Blood alcohol concentration

This decision addresses a Charter application in a case involving impaired driving charges against Francisco Osorio.

The court considered alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter related to the timing and administration of a Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST), the grounds for arrest and breath demand, the failure to provide an interpreter, and the length of detention.

The court found the SFST demand was timely and lawful, no Charter breach arose from the administration protocols or reliance on the SFST results despite the defendant's medical condition (BPPV), and no breach occurred regarding the interpreter or detention length.

The impaired operation charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt, but the blood alcohol concentration charge was upheld.

The appellant, Loveneet Kaur, appealed her conviction for impaired operation and operation with blood-alcohol concentration over 80, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s findings, including the rejection of the appellant’s evidence and the application of the statutory and common law tests for care and control.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no error in the trial judge’s analysis or application of the law.

This decision addresses the timing and legality of police detention and breath sample demands in an impaired driving case involving Erin Wanner.

The court found that Ms. Wanner was not detained until the police demanded a breath sample using an approved screening device (ASD).

The Crown failed to prove that the screening demand was made immediately upon forming reasonable suspicion, resulting in breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Despite these breaches, the breath sample evidence was admitted under section 24(2) because excluding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Wanner was the driver who crashed into a light pole with three children as passengers and found her guilty.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered whether section 320.19(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, which mandates a minimum $1,000 fine for impaired operation of a conveyance, is unconstitutional as it prevents eligibility for a discharge.

The offender, Tyler Piccin, pleaded guilty to impaired operation with an extremely high blood alcohol concentration (447mg/100mL).

The Court followed a two-stage approach: first considering an appropriate sentence, including the possibility of a discharge, and only then addressing the constitutional challenge if a discharge was appropriate.

The Court found that despite the offender’s significant rehabilitation efforts and supportive family, the severity of the offence and public safety concerns outweighed the benefits of a discharge.

The Court imposed a $2,000 fine, a one-year driving prohibition, and probation with conditions, concluding that a discharge would be contrary to the public interest and undermine Parliament’s intent.

This decision addresses a Charter application challenging the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence and other related evidence in a case involving impaired driving, operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml, and dangerous driving.

The court carefully analyzed the issues of identity of the driver, the reliability of the alcohol screening device (ASD) fail result considering residual mouth alcohol, the lawfulness of detention in the police cruiser during the alcohol screening demand, and the timing of the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter but did find a minor breach of section 10(b) due to a brief delay in providing the right to counsel.

The breathalyzer evidence was admitted, and the accused was found guilty of the "80 plus" offence but not guilty of impaired driving or dangerous driving.

This decision concerns the prosecution of Aysar Younes for two counts each of impaired driving/over 80 causing death and dangerous driving causing death, arising from a fatal collision on Highway 2 in Trenton, Ontario.

The court addresses the admissibility and reliability of blood alcohol evidence, the continuity of evidence, and the legal standards for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court finds the evidence of blood alcohol concentration and impairment reliable and sufficient, and concludes that Younes' conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, resulting in conviction on all counts.

The accused, Jessica Werpny, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The key issues were whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was operating the vehicle and whether the accused could rely on the statutory exception under section 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code, which applies if alcohol was consumed after ceasing to operate the vehicle.

The court found that the accused remained in care and control of the vehicle and did not cease operating it, despite being stuck and consuming alcohol while seated in the driver's seat.

The presumption under section 320.35 applied and was not rebutted.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 offence but not guilty of impaired operation, as the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, Maninder Grewal, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) equal to or above 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The trial focused on several Charter-based arguments, including the lawfulness of his arrest and breath demand, breaches of his right to counsel (informational component and premature termination of call), arbitrary detention, and unreasonable search and seizure related to being videotaped while urinating.

The court found breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel (false dichotomy of options and premature termination) and s. 9 right to not be arbitrarily detained.

The court dismissed the s. 8 and s. 9 arguments related to the ASD/mouth alcohol issue and the privacy issue while urinating.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence due to the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches.

The defendant, Minh Vu Nguyen Dao, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating with a blood alcohol concentration over .08.

He challenged the admissibility of the Certificate of a Qualified Technician, alleging breaches of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found a one-minute delay in providing the informational component of the right to counsel, but deemed it not serious and without impact on the defendant's rights, thus not warranting exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

Regarding the implementational component, the court found that police provided a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel of choice, and the defendant's subsequent decision to speak with Duty Counsel was a valid choice.

Consequently, the Certificate was admitted, and the defendant was found guilty on both charges.

The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of ceasing to operate it, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application, arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel for being denied re-consultation after providing the first breath sample.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no objective change in circumstances (new procedure, change in jeopardy, or deficient initial advice) as per R. v. Sinclair and R. v. Tahmasebi.

On the merits, the defence conceded all elements except the Crown's failure to prove the time the defendant ceased operating the conveyance.

The court held that the Crown must establish, directly or indirectly, whether the first breath sample was taken within two hours of driving ceasing to satisfy s. 320.14(1)(b) or to rely on the presumption in s. 320.31(4).

As the Crown failed to prove the time of driving, the charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control of a conveyance and exceeding the legal blood alcohol concentration, along with a provincial offence for having open liquor in a motor vehicle.

The central issue was whether the defendant was in "care and control" of the vehicle for the criminal charges.

The court found that the defendant successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control by demonstrating he did not intend to drive.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove actual care and control beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was no realistic risk of danger from the stationary vehicle or that the defendant would change his mind and drive.

Consequently, the criminal charges were dismissed, but the defendant was found guilty of the provincial offence.

The accused, Russell Collins, was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80mg.

The defence challenged the officer's grounds for demanding a breath sample and the Crown's proof of a system calibration test.

The court found the officer's subjective grounds for suspicion were objectively reasonable, dismissing the Charter challenge.

The court also determined that the Crown had proven the calibration test was conducted with a certified alcohol standard, despite an ambiguous notation, by considering the totality of the evidence.

Consequently, the accused was found guilty as charged.

The defendant, Arielle Wall, was charged with impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and having a blood alcohol concentration above 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The court dismissed the dangerous driving charge due to a lack of evidence regarding the manner of driving.

For the remaining charges, the court relied on expert testimony regarding blood alcohol concentration and its effects on driving faculties.

The defendant's blood alcohol concentration was found to be between 103 and 107 mg/100mL at the time of the blood sample, and calculated to be between 120-127 mg/100mL at the time of the collision.

The court concluded that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, which contributed to the fatal collision.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired driving causing death and having a blood alcohol concentration above 80 mg, and not guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

The accused was found unconscious in a running vehicle on a snowbank, exhibiting signs of severe intoxication.

Charged with impaired operation and operating over 80 mg%, the defence argued a Charter s. 10(b) breach, claiming the accused's waiver of the right to counsel was not informed or unequivocal due to his condition, and challenged the impairment evidence.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility and reliability.

It held that the police fulfilled their duty to inform the accused of his right to counsel, and his repeated declinations were unambiguous, not triggering a further duty to inquire despite his intoxication.

The court concluded that the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, finding the accused's physical and mental faculties were completely impaired by alcohol.

The Charter application was dismissed, and findings of guilt were entered for both counts, with the over 80 mg% count stayed under the rule against multiple convictions.

The defendant, Kamal Jandu, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration.

The trial focused on an alleged section 10(b) Charter violation regarding the right to counsel.

The defendant claimed she was misled by police when told she could not call her husband, whom she intended to ask for a lawyer.

The court found no Charter breach, ruling that the detainee has an obligation to explicitly state the purpose of contacting a third party for legal counsel.

Since the defendant failed to communicate this, the police were not obligated to facilitate contact with her husband for that purpose.

Consequently, the Charter application was dismissed, and a conviction was entered.

Olga Ajgirevitch was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of ceasing operation.

She challenged the admissibility of breath samples based on alleged breaches of her Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)) and argued the Crown failed to prove the evidentiary requirements for the breath samples.

The court found no Charter breaches, specifically that there was no arbitrary detention or realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The court also found the breath samples met the evidentiary requirements despite a deficient sample during the second test.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused, Kugaruban Somasundaram, brought a pre-trial application challenging the admissibility of his blood alcohol readings (BAC) on the grounds that his s. 10(b) Charter rights (right to counsel) were breached.

The court found that the accused's right to consult with counsel was breached because he spoke to a paralegal, not a lawyer, and the police, specifically the booking sergeant, were aware of this but did not inform the accused or facilitate a consultation with a lawyer.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court found the state conduct serious and the impact on the accused's Charter rights significant, leading to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The defendant was found guilty of operating a conveyance with a high blood-alcohol concentration (160 mg in 100 ml of blood) after a rear-end collision, with her 12-year-old daughter as a passenger.

She had no prior criminal record but a previous "warn" for alcohol.

The Crown sought 120 days custody, an 18-month license suspension, and 18 months probation.

The defence sought a 1-year driving prohibition and a 30-day conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 30-day conditional sentence, an 18-month driving prohibition, and 18 months probation with alcohol counselling, emphasizing the need to elevate penalties for impaired driving cases, especially with aggravating factors like an accident and a child passenger.

The accused, Hamidkhan Pathan, was charged with impaired operation and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He conceded impairment and BAC but denied operating the vehicle.

The court assessed the credibility of the Crown's witnesses (a 911 caller and a police officer) and found them credible and reliable.

The accused's testimony was rejected due to intoxication, inconsistencies with external evidence, and illogical claims.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the vehicle as alleged, leading to a conviction.

The defendant was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of breath samples and statements.

The court found no violation of the "immediately" requirement for the ASD demand and no residual mouth alcohol issue.

However, a s. 10(b) Charter violation was found due to a 7-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after arrest.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the breath sample evidence and statements should not be excluded.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, finding the defendant's BAC was at least 160 mg.