Sexual exploitation

The defendants were charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a young person who stayed at their residence intermittently over several years.

The Crown alleged that the defendants were in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable and lacking credibility due to inconsistencies, admitted manipulation, and expressed malice towards the defendants.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were in a position of trust or authority, or that the sexual activity was non-consensual.

Both defendants were found not guilty on all counts.

The offender, a teacher, was found guilty of sexual exploitation of a student.

At sentencing, the offender brought a Charter challenge arguing that the mandatory minimum sentence of one year under s. 153 of the Criminal Code constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the breach of trust, grooming, and post-offence conduct.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months in jail followed by 12 months of probation, along with ancillary orders.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability against a developmentally challenged male.

The court applied the Kienapple rule to conditionally stay the sexual assault conviction but upheld the two exploitation convictions.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the severe breach of trust and invasive abuse, the court sentenced the offender to 5 years in the penitentiary for sexual exploitation and a concurrent 3 years for sexual exploitation of a person with a disability, along with ancillary orders.

The mother appealed a trial judge's finding that her child was in need of protection due to a risk of sexual abuse or exploitation.

The risk stemmed from the mother's brother, who lived in the home and was convicted of luring and child pornography offences involving his students.

The mother argued the trial judge erred by making the finding without expert evidence, by rejecting an expert report filed on consent, and by not requiring the risk to be present at the time of the hearing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and upholding the flexible approach to the timing of risk in child protection matters.

The appellant, a high school teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two of his students.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the physical impossibility of the assaults and applied a stricter standard of scrutiny to his testimony compared to the complainants' evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were well-reasoned, even-handed, and free from material misapprehension of evidence.

The offender, a former teacher, was convicted of sexual exploitation of a former student.

The sexual relationship began when the victim was 16 and lasted for two years, resulting in a pregnancy and abortion.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence based on the breach of trust, while the defence sought 15 to 18 months.

The court weighed the severe impact on the victim against the offender's lack of criminal record, low risk of recidivism, and expressions of remorse.

The court sentenced the offender to 30 months' incarceration, less credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, and a 20-year SOIRA registration.

The accused faced 12 counts of historical sexual misconduct involving three complainants.

The court analyzed whether the accused were in a position of trust or authority towards the complainants under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused were not in a position of trust towards two of the complainants, resulting in the dismissal of several counts.

For the primary complainant, the court found a position of trust existed until she turned 16, but did not continue thereafter, leading to the dismissal of charges against the co-accused.

However, applying the W(D) framework, the court accepted the primary complainant's evidence regarding the principal accused and found him guilty of four counts of sexual misconduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on inadmissible evidence.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence of the appellant's sexual relationship with the complainant after the complainant turned 18, which the trial judge ruled inadmissible under section 276 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge subsequently relied on this post-majority relationship to reject the appellant's exculpatory police statement.

The Superior Court of Justice found this to be a reversible error, as the appellant was assured the evidence was inadmissible and had no opportunity to address it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual exploitation against his daughter.

The offences occurred when the victim was a teenager and involved inappropriate touching and measuring.

The court considered the accused's low risk of reoffending, lack of criminal record, and the historical nature of the offences, balanced against the significant breach of trust and psychological harm to the victim.

The court imposed a global conditional sentence of two years less a day, along with SOIRA registration, a DNA order, and a weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation by a person in a position of trust, breach of trust, and making and possessing child pornography involving a complainant who had lived in the accused’s home as a teenager.

The Crown alleged the accused used his position as a police officer and landlord to coerce sexual activity and take nude photographs of the complainant when she was under 18.

The court found significant inconsistencies and credibility concerns in the complainant’s testimony, including contradictions regarding photographs, camera use, alleged coercion, and post‑incident conduct.

The court accepted defence evidence that certain sexual activity occurred consensually after the complainant turned 18 and found the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual exploitation involving a 17‑year‑old relative who lived with him, and received a custodial sentence with probation and ancillary orders.

On summary conviction appeal, he challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including misapprehension of evidence, improper credibility analysis, misuse of prior incidents as grooming evidence, and erroneous reliance on his police statement as a confession.

The court held that the trial judge misapprehended and inadequately analyzed the accused’s statement to police, treating it as a confession to criminal conduct without identifying the conduct admitted or explaining the reasoning.

Because the statement played a central role in rejecting the accused’s testimony and assessing credibility, the error could not be cured under the proviso.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to admit two prior consistent statements made by the complainant in a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The court reviewed the general rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible for the truth of their contents but may be admitted for limited purposes such as narrative context or credibility assessment.

One statement to the complainant’s mother was conceded as admissible to explain how the allegations came to the attention of police.

The court also admitted a statement made to the complainant’s boyfriend, finding it necessary to explain the circumstances of disclosure and to avoid undermining the credibility of the witness whose observations prompted the disclosure.

The statements were admissible only in general terms and not for the truth of their contents.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation, sexual assault, uttering threats, sexual assault against a second complainant, and mischief.

The evidence established that the accused engaged in sexual activity with a teenage complainant who resided in the household of his common-law partner and whom he treated as a father figure.

The court found that the accused occupied a position of trust or authority within the meaning of s. 153 of the Criminal Code and was therefore guilty of sexual exploitation despite the complainant being legally capable of consenting at the time.

The Crown failed to prove lack of consent for the sexual assault charge and failed to establish the alleged threats or a sexual assault against the second complainant.

The accused was also found guilty of mischief for intentionally pulling a vehicle’s parking brake while a teenager was driving.

The offender was sentenced after a jury conviction for procuring a person to become a prostitute and controlling the complainant’s movements for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to s. 212 of the Criminal Code.

The evidence established that the offender began a relationship with a vulnerable young woman, later directing her into prostitution, imposing earning quotas, and exercising substantial control over her activities for approximately 18 months while living off her earnings.

The offender also pleaded guilty to uttering threats against another complainant.

The court rejected the defence request for a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the prolonged exploitation and control involved.

A penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed for the prostitution offences, with a concurrent six‑month sentence for uttering threats, along with a firearms prohibition and DNA order.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation involving repeated sexual acts against his granddaughter between approximately ages five and eleven.

The court applied the credibility framework in R. v. W. (D.) and assessed competing testimony from the complainant, the accused, and other family members.

The defence advanced theories of fabrication, lack of opportunity, mistaken identity, and motives related to family disputes and cultural issues.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence and found the complainant’s detailed and consistent testimony credible and reliable, including explanations for delayed disclosure and continued family contact.

The Crown proved the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry decision discharging the accused on a charge of sexual exploitation while committing him to trial on related sexual offences.

The reviewing court considered whether the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence when assessing whether a relationship of trust or authority existed between the accused and the complainant.

The court found the judge overlooked evidence supporting an inference that the accused occupied a position of trust, including parental permission for overnight visits and the accused’s own statements assuming a “big brother” role.

The failure to consider this evidence constituted jurisdictional error.

The discharge was quashed and the accused was ordered committed to stand trial on the sexual exploitation charge.