Sexual assault

The accused, a police officer, was charged with sexually assaulting a 17-year-old summer student in an elevator at the police headquarters in 2007.

The trial centered on credibility, as the accused completely denied the allegations and claimed he had no contact with the complainant.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the complainant's evidence compelling and rejected the accused's testimony, noting a pattern of downplaying his opportunity to commit the offence.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

During a trial for sexual assault, the complainant testified in cross-examination that she 'recovered' memories of the alleged assault during therapy sessions.

The accused brought a motion for directions to cross-examine the complainant on these recovered memories without making an application under s. 278 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the accused could ask the complainant what she meant by the terms 'recovered memory' and 'walked back', as this did not elicit the content of the therapeutic records.

However, the court ruled that questions regarding whether the memories were consistent or changed over time would elicit the content of the records and therefore required a s. 278 application.

The young person pleaded guilty to the sexual assault of his adopted sister, which occurred over a six-year period.

The Crown sought a six-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought probation.

The court noted that while custodial sentences are the norm for serious sexual assaults under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the young person's cognitive difficulties, including Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, constituted exceptional circumstances.

Given his low risk to re-offend, lack of prior record, and rehabilitative steps, the court imposed a non-custodial sentence of two years' probation, along with a DNA order and a weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, break and enter, and being unlawfully in a dwelling house after breaking into a stranger's apartment and sexually assaulting her.

The accused claimed he was in a dissociative state due to bereavement, lack of sleep, lack of food, and alcohol consumption, leading him to mistakenly believe he was in his childhood home in Casablanca with his fiancée.

The court emphatically rejected the accused's testimony as incredible and implausible.

The court found no air of reality to the mistake of fact defence, noting that self-induced intoxication short of automatism is not a defence to general intent crimes like sexual assault.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused faced multiple charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, cruelty to animals, and breach of probation, arising from a brief, tumultuous relationship with the complainant.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, ultimately believing the accused's testimony over the complainant's.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to intoxication, anxiety, memory gaps, and a potential motive to fabricate to deny the accused access to their child.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The young person accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with a heavily intoxicated complainant in a parking lot.

The complainant had limited memory of the events but recalled being held down and repeatedly saying no.

DNA evidence confirmed the presence of the accused's bodily fluids on the complainant.

The court found that the complainant's advanced state of intoxication rendered her incapable of consenting, and that she had also expressed her lack of consent.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of charges alleging sexual offences against a child on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Morin framework, the court assessed total Crown and institutional delay at approximately 17 months within an overall period of about 29 months and 21 days from charge to trial.

The court attributed a significant portion of the delay to the complainant's hospitalization and found only limited prejudice arising from stigma, legal expense, and restrictive bail terms.

Balancing the accused's interests against the strong societal interest in trying serious sexual offence allegations on their merits, the court held the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and two counts of breach of recognizance, and sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment in addition to 16 months' pre-trial custody.

The appellant, a first offender with a history of serious mental illness, appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal reviewed institutional records indicating the appellant had resisted treatment in custody.

Given the brutality of the assault and the risk posed to the community, the Court found no error by the trial judge and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended material aspects of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge specifically addressed the discrepancies raised, including the location of a truck, a phone call, an MSN message, and the complainant's description of the appellant's anatomy.

The Court held the trial judge properly explained why the complainant's evidence was reliable and supported by corroborating evidence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for historical sexual assault against a teenaged relative.

The Crown argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and sought a penitentiary term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no error in principle in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors and imposing a conditional sentence with strict house arrest.

The court granted the Crown's request to increase the SOIRA order to 20 years on consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and choking to assist in the commission of an indictable offence.

He argued the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and erred in drawing an adverse inference regarding the late disclosure of an extortion letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the evidence, sufficiently explained her credibility findings, and had already concluded the appellant was not believable before addressing the extortion letter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house and committing a sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and reliability, and in appreciating the elements of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, which attract great deference, and concluding that the finding of no permission to enter supported the conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, sexual assault, and criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred in appointing counsel to cross-examine the complainant, alleged unfairness in the appointment process, and claimed the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the procedural objections were raised for the first time on appeal and lacked merit, and finding no error in the trial judge's detailed assessment of credibility and reliability.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The conviction rested entirely on the evidence of the complainant, who had admitted to fabricating a detailed story to the police about a doctor's visit and pregnancy test.

The Court of Appeal found that the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury failed to adequately highlight the significance of her fabricated evidence.

The Court concluded that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could not have rendered a guilty verdict based exclusively on this evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for spousal sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the grounds relating to the trial judge's reasons but allowed the appeal based on fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence included post-conviction allegations made by the complainant and undisclosed police reports that supported the defence theory that the complainant fabricated the allegations to gain sole custody of their children.

The Court found the undisclosed evidence met the Stinchcombe threshold and impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in his final instructions on reasonable doubt and that the jury selection process was compromised by late disclosure of an annotated juror list by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's short-form instructions on reasonable doubt were problematic, the charge as a whole did not leave the jury under any misapprehension of the standard of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not cause a miscarriage of justice, as defence counsel was provided with the same information and chose not to use it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest and sexual assault, as well as his four-year concurrent sentences.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, shifted the burden of proof, and misapplied the W.D. test for credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated a firm grasp of the evidence, properly applied the burden of proof, and accurately reflected the W.D. framework.

The sentence was also upheld as the finding of a pattern of assaults was reasonable.

The appellant employer appealed a jury award of $468,969.18, including $300,000 in general damages, for sexual assaults committed against the respondent employee.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider whether other traumatic events in the respondent's life materially contributed to her psychological injuries under the 'crumbling skull' or successive tortious events principles.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in relying on the material contribution test for causation, which led to her failure to leave these questions with the jury.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, concluding the error did not cause a substantial wrong because the evidence that other incidents contributed to the damages was too weak to warrant jury consideration.

The general damages award, while high, was not plainly unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The complainant had repeatedly refused sex before finally saying 'okay' after the appellant persisted.

The Court of Appeal held that the complainant's final 'okay' was ambiguous in the context of her prior refusals, triggering the appellant's obligation to take steps to ascertain whether there was a reasonable basis for his belief in consent.

As the appellant took no such steps, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by excluding evidence under section 276 of the Criminal Code that the complainant engaged in consensual sex with another man shortly after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address presented a distorted narrative regarding the complainant's emotional state and loyalty to her boyfriend, making the excluded evidence highly probative to the defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.