Judy Hamilton

The plaintiffs, purchasers of pre-construction condominium and freehold units, brought motions for certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) against the development property after the original developer became insolvent and transferred the property to a new developer.

The purchase agreements contained non-registration clauses prohibiting the registration of CPLs.

The court found that while there was a triable issue regarding an interest in land based on constructive trust, the non-registration clauses and the equitable factors from Dhunna—including the lack of uniqueness of the property, the adequacy of damages, and the prejudice to new innocent purchasers—weighed heavily against granting the CPLs.

The motions were dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for default judgment after noting the defendants in default in an action for investment fraud.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to set aside the noting in default.

The court found that the defendants had engaged in a concerted effort to delay the proceedings and failed to provide any substantive evidence of a meritorious defence.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the noting in default and granted default judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the primary individual defendant liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract, and the defendant lawyer liable for negligent misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages, punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff attended a status hearing ordered by the Court of Appeal to establish a litigation timetable.

The remaining defendant argued the action should be dismissed for delay, citing the plaintiff's failure to advance the litigation since the appeal.

The court found that while the plaintiff's delay was unnecessary, it was not severe enough to warrant dismissal, especially given the defendant's own delay in delivering a statement of defence.

A litigation timetable was ordered.

The defendant corporate officer brought a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to strike a claim against him personally for inducing breach of contract.

The plaintiff alleged that the officer caused the corporate defendant to improperly draw on a letter of credit without the contractually required notice.

The court held that corporate officers are generally protected from personal liability unless the pleading alleges facts showing conduct outside the scope of authority or an independently actionable wrong.

The amended statement of claim contained only conclusory allegations and failed to plead sufficient material facts to establish a personal cause of action.

The claim against the officer was struck, but the plaintiff was granted leave to amend its pleading.

The applicant corporation sought an injunction to prevent approval of contracts related to a proposed light rail transit project in the Region of Waterloo.

The court found the applicant lacked standing, noting it was recently incorporated, had unknown ownership, and possessed no apparent assets or ratepayer status.

The court further held the principal failed to disclose a personal interest arising from expropriation of his property connected to the project, undermining the equitable basis for relief.

The applicant failed to provide an undertaking for damages, did not establish a strong prima facie case under the Planning Act, and failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or a balance of convenience favouring relief.

The application for an injunction was dismissed with costs.

The defendant, APP Capital Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of an employment contract and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff, the former CFO of the co-defendant corporation, claimed entitlement to compensation under a 2008 employment agreement following the sale of the corporation.

The court applied the framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin and found that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed regarding whether the moving party was bound by the 2008 agreement.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers due to incomplete documentary discovery and the potential for inconsistent verdicts, dismissing the motion.

The plaintiffs brought an action seeking a declaration that their mortgage debt to the defendants had been fully paid through a 'savings' agreement whereby the plaintiff worked off the debt on construction projects.

The defendant mortgagee counterclaimed for enforcement of the mortgages and a writ of possession.

The court found that the purported 'savings' agreement was a forgery and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim.

The court granted judgment to the defendant on the mortgages and authorized a writ of possession, but postponed its execution pending the outcome of a related proceeding concerning a recent power of sale transaction.

The applicants brought an application seeking declaratory relief requiring the respondent to contribute 50% of the carrying costs for a residential subdivision mortgage, relying on doctrines of unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and subrogation.

The respondent argued that the contractual agreements limited its investment and contained a mandatory arbitration clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the contractual terms provided a juristic reason for any alleged enrichment and explicitly ousted the court's jurisdiction in favour of arbitration.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis.