to provide limiting instructions regarding his conspiracy theory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the Crown improperly cross-examined the appellant on extraneous matters and his failure to deny allegations in-chief.

The trial judge also failed to instruct the jury on the limited use of the appellant's conspiracy theory.

The appeal was allowed, but a stay of proceedings was entered as the appellant had already served his sentence and this would be his fourth trial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and released on a promise to appear.

On the return date, no information was before the court at the specified time, but one was sworn later that afternoon.

The accused argued the court lost jurisdiction over the offence because the information was not laid before the time stated in the promise to appear, as required by s. 505(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while failure to comply with s. 505(b) results in a loss of jurisdiction over the person, it does not invalidate the information or result in a loss of jurisdiction over the offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to credit twenty-three months of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed that while the global sentence of four years was appropriate, the trial judge erred by not applying the conceded pre-trial custody credit.

The appeal was allowed to apply the twenty-three months credit, resulting in a net sentence of twenty-five months.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for confinement, assault, robbery, and break and enter.

The respondent had a lengthy criminal record but showed rehabilitative potential.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the trial judge's emphasis on rehabilitation, noting that maximizing rehabilitative potential provides the best long-range protection for the community.

The sentence was deemed lenient but not manifestly inadequate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following his third trial for the death of the victim.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting a surreptitiously recorded conversation between himself and the victim, claiming it was conscriptive evidence that should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

He also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding manslaughter, false alibi evidence, and the likely time of death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the recorded conversation was non-conscriptive and properly admitted, and that the jury instructions did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and sexual assault on several grounds, including inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, flawed pre-trial identification, an alibi that he was out of the country, discrepancies regarding his physical appearance, and the trial judge's reliance on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly addressed the evidentiary issues and that any minor errors did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking a reduction of a five-year prohibition on the possession of firearms, ammunition, or gunpowder.

He argued that the prohibition should be reduced because he had already been subject to a similar prohibition for four and a half years prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the total length of the prohibition was entirely appropriate given the circumstances of the offence.

The appellant appealed her sentence, arguing it was unfit and that a probation condition regarding her residence was unduly punitive.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit, noting the appellant committed the serious offence while on probation for a similar offence and had previously re-offended after receiving a conditional sentence.

The Court amended the wording of the probation condition to reflect the trial judge's reasons but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury and entered an acquittal because the Crown failed to explicitly ask the complainant where the incidents occurred, and the trial judge denied the Crown's application to re-open the case to establish territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the offences occurred in Ontario.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the Crown to re-open its case under the non-controversial exception, as there was no prejudice to the unrepresented accused.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of fraud after acting as a solicitor in transactions that defrauded banks.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, and his sentence, arguing he should have received a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's own acts and declarations proved him guilty as a party to the frauds.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle in imposing a custodial sentence.