impaired operation

Michael Miller was charged with operating a conveyance while impaired and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He pleaded guilty to impaired operation and admitted possession of fentanyl, but denied possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial focused on whether the Crown could prove the trafficking purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable doubt as to the purpose of trafficking and convicted Miller of the lesser included offence of possession of fentanyl.

The Ontario Court of Justice found Biplove Kumar guilty of impaired operation and excess blood alcohol operation following a collision with an ambulance.

The court addressed multiple Charter challenges raised by Kumar, including alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter concerning unreasonable seizure, unlawful arrest, and rights to counsel.

The court found Kumar was not detained in the ambulance prior to arrest, that police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand, and that the police acted with reasonable diligence in facilitating access to counsel.

The court also rejected claims of excessive force and found Kumar’s testimony lacked credibility, relying heavily on body-worn camera footage and witness testimony.

This decision addresses the Charter challenges raised by Trevor Allen regarding his arrest and breath sample seizures for impaired operation and excessive blood alcohol concentration.

The court analyzed alleged breaches of sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, focusing on the timing and lawfulness of demands for breath samples using an Approved Screening Device (ASD) and an approved instrument at the police station.

The judge found that while there was a delay in informing Mr. Allen of his right to counsel, the delay was not egregious and did not justify exclusion of the breath evidence under section 24(2).

The seizure of breath samples was held to be lawful and taken as soon as practicable.

Ultimately, Mr. Allen was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant, Loveneet Kaur, appealed her conviction for impaired operation and operation with blood-alcohol concentration over 80, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s findings, including the rejection of the appellant’s evidence and the application of the statutory and common law tests for care and control.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no error in the trial judge’s analysis or application of the law.

The decision concerns a fatal boating accident in Toronto, where Filip Grkovski was charged with multiple counts of criminal negligence and impaired operation causing death and bodily harm.

The court found that the only viable route to conviction was if Grkovski was proven to be driving at the time of the crash.

After reviewing the evidence, the court found reasonable doubt as to who was driving and acquitted Grkovski of all charges.

This decision addresses charges against Julian Kroll for impaired operation of a conveyance under s. 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and possession of methamphetamine under s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court considered evidence from police officers, a drug recognition evaluator (DRE), and a toxicologist.

Despite the accused initially self-representing, counsel was later retained and cross-examined witnesses.

The judge found the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on observations of impairment, toxicology results, and the presumption under s. 320.31(6) of the Criminal Code corroborated by toxicological analysis.

The decision carefully weighs the credibility of witnesses and the limitations of evidence such as pupil dilation and inadmissible statements.

The appellant, Ann Marie Ahola, appealed her conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance by drug.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered because the trial judge’s reasons did not adequately address the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis—specifically, whether the appellant’s evidence, though rejected, nevertheless left the court with a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offence.

The decision reviews the evidence, the law on misapprehension of evidence, the standard for an unreasonable verdict, and the requirements for reasons in credibility cases.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Morgan Lindo’s application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding that although the total delay from the swearing of the Information to the last scheduled trial date exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials, the net delay after deducting defence delay was just under the ceiling.

The defence failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the trial, including delays in correcting contact information, scheduling trial conferences, and filing the 11(b) application.

The Court emphasized the need for defence counsel to act reasonably and proactively to avoid unreasonable delay and held that the delay was not markedly longer than reasonably necessary given the case complexity and local backlog.

The court considered the Crown's application under section 714.2 of the Criminal Code to permit a key witness, Ms. Kelly Zeng, to testify by Zoom from outside Canada.

The application arose after the Crown failed to subpoena Ms. Zeng before she left the country.

The defence argued that the Crown should not benefit from its own negligence.

The court agreed, finding it contrary to the principles of fundamental justice to allow remote testimony in these circumstances, and dismissed the application, but left open the possibility for the Crown to renew it if further information became available.

The Ontario Court of Justice found Raymond Vitellaro guilty of impaired operation of a conveyance, dangerous operation, and refusing to provide a bodily sample following a multi-vehicle collision caused by his driving.

The court carefully analyzed the right to counsel issues, concluding no breach occurred despite delays in contacting his counsel of choice.

The evidence, including dashcam footage and credible witness testimony, established that Vitellaro drove dangerously at high speed, distracted by opening a bag of Cheetos, and was impaired by narcotic analgesics (suboxone).

His refusal to provide a bodily sample was not excused by his explanations and was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also dismissed a Charter s 11(b) application for delay, attributing most delay to the defence.

This decision addresses a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice during a DUI investigation.

The court found that the accused was denied proper access to his chosen lawyer due to lost audio and unclear police procedures, resulting in a serious breach.

Although the accused received advice from duty counsel, he was dissatisfied and maintained his right to speak to his own lawyer.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) due to this breach.

On the merits, the Crown failed to prove impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to dismissal of both charges.

The court considered an application to exclude drug evidence on the basis of alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The applicant, Zachary Telford, was arrested for impaired operation after being found asleep in his vehicle, and subsequently charged with possession of fentanyl and other drugs.

The court found that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and that the subsequent searches and demands were lawful.

The only Charter breach identified was a 20-minute delay in facilitating access to duty counsel, which was found to be minor and not to justify exclusion of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, Jessica Werpny, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The key issues were whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was operating the vehicle and whether the accused could rely on the statutory exception under section 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code, which applies if alcohol was consumed after ceasing to operate the vehicle.

The court found that the accused remained in care and control of the vehicle and did not cease operating it, despite being stuck and consuming alcohol while seated in the driver's seat.

The presumption under section 320.35 applied and was not rebutted.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 offence but not guilty of impaired operation, as the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

This sentencing decision addresses the conviction of Cengiz Ay for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The court considered aggravating factors including dangerous driving towards a residential home, structural damage, evacuation due to gas smell, and high intoxication.

Mitigating factors included the isolated nature of the incident, no prior record, and family support.

The judge imposed a global conditional sentence of 90 days (60 days for impaired operation and 30 days consecutive for refusal), house arrest with specific exceptions, a 24-month probation period with conditions including ignition interlock and counselling, and a 27-month driving prohibition.

The decision balances public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

This decision addresses multiple Charter challenges raised by Bambot Njei-Bentley in relation to his arrest for impaired operation and refusal to provide breath samples under the Criminal Code.

The court carefully analyzed the validity of the breath demand, the reasonableness of the arrest, and the police's compliance with the informational and implementational duties under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The judge found no breaches of sections 8, 9, or 10(b) rights that would warrant exclusion of evidence.

The Crown was found to have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally and unequivocally refused to comply with a lawful breath demand without a reasonable excuse, resulting in a conviction on the refusal charge.

The impaired operation charge was dismissed on Crown's own admission.

The accused, Maninder Grewal, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) equal to or above 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The trial focused on several Charter-based arguments, including the lawfulness of his arrest and breath demand, breaches of his right to counsel (informational component and premature termination of call), arbitrary detention, and unreasonable search and seizure related to being videotaped while urinating.

The court found breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel (false dichotomy of options and premature termination) and s. 9 right to not be arbitrarily detained.

The court dismissed the s. 8 and s. 9 arguments related to the ASD/mouth alcohol issue and the privacy issue while urinating.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence due to the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches.

The defendant, Minh Vu Nguyen Dao, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating with a blood alcohol concentration over .08.

He challenged the admissibility of the Certificate of a Qualified Technician, alleging breaches of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found a one-minute delay in providing the informational component of the right to counsel, but deemed it not serious and without impact on the defendant's rights, thus not warranting exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

Regarding the implementational component, the court found that police provided a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel of choice, and the defendant's subsequent decision to speak with Duty Counsel was a valid choice.

Consequently, the Certificate was admitted, and the defendant was found guilty on both charges.

Mark Godwin pleaded not guilty to impaired operation and over 80 mg.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of Charter sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the police fulfilled their s. 10(b) obligations to facilitate access to counsel, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable (no s. 8 breach), and the continued detention was lawful (no s. 9 breach) given the accused's high blood alcohol readings.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges, concluding that the breath test results were admissible and that there was ample evidence of impairment even without the readings.

The accused, Ryan Schuster, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

The defence alleged breaches of the accused's Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b), and sought exclusion of breath readings.

The court summarily dismissed the section 9 breach allegation due to non-compliance with the Criminal Rules of the Ontario Court of Justice regarding factual pleading.

The court found no breaches of section 10(b), ruling that police were not obligated to advise the accused he could wait for specific counsel before speaking with duty counsel, nor were they required to re-offer counsel options after he expressed dissatisfaction with duty counsel, given the reasonable steps taken by the police.

Even if a breach occurred, the court stated it would not exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On the impaired operation charge, the court found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of circumstantial evidence, including driving behaviour, physical indicia, and belligerent conduct.

Mr. Osbourne was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance.

He was found asleep in the driver's seat of his car with the engine running, while intoxicated.

The court first determined if the presumption of operation under s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code was rebutted, finding that Mr. Osbourne did not intend to set the vehicle in motion.

However, the court then assessed whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Osbourne was in "care or control" of the vehicle, applying the three-part test from R. v. Boudreault.

Despite Mr. Osbourne's good intentions, the court found that his conduct (being highly intoxicated, in a running vehicle, on a busy street, without a reliable plan or phone) created a realistic risk of danger to the public, either by inadvertently setting the car in motion or changing his mind to drive while impaired.

He was found guilty.