B. Donohue

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after stabbing and killing his husband.

He proceeded to trial before a judge alone.

The defence argued the accused should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, relying on two forensic psychiatrists who opined he was experiencing psychosis at the time of the killing.

The court found the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time but held that the defence had not established on a balance of probabilities that he was incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions, as the expert opinions relied heavily on inadmissible hearsay.

The court further found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite intent for murder, finding him guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code to adduce text messages exchanged with the complainant before and after the alleged offence.

The accused argued the sexualized messages formed part of the subject matter of the charge or were otherwise admissible to show the complainant's state of mind and to challenge her credibility.

The court held that the messages did not form part of the subject matter of the charge and were subject to the s. 276 screening regime.

The court ruled the messages were inadmissible to show the complainant's state of mind regarding consent, as this relied on myth-based reasoning.

However, certain messages were admitted for the limited purpose of exploring material inconsistencies in the complainant's preliminary hearing evidence.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after stabbing the victim multiple times during a physical altercation over drugs.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the use of a knife and the drug context, against mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 years and 9 months before credit, reducing it by 3 months for the collateral consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, and granted enhanced credit for time spent in lockdown.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of the recent Criminal Code amendments that abolished peremptory challenges during jury selection.

The applicant relied on a recent decision by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction that found the amendments unconstitutional.

The court held that it was not bound by the prior decision and found it to be plainly wrong.

The court concluded that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not violate the right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, or the principles of fundamental justice, as other safeguards such as challenge for cause and the enhanced stand-aside power remain in place.

The application was dismissed and the legislation was upheld as constitutional.

The accused faced 12 counts of historical sexual misconduct involving three complainants.

The court analyzed whether the accused were in a position of trust or authority towards the complainants under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused were not in a position of trust towards two of the complainants, resulting in the dismissal of several counts.

For the primary complainant, the court found a position of trust existed until she turned 16, but did not continue thereafter, leading to the dismissal of charges against the co-accused.

However, applying the W(D) framework, the court accepted the primary complainant's evidence regarding the principal accused and found him guilty of four counts of sexual misconduct.