Dangerous driving causing death

The accused, a 25-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and failure to remain at the scene of an accident.

The accused struck and killed a 94-year-old pedestrian while speeding in a busy tourist area, then fled the scene in panic.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the driving conduct and flight against the mitigating factors of the accused's youth, positive background, genuine remorse, and guilty pleas.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence while applying the principle of restraint for youthful first offenders, the court imposed a total sentence of 21 months in custody and a five-year driving prohibition.

The offender, a transport truck driver, pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death after rear-ending a stopped vehicle in a highway construction zone, killing two young men.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victims' families, the offender's prior driving record, and his status as a Convention refugee facing potential deportation.

The court found that the proposed sentence of five months to avoid immigration consequences was entirely inadequate given the gravity of the offences.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years in the penitentiary and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding circumstantial identification and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehensions of evidence and concluding that a properly instructed jury could have found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death and his sentence of five years' imprisonment and a fifteen-year driving prohibition.

The appellant had fallen asleep at the wheel, drifted into oncoming traffic, and caused a fatal head-on collision after falsifying his driving logs to avoid rest obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of the offence and the distinction from dangerous driving causing death.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's deliberate disregard for safety rules and the need for specific deterrence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle accident that killed his son.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and inconsistent with his acquittal for impaired driving, asserting that his alcohol consumption should not have been considered.

The Court of Appeal held that alcohol consumption short of impairment is relevant to the mens rea of dangerous driving.

The court also rejected arguments regarding Crown misconduct, jury misdirection, and pre-trial applications.

The court dismissed the fresh evidence application and upheld the sentence of nine months' imprisonment, finding it was not demonstrably unfit.

The accused, an on-duty police officer, was tried before a jury for dangerous driving causing death after striking a pedestrian while driving an unmarked police vehicle at 115 km/h.

At the pre-charge conference, the Crown requested that the included offence of dangerous operation simpliciter be left with the jury, arguing they might find the driving dangerous but have a reasonable doubt about causation due to the pedestrian jaywalking.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to the included offence, finding that even if the pedestrian's actions were an intervening act, the dangerous driving remained a significant contributing cause of death.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death after striking a 13-year-old pedestrian while driving 152 km/h in a 50 km/h zone.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider evidence regarding his speed and erred in assessing legal causation, specifically whether the victim running onto the road was an intervening act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the speed evidence lacked probative force and the appellant's dangerous driving was a significant contributing cause of the death.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of criminal negligence causing death and leaving the scene of an accident, but acquitted of dangerous driving causing death arising from the same conduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdicts for criminal negligence and dangerous driving to be necessarily inconsistent, as the jury found a marked and substantial departure but not a marked departure.

The conviction for criminal negligence was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The conviction for leaving the scene was also set aside due to a flawed jury instruction on 'evidence to the contrary', and a new trial was ordered on that count.

The court considered whether police could, without a warrant or consent, enter a damaged vehicle at a fatal collision scene and download Event Data Recorder information showing speed, braking, and accelerator position in the seconds before impact.

Applying the totality of the circumstances privacy analysis, the court held that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicle and in the EDR data, and that the warrantless download breached s. 8 of the Charter.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court found the breach was at the low end of seriousness given the unsettled state of the law at the time and admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The voir dire was therefore dismissed and the EDR evidence remained admissible at trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of dangerous driving causing death arising from a highway collision after attempting to pass three vehicles on a wet two-lane road while cresting a hill in heavy traffic.

The court held that the trial judge gave careful and thorough reasons and committed no reviewable error in finding that the passing manoeuvre was dangerous and a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The court rejected appellate calculations advanced to challenge the factual findings, noting they had not been tested through the trial process and did not undermine the trial judge's reasoning.

The court also upheld the finding that evasive action and loss of control by the oncoming vehicle were foreseeable consequences of the appellant's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a violation of s. 8 after police accessed and downloaded data from the airbag control module (ACM) of his vehicle without a warrant following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The court held that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data stored on the vehicle’s onboard computer and that the police conduct in entering the vehicle, cutting the flooring, and imaging the data constituted an unreasonable warrantless search.

However, applying the framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The breach was moderate, the evidence was reliable and real, and society’s interest in adjudicating a fatal dangerous driving charge on its merits was high.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At trial, the defence called a psychiatrist who testified that the appellant's schizophrenia may have affected his appreciation of the risk of his driving.

On cross-examination, the Crown elicited hearsay evidence from the appellant's medical records regarding prior violent incidents to suggest the appellant had anger management issues.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the limited permissible use of this bad character evidence and its hearsay nature.

The Crown also invited the jury to engage in prohibited propensity reasoning during closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal found these non-directions fatal to the verdicts, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.