Abuse of process

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering him to pay $25,000 in compensation for disposing of the tenant's property after an eviction.

The tenant had been incarcerated, and his parents attempted to pay rent, but the landlord refused payment and ignored their communications.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the landlord's conduct constituted an abuse of process was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The respondent employee was wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages in Small Claims Court.

The appellant employer engaged in years of frivolous and vexatious litigation to avoid paying the judgment, including multiple failed appeals and motions.

The respondent successfully garnished the funds after correcting a misnomer in the appellant's name.

The appellant appealed the misnomer correction and the refusal to return the garnished funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the misnomer appeal on the merits, declined to lift the stay of garnishment due to lack of financial hardship evidence, but ultimately dismissed the appellant's second appeal as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.02, thereby lifting the stay and prohibiting the appellant from bringing further motions without leave.

The respondents brought a motion to quash an appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing the appellants' application as an abuse of process.

The appellants argued the appeal belonged in the Divisional Court because the original proceeding was brought under the Business Corporations Act.

The court determined that the 'lynchpin' of the underlying application was a claim for breach of a joint venture agreement, not a corporate remedy.

Consequently, the order appealed from was a final order disposing of contractual claims, meaning the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal under section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion to quash was granted.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenants had failed to pay rent for over a year and did not comply with the Board's interim orders.

The tenants appealed the eviction order, which automatically stayed the eviction, allowing them to remain in the premises rent-free.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit, raised no valid questions of law, and was brought solely for the purpose of delay.

The appeal was quashed as an abuse of process and costs were awarded to the landlords.

The moving parties brought a motion to set aside a Small Claims Court default judgment arising from a motor vehicle accident and to reinstate a suspended driver's licence.

The court found that the moving parties had previously agreed to a consent order dismissing an earlier motion on the condition of a payment plan, which they subsequently breached.

The court dismissed the current motion as an abuse of process, noting that the responding party was acting within its rights under the consent order when it requested the licence suspension.

The landlord brought a motion to dismiss the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating the tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The tenant had not paid any rent since moving in and failed to comply with a Board consent order requiring payment of rent into the Board.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was completely devoid of merit, raised no genuine questions of law, and constituted an abuse of process designed solely to prolong a rent-free existence.

The motion was granted, the appeal was dismissed, the stay was vacated, and the landlord was awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant brought two appeals from the Landlord and Tenant Board and one application for judicial review regarding a Human Rights Tribunal decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals, which raised no questions of law, and lacked jurisdiction to award damages on a judicial review application.

All three proceedings were dismissed.

The tenant appealed a consent eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board on the last day before enforcement, triggering an automatic stay.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was devoid of merit and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court found the tenant was 'gaming the system' to avoid paying rent, quashed the appeal, lifted the stay, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the landlord.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her request to add the University of Windsor as a party to her complaint against the Law Society, dismissed her complaint against the Law Society, and declared her a vexatious litigant regarding her attempts to pursue allegations against the University over her official transcript.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the HRTO had ample authority to control its processes and prevent abuse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of several decisions relating to his 2003 dismissal from the Ministry of Environment, including decisions by the OLRB, the Grievance Settlement Board, and a Superior Court judge who dismissed his civil action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the Superior Court's final order, which belongs in the Court of Appeal.

The Court also held that setting aside a private settlement agreement is not the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review, and that the OLRB decisions were both out of time for review and reasonable.

The application was deemed an abuse of process.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for incivility during a criminal trial.

The Appeal Panel had reduced his penalty to a one-month suspension and $200,000 in costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Law Society has jurisdiction to discipline lawyers for in-court conduct without intruding on judicial independence.

The Court articulated the test for when incivility becomes professional misconduct, requiring that the conduct undermines or has the potential to undermine the proper administration of justice.

The Court found the Appeal Panel's application of the test and the resulting penalty and costs orders to be reasonable.

The Law Society's cross-appeal regarding the evidentiary use of prior judicial comments was also dismissed.

The moving party (Third Party) brought a motion to set aside an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court, which had quashed its appeal from a Master's interlocutory orders regarding the procedure for a trade secrets protection motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the Master's orders were interlocutory and properly appealable only to a judge of the Superior Court.

The court also dismissed the moving party's requests to vary the order to permit examination of opposing counsel and to delete portions of the judge's endorsement, characterizing the moving party's conduct as an abuse of process.

The responding party's cross-motion was granted in part, requiring the moving party to obtain leave before bringing further procedural motions.

Full indemnity costs were awarded against the moving party.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside orders of single judges that quashed his application for mandamus and allowed interveners to participate.

The applicant sought to compel three police forces to investigate alleged criminal conduct by the CN Police Service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, affirming that mandamus does not lie to compel police to investigate specific crimes, as police discretion in such matters is not subject to judicial dictation.

The court also upheld the costs awards and strongly criticized counsel for filing voluminous, uncoordinated materials, citing the culture shift required by Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel that affirmed findings of professional misconduct and the revocation of her licence to practice law.

She argued that the Hearing Panel lacked jurisdiction due to improper transition from the old discipline regime to the new one, and that she was denied procedural fairness when refused access to an RCMP file.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the transition provisions were properly applied, the appellant suffered no prejudice, and she failed to demonstrate the relevance of the RCMP file or overcome the doctrine of abuse of process regarding her prior litigation.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar General's decision to cancel his birth registration under the Vital Statistics Act, following a criminal conviction where it was found he had assumed a false identity.

The applicant argued that delegating the decision to a Ministry lawyer created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that denying his request for a teleconference hearing breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias given the distinct roles within the Ministry, and concluding that a written hearing satisfied the duty of fairness as the applicant failed to provide new evidence conclusively impeaching the prior judicial finding of his identity.

The respondent physicians brought a motion to restrain the appellant from bringing further appeals or motions in the Divisional Court without leave, pending the determination of an application to declare her a vexatious litigant.

The appellant had commenced multiple actions arising from the same events, filed lengthy and incomprehensible documents, made scandalous allegations against judges and counsel, and failed to pay over $34,000 in outstanding costs awards.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, invoking its inherent jurisdiction and statutory powers to prevent an abuse of process, and stayed all related proceedings by the appellant unless leave is obtained.

The applicant sought judicial review of three Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions that dismissed his five applications alleging discrimination and reprisal by the respondent church, and declared him a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found no errors of law or unreasonable findings of fact in the Tribunal's decisions.

The application for judicial review was dismissed, and costs of $3,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order dismissing her motion for a new trial and brought a separate application challenging the same proceedings.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals, dismiss the application, and obtain an order prohibiting the appellant from bringing further proceedings without leave.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding it lacked jurisdiction under section 31 of the Courts of Justice Act because the amount in dispute was less than the $2,500 prescribed limit.

The application was also dismissed as an abuse of process constituting a collateral attack on the Small Claims Court order.

The court declined to make a vexatious litigant order, noting such relief must be sought by way of an originating application rather than a motion, but directed that garnished funds held in court be paid out to the respondent.

The applicants brought two applications for judicial review of decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

At the hearing, the applicants requested an adjournment based on irrelevant proceedings and offensive submissions.

The court refused the adjournment and directed the applicants to proceed.

When the applicants refused to proceed, the court dismissed the applications and suggested that the respondents consider bringing a vexatious litigant application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendant vehicle owner sought leave to appeal the dismissal of its summary judgment motion.

The owner argued that the driver's criminal conviction for operating a motor vehicle without consent precluded re-litigating the issue of consent, making the claims an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the insurer had led evidence to the contrary raising a genuine issue for trial, and that a full appreciation of the evidence required a trial.