J. De Filippis

The offender was found guilty of sexually assaulting a sleeping victim while intoxicated.

The Crown sought a nine-month custodial sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence order and an exemption from SOIRA registration.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's high moral blameworthiness and lack of insight.

The court sentenced the offender to four months in jail followed by two years of probation, and denied the SOIRA exemption.

The accused, a 25-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and failure to remain at the scene of an accident.

The accused struck and killed a 94-year-old pedestrian while speeding in a busy tourist area, then fled the scene in panic.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the driving conduct and flight against the mitigating factors of the accused's youth, positive background, genuine remorse, and guilty pleas.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence while applying the principle of restraint for youthful first offenders, the court imposed a total sentence of 21 months in custody and a five-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was found guilty of incest and sexual assault against his 18-year-old half-sister.

The victim awoke to find the defendant sexually assaulting her.

The court considered the defendant's difficult childhood and lack of a prior criminal record as mitigating factors, but noted the lack of remorse and the significant harm caused to the victim.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, the court sentenced the defendant to two years less one day in custody, followed by one year of probation.

The accused was charged with break and enter and committing aggravated assault as a party to the offence.

Two men broke into the victim's motel cabin and repeatedly stabbed him.

The accused arrived with the assailants, waited outside the cabin during the attack, and fled with them.

The Crown alleged she acted as a lookout and aided or abetted the crime.

The court found that while the attack was targeted and the accused likely knew of it, mere presence is insufficient for party liability.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused provided actual assistance or encouragement.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown applied to remove the accused's counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine.

The accused's employer, an unindicted co-conspirator in the same investigation, had previously declined to give a statement to police and referred them to the same lawyer, claiming him as his own counsel.

The court found that a confidential relationship likely existed between the employer and the lawyer, creating a realistic risk of a conflict of interest that could adversely affect trial fairness and the integrity of the justice system.

The application was granted and the lawyer was removed as counsel.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging breaches of his rights to counsel and privacy.

The court dismissed the s. 10(b) claims, finding the brief delay in providing rights to counsel was justified and the accused freely chose to speak to duty counsel.

However, the court found a s. 8 breach because the accused was video recorded urinating in his cell without reasonable privacy measures.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police's ongoing failure to address washroom privacy despite prior judicial pronouncements.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter motion arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice was violated.

The arresting officer's field notes indicated the defendant asked for a specific lawyer, but her typed report stated he had no preference and was fine with duty counsel.

Due to the material inconsistency and the officer's lack of independent recollection, the court found a s. 10(b) violation.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicants, two young persons charged with multiple counts of robbery, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay between arrest and the scheduled seven-day trial was approximately 13 months.

The court applied the Morin framework, finding that while the delay was longer than ideal for a youth court matter, it was largely attributable to neutral inherent time requirements, including bail proceedings and retaining counsel.

The institutional delay of just over nine months was deemed reasonable given the complexity of the case, and the motion was dismissed.

The applicants, facing multiple fraud-related charges, applied under section 523(2) of the Criminal Code to vacate their pre-trial detention orders.

They argued that new proposed sureties constituted a material change in circumstances justifying release.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a material change in the strength of the Crown's case, and that the newly proposed sureties were unsuitable to supervise the applicants.

The accused, a young person at the time of the events, was charged with multiple sexual assaults against a younger cousin occurring between 2003 and 2008.

The complainant disclosed the allegations years later and provided evolving accounts during police interviews, discussions with Crown counsel, and trial testimony.

The court found significant inconsistencies between prior statements and trial evidence, raising reasonable doubt about many alleged incidents.

However, the accused had provided a videotaped police statement admitting to a single incident involving sexual touching when he was thirteen and the complainant was seven.

Relying on that admission and finding the complainant confused but not dishonest, the court convicted the accused of sexual assault for that incident.