Impaired driving

The applicant was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to section 320.27(2) of the Criminal Code, which permits police officers to demand a breath sample from drivers of motor vehicles without any suspicion of alcohol consumption.

The applicant alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while section 320.27(2) engages section 8 protections, the search and seizure is reasonable and constitutional.

The court also found that any breach of section 9 rights is justified under section 1 of the Charter, and that section 10(b) rights are appropriately suspended during brief roadside sobriety investigations.

The applicant was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

A citizen called 911 reporting dangerous driving, and police observed the vehicle swerving between lanes, nearly striking a parked bus.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer detected a strong odour of alcohol and observed signs of impairment.

The defence challenged the arrest and detention under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, and disputed the Crown's proof of impairment.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest, no arbitrary detention, and no breach of the right to counsel despite language barriers.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, with the second count stayed under the Kienapple rule.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit.

The accused conceded her impairment, her elevated blood alcohol content, and that she was driving, but claimed she did not voluntarily consume the alcohol necessary to exceed the legal limit, asserting instead that a companion had spiked her drink with an unknown drug, rendering her unconscious and incapable of making conscious decisions about drinking and driving.

The court rejected the accused's characterization of the defence as a mens rea issue and determined it was an actus reus issue involving a claim of involuntary conduct akin to automatism.

The court found the accused bore the burden of proving involuntary conduct on a balance of probabilities and failed to meet this burden.

The court rejected the accused's claim of amnesia as not credible and found no evidentiary foundation for the claim of drug-induced impairment.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having excess alcohol in his system.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of his vehicle, intoxicated, with the vehicle stopped in the middle lane of eastbound traffic on Sheppard Avenue East at Don Mills Road at approximately 2:00 a.m.

The Crown's case was that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The defence argued that the accused's girlfriend had been driving and that the accused was placed in the driver's seat by his girlfriend while she cleaned up vomit, and that he was waiting for his father to pick them up.

The trial judge found that although the accused did not drive the vehicle to the location, he engaged in a course of conduct associated with the motor vehicle that posed a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, thereby establishing care or control under the third route identified in case law.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with the impaired care or control charge stayed to avoid double punishment.

The defendant was found asleep in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with missing front tires and damaged rims at 1:53 AM on a roadway.

Police arrested him for impaired care or control and made a breath demand.

The defendant's breath samples registered over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

The defendant was charged with both Over 80 and Impaired Care or Control and challenged the constitutionality of the arrest and breath demand on multiple Charter grounds.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the defendant on both counts, finding that the officer had reasonable grounds for the arrest and that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol and having 80 mg or more of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

She brought a Charter application to exclude breath test evidence, alleging breaches of her s. 10(b) (right to counsel), s. 8 (search and seizure), and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

The defendant argued that the approved screening device demand was not made immediately, that she was not advised of her right to counsel during the delay caused by her chewing gum, and that her arrest was arbitrary.

The court found that the demand was made immediately, that the delay was too brief to require the officer to facilitate access to counsel, and that the defendant's Charter rights were not infringed.

The application was dismissed and the breath test evidence was admitted.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a RIDE stop in Mississauga where he registered a fail on an approved screening device.

At trial, the Crown sought to rely on breath samples showing readings of 130 and 120 mg/100mL.

The defence raised three Charter arguments: (1) that the Crown failed to establish the concentration of the alcohol standard solution for the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31 of the Criminal Code; (2) that the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) was breached by failing to facilitate his request to contact a friend to obtain his lawyer of choice and by "funnelling" him toward duty counsel; and (3) that the accused's right to be free from arbitrary detention under s. 9 was breached by being held for approximately two hours after the breath tests without a timely assessment of his suitability for release.

The court found breaches of s. 10(b) and s. 9, and excluded the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours after ceasing to operate a conveyance, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the roadside breath demand and alleged breaches of his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to demand a roadside sample based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's dazed appearance, slow and deliberate movements, and apparent hand-eye coordination difficulties following a serious motor vehicle accident.

The court also found no breach of the accused's s. 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated understanding of his rights and provided cogent responses to questioning.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with Operation Over 80 and Exceed 80 following a motor vehicle stop on Highway 401.

An off-duty officer observed erratic driving and called for uniformed officers.

The off-duty officer detained the accused for 36 minutes without providing Charter rights to counsel.

When the uniformed officer arrived, an Approved Screening Device demand was made 45 minutes after the initial stop.

The accused challenged the validity of the roadside demand and the admissibility of the breath samples on Charter grounds.

The court found breaches of s. 10(b) rights due to the delay in making the roadside demand and the failure to provide a realistic opportunity to consult counsel.

The breath samples were excluded under s. 24(2).

The Exceed 80 charge was dismissed.

However, the court found the accused guilty of Operation Impaired based on the pattern of erratic driving observed prior to the stop.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample after police responded to a noise complaint at her residence.

The accused was found sitting in the driver's seat of a van in her driveway with the keys in the ignition and beer cans in the centre console.

The trial judge found that while the accused was in the driver's seat and had consumed alcohol, the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was impaired or that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The judge also found that the breath demand was not made in unequivocal terms and therefore did not constitute a valid demand.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs per 100 mls of blood and impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was arrested following a motor vehicle collision after police observed him attempting to reverse the vehicle from the scene.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging excessive use of force during arrest, seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence or a stay of proceedings.

The court found no breach of section 7 Charter rights, as the police use of force was reasonable and proportional given the dynamic emergency circumstances.

The court also rejected the accused's alternative arguments for exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) and found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of circumstances.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a December 6, 2018 incident where a civilian witness observed erratic driving on Highway 403 and called 911.

Police attended at an ice arena parking lot where the defendant was located.

The defendant failed a roadside screening device test and was arrested.

Breath samples revealed readings of 340 and 330 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant brought Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the detention, the timing of the ASD demand, the provision of rights to counsel, and the reasonableness of grounds for arrest.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the defendant guilty of both offences.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown withdrew the charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mgs. of alcohol in 100 mls. of blood.

The trial addressed two issues: the admissibility of roadside observations and whether the accused was impaired while operating his motor vehicle.

The court found that observations made when the accused exited his vehicle were admissible because the officer had valid reasons for requesting the exit, including officer safety and the practical administration of an Approved Screening Device test.

On the merits, the court found the accused guilty based on the totality of the evidence, including observations of sudden braking, stuttered parking, odour of alcohol, lack of balance, slurred speech, swaying, and word confusion.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed all Charter applications and found the breath samples admissible and reliable.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the approved screening device demand, the officer's misstatement regarding calibration did not undermine reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, there was no realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the ASD arrived, and the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100ml following a traffic stop.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving observed by a civilian witness, observations by police officers at the roadside and station, and approved breath test results of 297 and 280 mg/100ml.

The accused claimed his driving errors and physical symptoms resulted from medical conditions including post-chemotherapy spasms and medication non-compliance.

The court found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on credible evidence from the civilian witness and police officers, rejecting the accused's medical explanation as not credible.

The court also dismissed Charter applications regarding the timing of the approved instrument demand and the duration of detention.

The accused was found guilty on the impaired driving count, while the "Over 80" count was stayed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether the accused's Charter rights were violated and whether evidence should be excluded.

The court found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel of choice when police failed to wait a reasonable period for the accused's preferred counsel to return a call before offering duty counsel.

However, the court found the accused was in care and control of the vehicle and was impaired by alcohol.

The breath sample evidence was excluded due to the Charter violation, resulting in dismissal of the "over 80" charge but conviction on the impaired driving charge.

The Crown appealed with leave from a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision dismissing the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on a charge of driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The respondent was stopped by police who were investigating a report of an impaired driver in a pickup truck.

The respondent was driving a different colored pickup truck but was stopped under the Highway Traffic Act for sobriety purposes.

The trial judge found Charter breaches and excluded the breathalyzer evidence and statements.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by characterizing the stop as an investigative detention rather than a lawful traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court allowed the appeal and entered a conviction.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with failing to stop and provide his name and address at the scene of an accident contrary to section 252 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called evidence from a civilian witness, three police officers, and an expert toxicologist.

The accused testified and raised Charter violations.

The court found no Charter breaches, rejected the accused's evidence regarding post-accident drinking as fabricated, and found the Crown proved the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court acquitted on the section 252 charge, finding the accused provided his cell phone number and did not intend to escape liability.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples on the grounds that they were not obtained as soon as practicable, contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code and breaching the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found a breach occurred due to unexplained delays totalling approximately one hour between the demand and the first breath sample.

However, the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the breach was not serious state conduct, the intrusion was minimal, and the public interest in prosecuting impaired driving was significant.

On the merits, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and failure to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded the second charge and it was dismissed.

The court found the defendant guilty of the first charge.

The central issue was whether the defendant had care and control of the vehicle.

The court found that the defendant's actual operation of the vehicle—moving it from a gas pump to a parking spot—established care and control.

The defendant's intoxication was established through witness testimony and video evidence.