Shorey v. Belleville Police Service, 2017 CanLII 53072

ONTARIO CIVILIAN POLICE COMMISSION

DATE: August 14, 2017

FILE: OCPC 16-ADJ-002

CASE NAME: SHOREY AND BELLEVILLE POLICE SERVICE

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL UNDER SECTION 87(1) OF THE POLICE SERVICES ACT, R.S.O. 1990, C.P.15, as amended

BETWEEN:

CONSTABLE ERIC SHOREY APPELLANT

-and-

BELLEVILLE POLICE SERVICE RESPONDENT

DECISION

Panel: D. Stephen Jovanovic, Associate Chair Katie Osborne, Member Ted Crljenica, Vice-Chair

Hearing Date: February 3, 2017

Hearing Location: Ontario Civilian Police Commission 250 Dundas Street West, Suite 605 Toronto, ON M7A 2T3

Appearances: Joanne Mulcahy, Counsel for the appellant David Migicovsky, Counsel for the respondent

I. Overview

1The appellant is a member of the Belleville Police Service (the “BPS”). He was convicted of criminal harassment and breach of trust and subsequently found guilty of misconduct under the Police Services Act (the “PSA”). He appeals the penalty of resignation within seven days or dismissal that was imposed by the Hearing Officer following a penalty hearing.

2The conduct that gave rise to the appellant’s criminal convictions followed the termination of his three-year relationship with S.C. The relationship initially remained cordial following their breakup. However, things deteriorated after S.C. moved in with a new partner. The appellant remained fixated on S.C. He continued to text her, drive by her house and engage in other conduct that was troubling to her, even after S.C. made it clear to the appellant that she did not want further contact with him.

3Videotape from a home security system showed the appellant in his vehicle outside S.C.’s home on two occasions. S.C. reported her concerns to police. The appellant was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, criminal harassment. He was also convicted of breach of trust for unauthorized database searches relating to S.C. and her partner.

4The appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of discreditable conduct under the PSA in relation to the criminal harassment and breach of trust convictions. Following a penalty hearing, the Hearing Officer ordered the appellant to resign from the BPS within seven days or be summarily dismissed.

5On his penalty appeal to the Commission the appellant argued that the Hearing Officer’s penalty decision is unreasonable. The appellant alleged various errors of principle and law and argued that the penalty of dismissal is harsh, excessive and outside the appropriate range of penalties for the offences committed. The BPS argued that the Hearing Officer’s decision is reasonable and asked the Commission to confirm the penalty of dismissal.

II. Disposition

6In our view, the penalty of dismissal was available to the Hearing Officer and his written reasons provide reasonable support for the disposition of dismissal. We find the penalty decision of the Hearing Officer is reasonable. There is no overriding error in principle. We deny the appeal and confirm the penalty of resignation within seven days or dismissal that was imposed by the Hearing Officer.

III. Background

(a) The appellant’s relationship breakdown and subsequent conduct

7The appellant and S.C. began dating in November 2005. The appellant began his career with the BPS in 2007, during the course of his relationship with S.C. Their relationship ended in December 2008.

8By all accounts the appellant and S.C. remained on friendly terms for some time following the breakup. They periodically exchanged text messages and emails, and they spoke on the phone. During this period, their interactions were about innocuous maters including friends, activities and life circumstances. None of the communications was threatening.

9In September 2010, S.C. started dating W.B. They subsequently moved in together. During the early post-separation period, S.C. initially felt sorry for the appellant. She described him as having difficulty “letting go.”

10During the period from the fall 2010 through 2011, S.C. became increasingly concerned with the appellant’s conduct. She observed him driving by her home. S.C. felt the appellant was trying to monitor her whereabouts and associations. The appellant also sent a continuous series of texts to S.C. after seeing her at a local bar with friends.

11In February 2012, the appellant stopped S.C. while she was driving. The rationale for the stop was that she had a bent licence plate. S.C. felt she had been stopped primarily because the appellant recognized her vehicle. In a text message exchange following this incident, the appellant expressed a desire to meet with W.B. and cautioned S.C. to “watch herself” when she was in Belleville.

12By the early part of 2012 S.C. made it clear to the appellant that she did not want further contact of any kind with him. She texted him asking that he stop driving by her home. She also asked that he not have any contact with her children.

13By this time, S.C. and W.B. had moved to a new home. This home was located in a rural and quite isolated location, something that reinforced S.C.’s view that the appellant’s “drive bys” were done for the purposes of watching her. She also received a number of unwanted text messages from the appellant.

14S.C.’s concerns led her to contact the BPS to report the appellant’s conduct. She wanted the conduct documented, and wanted his employer to be aware of it. She hoped that the appellant’s superiors would talk to him and that the unwanted contact could be resolved without making a “fuss.” S.C. was advised that she would be contacted by the Deputy Chief of the BPS.

15After S.C. made a second call to the BPS, Deputy Chief Vandegraaf contacted her. Before doing so, Deputy Chief Vandegraaf asked the appellant whether he was aware of any reason S.C. might be contacting him. When Deputy Chief Vandegraaf spoke to S.C., he indicated that he would give the appellant a stern talk and document the conduct.

16After speaking to S.C. there was no follow-up by Deputy Chief Vandegraaf or any senior officer with respect to her concerns. There was no discussion or “stern talk” with the appellant, no official or unofficial report made to the appellant’s supervising officers or to the Belleville Police Association, and no referral to the Employee Assistance Program.

17There was no reported contact between the appellant and S.C. following the February incidents. S.C. assumed that this was the result of the direct intervention of Deputy Chief Vandegraaf. She was unaware that no formal or informal steps had been taken in response to her reported concerns.

18In July 2012, recorded images from a motion-detecting camera at S.C.’s home with W.B. showed the appellant sitting in his truck at the end of their driveway on two occasions. The first image, recorded shortly after noon on July 19, 2012, showed the appellant sitting in his vehicle looking toward their residence for a period of 19 seconds. The second image, recorded shortly after 1:00 p.m. on July 25, 2012, captured a two-second stop of the appellant’s vehicle on the roadway adjacent to the laneway at the residence.

19After viewing the images, S.C. reported her concerns to the Ontario Provincial Police (the “OPP”).

Criminal Harassment and Breach of Trust Convictions

20The appellant was arrested on July 26, 2012 and charged with criminal harassment. As part of the investigation into the charge, the OPP conducted an audit of police database searches performed by the appellant between August 25, 2010 and May 23, 2012. The audit revealed that during this period the appellant made 25 database inquires on 15 separate days in relation to S.C. and/or W.B. None of these inquiries was made for legitimate, investigative, administrative, or operational purposes. The appellant was subsequently charged with breach of trust in relation to these unauthorized inquiries.

21Following a trial before the Honourable Mr. Justice Tetley of the Ontario Court of Justice, the appellant was convicted of criminal harassment contrary to s. 264(1)(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, and breach of trust contrary to s. 122 of the Criminal Code.

22In his reasons for decision, Justice Tetley found that the appellant had engaged in physical surveillance of the S.C.-W.B. residence on at least four occasions between February and July, 2012. He specifically referred to the two videotaped attendances by the appellant at the property. Justice Tetley found that the repeated attendances at the residence constituted the offence of criminal harassment as a consequence of the appellant besetting or watching S.C.’s dwelling house.

23Justice Tetley found that the unauthorized database searches were made for purposes other than the public good. He concluded that the appellant’s conduct, given the number of inquiries and the purpose for which they were made, constituted a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of an individual in a position of public trust.

24While Justice Tetley was critical of the failure of the BPS to take action in response to the S.C.’s complaints about the appellant, he noted that the appellant was ultimately responsible for his own actions and he knew that what he was doing was wrong. Justice Tetley also noted that Deputy Chief Vandegraaf had advised the appellant that S.C. had called, something that should have alerted the appellant to the issue and its potential implications.

25On November 29, 2013, Justice Tetley imposed a suspended sentence with three years’ probation concurrent on each count. The appellant received a mandatory firearms prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code due to the criminal harassment conviction. There is an exemption for employment purposes available under s. 113 of the Criminal Code, however Justice Tetley was not persuaded that it was warranted at that time.

The Penalty Hearing and Decision

26Police discipline in Ontario is governed by Part V of the PSA. The responsibility for conducting discipline hearings rests with the chief of police (or, in the case of the Ontario Provincial Police, the Commissioner). Section 94 of the PSA allows the chief of police to designate a hearing officer. In this case, the Chief of Police of the BPS authorized Deputy Chief (retired) Terrence Kelly to act as the Hearing Officer for the appellant’s disciplinary hearing.

27On October 8, 2015, the appellant appeared before the Hearing Officer and pleaded guilty to two counts of discreditable conduct under s. 2(1)(a)(ix) of the PSA in relation to the criminal harassment and breach of trust convictions.

28A hearing with respect to penalty only was held on October 8, 9 and November 12, 2015. The Hearing Officer released his decision on February 12, 2016.

29After considering the evidence and some of the factors that apply when determining a penalty, the Hearing Officer determined that the appellant’s misconduct met the test for dismissal. In reaching this conclusion, he found that the misconduct was of such seriousness that the appellant’s suitability as an officer in the BPS had been nullified. He noted that neither the BPS, nor the community it serves, can condone or tolerate a law enforcement officer acting in the way the appellant did. In imposing the penalty, the Hearing Officer wrote:

…the conduct of Constable Shorey was so egregious as to cause serious damage to the reputation of the Belleville Police Service. Police officers who commit such serious offences must be severely dealt with and, therefore, only one course of action is available to this Tribunal which has a duty to prevent further serious breaches of conduct.

30The Hearing Officer required the appellant to resign from the BPS within seven days or be summarily dismissed.

31Under the PSA, both a finding of guilt and the issue of penalty can be appealed by the police officer to the Commission. In this case the appellant appealed the penalty decision only.

IV. Issue on Appeal

32The issue in this appeal is whether the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Hearing Officer is reasonable.

V. Analysis

Powers of the Commission

33On appeal from a decision of a Hearing Officer, the Commission has broad powers under s. 87(8) of the PSA to confirm, vary or revoke the decision being appealed or to substitute its own decision for that of the chief of police or, as in this case, the hearing officer acting as designate. The Commission can also order a new hearing.

Standard of Review

34In a penalty appeal, the Commission reviews the hearing officer’s findings and the evidence to ensure that the penalty imposed is supportable by that evidence, is not based on an error in principle and is within the appropriate range of penalties for the circumstances and the offence committed. The hearing officer’s decision is entitled to deference.

35It is not our role to reweigh the dispositional factors, or to alter the penalty based on our views of the case and the appropriate penalty.¹ In Karklins v. Toronto (City) Police Service, 2010 Carswell Ont. 567 (Div. Ct.) at para 10, the Divisional Court affirmed the following description of the Commission’s role on a penalty appeal:

The role of the Commission on a penalty appeal is well established. Our function is not to second guess the Hearing Officer or substitute our opinion. Rather, it is to assess whether or not the Hearing Officer fairly and impartially applied the relevant dispositional principles to the case before him or her. We can only vary a penalty decision where there is a clear error in principle or relevant material facts are not considered. This is not something done lightly.

36The reasonableness standard does not require each element of the reasons to pass the reasonableness test, nor does it require the Commission to agree with the result. The reasonableness standard requires the Commission to determine whether the Hearing Officer’s reasons, taken as a whole, are tenable as support for the decision. In Ryan v. Law Society (New Brunswick), 2003 SCC 20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, [2003] S.C.J. No 17 at paras 50-56 the Supreme Court of Canada described the application of the reasonableness standard in the review of a tribunal decision:

A decision will be unreasonable only if there is no line of analysis within the given reasons that would reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived. If any of the reasons that are sufficient to support the conclusion are tenable in the sense that they can stand up to a somewhat probing examination, then the decision will not be unreasonable and a reviewing court must not interfere. . . This means that a decision may satisfy the reasonableness standard if it is supported by a tenable explanation even if this explanation is not one that the reviewing court finds compelling.

This does not mean that every element of the reasoning given must independently pass a test for reasonableness. The question is whether the reasons taken as a whole are tenable as support for the decision. At all times, a court applying a test of reasonableness must assess the basic adequacy of a reasoned decision remembering that the issue under review does not compel one specific result. Moreover, a reviewing court should not seize on one or more mistakes or elements of the decision which do not affect the decision as a whole.

The factors to consider in determining penalty

37The Commission has accepted a number of factors to be considered when assessing penalty. A comprehensive list of these factors is outlined by Paul Ceyssens in Legal Aspects of Policing.² That list includes:

• the nature and seriousness of the misconduct;
• the officer’s potential to reform and rehabilitate;
• damage to the reputation of the police force;
• public interest;
• the officer’s employment history and experience;
• the officer’s recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct;
• the need for general and specific deterrence;
• disability and other relevant personal circumstances;
• provocation;
• procedural fairness considerations;
• effect of any disposition on the police officer and the police officer’s family;
• effect of publicity;
• systemic failure and organization/institutional context; and
• consistency with prior disciplinary decisions.

38The relevance and importance of individual factors will vary depending on the circumstances of the case.

39The Hearing Officer identified many of the penalty factors at the outset of his analysis. In reaching his decision he focused in particular on the seriousness of the misconduct, the appellant’s ability to reform and rehabilitate, and damage to the reputation of the police force, including the damage that would occur should the officer remain on the force.

The positions of the parties

40The appellant argues that the Hearing Officer erred in his consideration of specific penalty factors, and that he failed to consider some relevant penalty factors altogether. The appellant also argues that the Hearing Officer misapprehended the period of the criminal harassment as taking place over two years (instead of five months), erred in relying on internet searches conduct by the appellant after he was charged criminally, and conducted the hearing in a manner that was unfair and breached natural justice by allowing materials not properly before the Hearing Officer in relation to an unrelated and unproven outstanding criminal charge.

41The appellant argues that the Hearing Officer imposed a penalty that was harsh and excessive and unwarranted by the particular facts of the case. The appellant asks the Commission to impose a lesser penalty.

42The BPS takes the position that the penalty of dismissal is reasonable. The BPS submits that the appellant is asking the Commission to reweigh the factors to reach a different decision, something it cannot do. The BPS asks the Commission to confirm the Hearing Officer’s decision.

The reasonableness of the Hearing Officer’s decision

(a) The nature and seriousness of the misconduct

43Dismissal of an officer is the most serious punishment that can be imposed in a disciplinary proceeding. The jurisprudence makes clear that it should be reserved for the most serious cases.³

44The reasons of the Hearing Officer repeatedly emphasize the nature and seriousness of the appellant’s offences. It is clear that this factor weighed very heavily in his decision.

45The Hearing Officer viewed the offences committed by the appellant as egregious. In our view, he was rightly troubled by the extended period over which the harassment and unauthorized searches took place. The Hearing Officer viewed the repeated and ongoing misconduct as showing deliberation. He contrasted the nature of the appellant’s misconduct with situations where an officer has made a single error in judgment. The Hearing Officer felt that the ongoing and deliberate nature of the misconduct elevated its seriousness and warranted greater punishment. We agree.

46The appellant argues that the Hearing Officer erred by misapprehending the period of harassment. In our view, the Hearing Officer’s assessment of the seriousness and deliberateness of the conduct would hold even if the shorter five-month period of harassment argued by the appellant applied. In our view, it was also appropriate to look at the entire history and course of conduct in determining penalty, something confirmed by the Court of Appeal on the appellant’s appeal from his convictions for criminal harassment and breach of trust.

47The Hearing Officer took a very dim view of the appellant’s unauthorized database searches, emphasizing the significance of the breach of public trust by a police officer, as well as the fact that police resources were used improperly (and repeatedly) for purpose of facilitating a criminal offence. In our view, the Hearing Officer’s concerns with the nature of this misconduct were not misplaced.

48Appellant’s counsel argues that the Hearing Officer erred by relying on internet searches relating to S.C. that the appellant conducted after he was charged criminally. These searches were not in violation of any bail conditions, related to criminal charges that were withdrawn, and were not referenced in the Notice of Hearing. The appellant contends that the post-charge internet searches caused the Hearing Officer to question whether the appellant truly recognized the seriousness and potential consequences of his conduct.

49In our view, nothing turns on the Hearing Officer’s references to the post-charge internet searches. The Hearing Officer’s reasons make clear that he viewed the conduct that was the subject of the appellant’s criminal convictions as egregious. The information on the additional searches did not take the matter “over the line” for the Hearing Officer. We find the references to additional post-charge internet searches did not impact the Hearing Officer’s decision in any meaningful way. They do not amount to an error in principle. For similar reasons, we reject the appellant’s argument that the Hearing Officer breached natural justice by considering materials (newspaper articles, the information, bail conditions) pertaining to the related, unproven and outstanding criminal charge.

50The crimes of criminal harassment and breach of trust are extremely serious ones – particularly for a police officer, given his position of public trust. The appellant’s offences also represent a serious abuse of power and are contrary to his oath of office and duties as a police officer. Police officers are rightly held to a higher standard, both on and off duty. We agree with the Hearing Officer’s comments that the type of behaviour displayed by the appellant “constitutes a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of an individual in his position of public trust.”

51In Krug and Ottawa Police Service, January 21, 2003 (OCCPS), the Commission spoke to the issue of the seriousness of the offence and the weight to be accorded to it and other factors:

There is no requirement that any one factor be given more weight than another. The seriousness of the offence alone may justify dismissal. Aggravating factors can serve to diminish the weight of any mitigating factors.

52In our view, it was reasonable for the Hearing Officer to give considerable weight to the nature and seriousness of the offences in determining the penalty in this case.

(b) The officer’s ability to reform and rehabilitate

53While appellant’s counsel acknowledged that the offences were serious, she argues that the Hearing Officer failed to adequately consider the appellant’s prospects for rehabilitation. She also submits that the Hearing Officer failed to properly consider the fact that the appellant had no previous disciplinary issues, failed to consider the numerous letters of support from police and community members, and erred in finding there was a potential risk to reoffend.

54The Hearing Officer did not fail to consider the appellant’s prospects for rehabilitation. He explicitly recognized the importance of the potential to reform or rehabilitate as a penalty factor. His reasons contain the following passage from Ceyssens, Legal Aspects of Policing:

. . .[R]rehabilitation is a very important and significant factor when considering an appropriate penalty. . .the commission believes that unless the offence is so egregious and unmitigated the opportunity to reform should be a significant consideration.

55The Hearing Officer went on to consider the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation, as well as some related factors. Among other things, he considered the information in an OPP Threat Assessment Report, and in a Psychological Assessment Report prepared by Dr. Rick Lindal prior to the appellant’s penalty hearing. While these reports contain somewhat mixed assessments, they highlight some potential risk factors based on the appellant’s personality profile and history. The Hearing Officer was entitled to conclude on the basis of this and other evidence that there was potential to reoffend and that the appellant’s prospects for rehabilitation were poor.

56The Hearing Officer acknowledged letters of support for the appellant, and the appellant’s apologies for his actions, but they were not sufficient to overcome his concerns about the nature and seriousness of the appellant’s offences.

57In previous cases the Commission has found that some actions by a police offer can be so serious that they justify little weight being given to the officer’s prospects for rehabilitation when determining penalty. See Favretto and OPP (2001) OPR 1540; 2004 CanLII 34173 (ON CA), [2004] OJ No. 4248. It was open to the Hearing Officer in the present case to give less weight to the evidence supporting the appellant’s rehabilitative potential in light of the facts and the Hearing Officer’s concerns about the nature and seriousness of the offences.

(c) Other penalty factors

58In his reasons for decision, the Hearing Officer addressed some of the other factors applicable in determining penalty. He considered the issues of specific and general deterrence, with particular weight given to specific deterrence. He was of the opinion that the appellant’s continuous breaches of the PBS policies and procedures demonstrated his disregard for the rules governing all police officers. The Hearing Officer felt the penalty imposed must send a strong message to the appellant that his conduct was inexcusable and would not be tolerated. He concluded that the reputation of the BPS was significantly damaged as a result of the appellant’s actions and the accompanying publicity.

59In assessing the damage to the reputation of the BPS and the appellant’s usefulness to the police force, the Hearing Officer expressed concern about the ten-year firearms prohibition imposed by Justice Tetley, as well as potential credibility issues the appellant might face when testifying in court if he were to remain on the police force. On the issue of credibility, the Hearing Officer wrote:

There is no doubt Constable Shorey’s credibility will be at issue if he was to remain a member of the Service. Constable Shorey’s credibility will be at issue each time he testifies as an officer. If this matter is not commonly known by defence attorneys, it will be. The circumstances of these matters can be delved into because they speak to Constable Shorey’s credibility. This could seriously jeopardize an investigation if Constable Shorey was involved and could call into question any evidence presented by him in court. Police officers in the performance of their duties must testify in criminal proceedings and be examined and cross examined on their testimony. The circumstances of this matter will affect Constable Shorey’s usefulness, and each time this occurs it will further damage the reputation of the Police Service.

60In our view it was open to the Hearing Officer to conclude that the credibility issues arising from the appellant’s criminal and disciplinary records would affect the appellant’s usefulness, and that they could create ongoing reputational damage for the BPS.

61In addressing the impact of the firearms prohibition, the Hearing Officer acknowledged the submissions of appellant’s counsel that there were areas within the BPS where the appellant could be positioned, even with the firearms prohibition in place. However, he concluded that the firearms prohibition “would clearly impede” the appellant’s ability to carry out his duties as a member of the BPS. In reaching this conclusion, the Hearing Officer spoke to the greater reputational impacts and practical challenges associated with a return to work in a smaller community like Belleville. On the issue of the practical challenges associated with returning the appellant to work, the respondent emphasized that the inability to carry a firearm is a more significant impediment in a smaller community where there is a greater need for all officers to be operational.

62Ultimately, the Hearing Officer concluded that the extent and degree of the appellant’s conduct, the reputational damage, and the challenges associated with a return to the force were such that his suitability and usefulness as an officer had been nullified.

63Again, these findings were open to the Hearing Officer on the evidence before him. We see no reason to disturb them.

(d) Consistency of penalties

64It is well established that penalties must be appropriate and consistent.

65The appellant’s counsel submitted that the penalty of dismissal is harsh and excessive and not within the range of what is reasonable in the circumstances. She put before us dozens of decisions involving unauthorized use of databases and harassment. The misconduct in these cases resulted in the imposition of far lesser penalties, including reprimand, forfeiture of pay, and demotion. Counsel argued that the penalty of dismissal in the appellant’s case cannot be reconciled with the penalties imposed in other cases.

66We carefully considered the many penalty decisions put forward by appellant’s counsel. It is true that these cases resulted in lesser penalties than the one imposed on the appellant. We note, however, that many of the officers in these cases who engaged in unauthorized database searches were found guilty of insubordination, neglect of duty, breach of rules, and code of conduct violations under the PSA, unlike the appellant who was found guilty of criminal breach of trust. Many of the officers involved also did not access the databases to facilitate the commission of a criminal offence.

67The penalties imposed in cases involving criminal harassment are more difficult to reconcile, but in our view the existence of decisions imposing lesser penalties is not sufficient to render the Hearing Officer’s decision unreasonable. Some of the decisions before us where lesser penalties were imposed can be distinguished on their facts. Additionally, when we look at all of the decisions submitted by both the appellant and the BPS we note a very wide range of penalties.

68Decisions cited by the BPS for abuse of police databases involved penalties ranging from forfeiture to dismissal. Cases for breach of trust by a police officer or other serious criminal offences resulted in penalties ranging from reduction in rank to dismissal. These decisions support a finding that the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Hearing Officer in this case is within the range of reasonable outcomes, even if it is at the highest end of that range.

69We also note that the existence of cases involving lesser penalties is not determinative. Assessments of appropriate penalties are fact-specific and nuanced. They can also shift over time, as we have seen with significantly lower tolerance – and more severe punishments – for crimes like drinking and driving and domestic abuse.

70There is growing understanding that harassment is a serious crime, with significant and sometimes devastating impacts on victims. Increased availability of information online has heightened concern with privacy rights and decreased public tolerance for database misuse, cyber-stalking and other privacy breaches. The Hearing Officer described the appellant’s offences as egregious. He concluded that the public can and will not tolerate such conduct by a police officer. We agree.

71There is no doubt that some police officers have been treated less harshly in the disciplinary process. However, while the penalty of dismissal was at the highest end of the range of penalties, it was available to the Hearing Officer on the facts of this case and his decision provides a reasonable basis for the penalty imposed. The penalty of dismissal is not disproportionate to the offence and falls within the range of possible, acceptable and defensible outcomes that were open to the Hearing Officer on the evidence. We see no basis to intervene.

VI. Conclusion

72The Hearing Officer’s reasons are not perfect. However, the reasonableness standard does not require the reasons to be perfect, nor does it require the Commission to agree with every element of the reasoning or the result. Had we been in the Hearing Officer’s shoes, we may well have viewed the appellant’s prospects for rehabilitation more positively, or assessed and weighed other penalty factors differently than the Hearing Officer. That said, the findings made by the Hearing Officer were available to him and fall within the reasonableness standard.

73The Hearing Officer provided a detailed review of the background events surrounding the appellant’s criminal offences, and he described the nature and elements of those offences. He identified and considered, to varying degrees, the key factors to be applied in determining a penalty. His reasons adequately explain the bases for his decision.

74In our view, the penalty of dismissal was available to the Hearing Officer and his written reasons provide reasonable support for the disposition of dismissal. None of the errors alleged by the appellant rise to the level of an overriding error in principle. While the Hearing Officer’s decision resulted in the imposition of the most serious penalty available, that penalty falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes that were open to the Hearing Officer on the evidence.

VII. Disposition

75Pursuant to section 87(8) of the PSA, the Commission confirms the decision of the Hearing Officer requiring the appellant to resign within seven days or be summarily dismissed.

Footnotes

1. 1See, for example, Markham and Waterloo Regional Police Service, February 13, 2015 (OCPC) at para 30; Karklins and Toronto Police Service, September 25, 2007 (OCCPS) at para 105.
2. 2Ceyssens Paul, Legal Aspects of Policing, loose-leaf (Saltspring Island: Earlscourt, 1994).
3. 3See, for example, PC Gregg and Midland PS (OCPC-2001); PC Cate v PRP (1998) OPR 1257; PC Carson v Pembroke PS (2001) OPR 1479; PC Favretto and OPP (2001) OPR 1540; 2004 CanLII 34173 (ON CA), [2004] OJ No. 4248 (CA).