impaired operation

The Crown appealed the trial judge's dismissal of impaired operation and "over 80" charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found the certificate of qualified technician (CQT) inadmissible because the Crown failed to prove that the respondent was "given" a copy of the certificate as required by section 320.32(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by requiring proof beyond merely showing the document to the accused.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding was a question of fact, not law, and that "given" requires permanent transfer of the document to the accused, not merely temporary display.

The accused, Travis Roopchand, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of 80 mg.

The court found that the Crown proved identity beyond a reasonable doubt, establishing Roopchand as the driver.

However, the court acquitted Roopchand of impaired operation, finding insufficient evidence of impairment beyond the accident and an odour of alcohol.

Regarding the "Over 80" charge, the defence argued for exclusion of breath test results due to alleged Charter breaches (sections 8, 9, and 10(a)).

The court found no Charter breaches, or in the alternative, that any minor breach was inadvertent and would not warrant exclusion under a s. 24(2) Grant analysis.

Consequently, the breath test results were admitted, and Roopchand was found guilty of the "Over 80" charge.

The defendant, Thisock Seevaratnam, was charged with Impaired Operation and 80 plus Operation.

The trial addressed several Charter issues, including reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the informational component of the right to counsel (s. 10(b)), police questioning post-assertion of right to counsel, insufficient efforts to contact counsel of choice, and lost video evidence (s. 7 violation).

The court found a s. 10(b) violation for failure to contact counsel of choice (Peter Connelly) and a s. 7 violation for lost video evidence, but admitted the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding no irreparable prejudice to the defence.

Ultimately, the court found the defendant guilty of both charges, concluding that impairment was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of evidence.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, brought a motion to re-open a pre-trial Charter application, seeking to exclude evidence of his refusal to provide a breath sample.

The basis for the motion was an alleged material change in circumstances, specifically that the arresting officer, PC Shannon Swiderski, had embellished her testimony at trial regarding the odour of alcohol, thereby undermining her credibility and the lawfulness of the initial arrest and subsequent breath demand.

The court found that while the officer's trial testimony was indeed an embellishment, it did not constitute a material change that would have likely altered the original finding that she had honest, subjective, and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

Consequently, the motion to re-open the Charter application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired operation and excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had found breaches of the respondent's s.10(a) and s.10(b) Charter rights, leading to the exclusion of breath samples and acquittal.

The appeal court found no s.10(a) breach but upheld the trial judge's finding of a s.10(b) Charter breach, agreeing with the assessment of "flagrant disrespect" by the police.

Consequently, the appeal court affirmed the trial judge's decision to exclude the breath sample evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter and upheld the acquittal.

The defendant, Marta Bueno Troncoso, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with over the legal limit of alcohol.

The court found a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter rights due to an unexplained delay in providing rights to counsel and a failure to facilitate her right to counsel of choice, leading to the exclusion of breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court dismissed claims of s. 8 and s. 10(a) breaches, and found no arbitrary detention under s. 9.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty of the over-limit charge.

However, based on civilian and police observations of impairment, the defendant was found guilty of impaired operation, as alcohol was a contributing factor to her impairment, notwithstanding her claim of fatigue.

The defendant, Gerard Gopaul, faced charges of impaired operation, 80 plus operation, taking a motor vehicle without owner's consent, and possession of cocaine.

The court addressed several Charter applications, finding violations of sections 8 (unlawful strip search, lost video evidence) and 10(a) and (b) (failure to advise of drug jeopardy, insufficient steps for counsel of choice).

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court excluded the cocaine and breath test evidence due to the seriousness and cumulative impact of the Charter breaches.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty of taking a motor vehicle without consent and impaired operation, but the charges related to cocaine and 80 plus operation were effectively dismissed due to the exclusion of evidence.

The accused, Sethuraman Sarvanantharajah, was charged with impaired operation and operation over the legal limit after striking a parked car.

The court addressed several issues, including the time of driving, proof of impairment, reasonable grounds for arrest, and alleged breaches of Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the Crown proved the time of driving and impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds.

Furthermore, the court determined there was no unreasonable delay in contacting counsel and that the police were not obligated to provide detailed grounds for arrest to counsel during the initial consultation, as such information could be obtained from the client or through disclosure.

The accused was found guilty of both charges, with a conditional stay on the impaired driving charge.

The accused was found unconscious in a running vehicle on a snowbank, exhibiting signs of severe intoxication.

Charged with impaired operation and operating over 80 mg%, the defence argued a Charter s. 10(b) breach, claiming the accused's waiver of the right to counsel was not informed or unequivocal due to his condition, and challenged the impairment evidence.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility and reliability.

It held that the police fulfilled their duty to inform the accused of his right to counsel, and his repeated declinations were unambiguous, not triggering a further duty to inquire despite his intoxication.

The court concluded that the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, finding the accused's physical and mental faculties were completely impaired by alcohol.

The Charter application was dismissed, and findings of guilt were entered for both counts, with the over 80 mg% count stayed under the rule against multiple convictions.

The accused, charged with impaired operation, objected to the admissibility of Intoxilyzer printouts and breath technician/analyst certificates.

The defence argued that the analyst's certification of the solution could not be proven by the breath technician's viva voce evidence or certificate, citing R. v. Goldson.

The court rejected this argument, affirming that a Supreme Court of Canada refusal of leave to appeal does not add precedential value to a lower court decision.

Following Ontario precedent, the court found the breath technician's evidence and certificate admissible to prove the solution was certified by an analyst, and that the analyst's certificate, though referring to an old section, was sufficient to establish suitability for the Intoxilyzer.

The objection was dismissed, and the evidence was admitted.

The defendant, Jia Qiong Shen, faced charges of impaired operation and operation over 80.

The court addressed several admissibility issues, including a Charter s. 8 challenge to a key fob found on the defendant, a s. 9 challenge to the lawfulness of her arrest, and ss. 10(a) and (b) challenges to the admissibility of breath test results.

Additionally, the voluntariness of post-breath test utterances was contested.

The court found the arrest lawful and the key fob admissible.

While the Crown conceded ss. 10(a) and (b) breaches due to delays in providing rights in Mandarin, the court admitted the breath test results under a s. 24(2) analysis, deeming the breaches moderate and the evidence reliable and essential.

However, the post-test utterances were excluded as the Crown failed to prove their voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, the court found the defendant guilty of both impaired operation and operation over 80 based on circumstantial evidence and the admitted breath test results.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in considering an involuntary statement but applied the curative proviso, deeming the error harmless given overwhelming evidence of impairment and realistic risk of danger.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction.

The accused, Manish Kumar, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on civilian and police observations of erratic driving, physical indicia of impairment, and consciousness of guilt.

However, the court excluded the breath test results for the "80 and over" charge under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the accused, whose first language was Punjabi, understood and could meaningfully exercise his right to counsel, constituting a serious Charter violation.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty of the "80 and over" charge.

Hayden Bieber pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a conveyance, possession of property obtained by crime, possession of a weapon dangerous to public peace (all Criminal Code offences), and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking (Controlled Drugs and Substances Act).

The offences occurred following a traffic stop where police found drugs, cash, and brass knuckles.

Bieber, 25, had no prior criminal record and had made significant efforts towards rehabilitation, including abstaining from drugs for a year and attending Narcotics Anonymous.

The Crown sought a 4-year incarceration, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day, or a sentence in the upper reformatory/lower penitentiary range if incarceration was necessary.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence for fentanyl trafficking, finding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate despite Bieber's rehabilitative efforts and lack of criminal record.

The judge imposed a global sentence of 36 months (3 years) of imprisonment, after applying credit for pre-sentence release conditions and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and forfeiture/destruction of seized substances.

The defendant, William Leahy, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his ability was impaired by a drug.

He was found passed out in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the engine running.

The court addressed whether the defendant rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code, and if so, whether the Crown proved de facto care or control by demonstrating a realistic risk of danger.

The court found that the defendant rebutted the presumption, distinguishing prior case law (Hatfield and Miller) by emphasizing that the impaired occupancy of the driver's seat did not begin with an intention to set the vehicle in motion.

The court also found no realistic risk that the defendant would change his mind and drive or unintentionally set the vehicle in motion.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty.

The accused, Seleshi Robi, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The defence argued involuntary intoxication, claiming the accused was unaware that the traditional Ethiopian drink, Tej, consumed at a church celebration, contained alcohol.

The defence also attributed erratic driving and physical observations to extreme fatigue and back pain.

The court found the accused's testimony regarding his lack of knowledge about Tej's alcohol content and his English comprehension to be incredible and unreliable, given his statements to police and the nature of the drink.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, dismissing the defence of involuntary intoxication and finding the accused guilty.

The accused, Hamidkhan Pathan, was charged with impaired operation and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He conceded impairment and BAC but denied operating the vehicle.

The court assessed the credibility of the Crown's witnesses (a 911 caller and a police officer) and found them credible and reliable.

The accused's testimony was rejected due to intoxication, inconsistencies with external evidence, and illogical claims.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the vehicle as alleged, leading to a conviction.

The appellant, Lerrell Stennett, appealed his convictions for dangerous operation and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and an ancillary victim surcharge order.

The accident involved the appellant losing control of his vehicle on a wet highway, resulting in multiple collisions and serious injuries to himself and passengers.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on circumstantial evidence of excessive speed for the conditions and a projected blood alcohol concentration indicating impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no improper inference from consequences, and no circular reasoning.

The court allowed the appeal from sentence only to set aside the victim surcharges, as the regime was later ruled unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) analysis and providing insufficient reasons.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her credibility findings were entitled to deference, and she properly applied the W.(D.) principles and provided adequate reasons.

The applicant, Christie Ann Culotta, faced five counts related to impaired and dangerous operation of a vessel causing bodily harm.

Both the Crown and defence brought pre-trial applications.

The Crown sought to admit utterances and a written statement as voluntary.

The defence sought to exclude these statements and evidence derived from seized blood samples and medical records, alleging breaches of Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court ruled that the applicant's utterances in the ambulance and her subsequent written statement were voluntary and admissible.

However, the court found that the sealing of additional blood vials by police, with the lab technician's involvement, constituted an unlawful and warrantless seizure in violation of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights, and this evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The court also found that the initial arrest for impaired operation lacked reasonable and probable grounds, but this did not lead to the exclusion of the statements.

The search warrant for medical records was upheld as valid.