Joanne Mulcahy

The applicants, two police officers charged with theft, obstruct justice, and perjury, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 41 months and 6 days.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including an implicit waiver by one co-accused, and delay caused by an inaccurate estimate for the preliminary inquiry.

The court also deducted 10 months as an exceptional circumstance due to the COVID-19 pandemic backlog.

After deductions, the net delay for both applicants fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The Chief of Police appealed a youth court judge's decision denying the disclosure of a young person's youth records.

The records were sought by both the prosecuting police service and the subject officer for use in a police disciplinary proceeding, where the young person was a key witness.

The appeal court found that the principle of diminished moral culpability under the Youth Criminal Justice Act does not shield a young person's records from disclosure when they are a witness and their credibility is at issue.

The court set aside the youth court judge's decision and ordered the records produced, subject to publication bans and redactions to protect the young person's identity.

Five police officers were convicted of attempting to obstruct justice, and three of them were also convicted of perjury, arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent false memo book entries and testimony to conceal the timing of the search.

The Crown sought penitentiary sentences of three to four years, while the defence sought non-custodial sentences.

The court considered the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also weighed significant mitigating factors, including the catastrophic impact of the prolonged 14-year investigation and proceedings on the officers' lives, careers, and health.

The court concluded that a penitentiary term was not warranted and imposed a 45-day conditional sentence (house arrest) for each offender.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

Media organizations sought permission to use electronic devices to transmit information from inside the courtroom and to make audio recordings during a criminal jury trial.

The court considered s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and an applicable practice direction permitting unobtrusive audio recording by journalists solely to supplement handwritten notes.

The court authorized such audio recordings and permitted journalists to transmit information from inside the courtroom, provided proceedings were not disrupted.

The court also established a procedure governing media access to large volumes of documentary exhibits, requiring undertakings preventing publication until a judicial determination confirmed sufficient evidence to place the document before the jury.

A publication restriction was ordered for specified personal identifying information contained in documentary materials.