Kevin Anthony Egan

The Ministry of the Solicitor General sought judicial review of a Presiding Coroner's interlocutory decision regarding the scope of an upcoming inquest into seven deaths at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

The Coroner had included issues of correctional programming and staff absenteeism in the scope, and admitted expert evidence on programming.

The Divisional Court held that the challenge to the evidentiary ruling was premature.

On the scope issues, the Court found the Coroner's decision reasonable, as there was sufficient evidence to warrant considering whether programming and staffing were contributing factors to the deaths.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The moving party, the presiding coroner at an inquest into several deaths in custody, brought a motion on consent for a sealing order over the coroner's inquest brief and confidential correspondence containing draft victim impact statements.

The motion was brought in the context of a judicial review application by the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

The Divisional Court granted the sealing order, applying the test from Sherman Estate.

The court found that the benefits of protecting the confidentiality of the investigative materials and the families' expectations outweighed the deleterious effects of sealing, preserving the integrity of the coroner's process.

The appellants sued the respondent for false imprisonment and Charter breaches after the appellant was unconstitutionally denied accelerated parole review, resulting in her spending an extra 26 months in custody.

Following a court declaration of unconstitutionality, it took 43 days to process her release.

The appellants sought partial summary judgment for the 43-day delay, but the motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, finding no negligence or s. 7 Charter breach.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the delay claims but allowed the appeal in part to amend the order, clarifying that the 43-day period could still be claimed as part of the broader 26-month false imprisonment action.

This endorsement concerns the approval of a class action settlement and class counsel fees in two consolidated proceedings (Johnson et al. v. Ontario and Sabourin v. Ontario) alleging deplorable conditions at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

The court approved a settlement of $32,795,400 and class counsel fees of $9,388,207.92, finding the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the significant litigation risks, the protracted nature of the actions, and the desire for a certain outcome for the thousands of affected class members.

The contingency fee agreements and the requested fees were also deemed fair and reasonable.

The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a finding that the defendant was liable for damages arising from Souphin Inlakhana’s 43-day imprisonment after a judicial decision made her eligible for accelerated parole review (APR).

The plaintiffs alleged false imprisonment, negligence, misfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches (ss. 7, 9, 11(i), 12).

The defendant sought dismissal of the motion.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding no Charter violation or negligence in the administrative delay of release, as the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and Parole Board of Canada (PBC) followed statutorily mandated processes within established timeframes, despite some delays.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendant on this specific claim.

The applicant, the Prime Minister of Canada, sought to quash a subpoena compelling him to testify at the criminal trial of the respondent, who was charged with assault with a weapon for throwing gravel at the applicant during a campaign event.

The court quashed the subpoena on three independent grounds: the respondent failed to show the applicant was likely to give material and necessary evidence; the subpoena was an abuse of process intended for political purposes rather than legal ones; and the applicant enjoyed absolute parliamentary privilege providing testimonial immunity while Parliament is in session.

The plaintiff sued the defendant police service for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and wrongful arrest after criminal charges against him were withdrawn.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions refused during discovery, arguing that communications between the plaintiff and his criminal defence lawyer were relevant to whether the charges were terminated in his favour.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the communications irrelevant to the tort claims and protected by solicitor-client privilege, which had not been waived.

The court also declined to order the plaintiff to obtain records for a destroyed cellphone owned by a third party.

Donald Parker appealed a motion judge's refusal to extend his opt-out period from a class action and a related costs order.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario moved to quash Parker's appeal, arguing the motion judge's order was interlocutory and thus appealable only to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Ontario's motion, holding that the motion judge's order was final because it effectively terminated Parker's individual civil action by denying his substantive right to opt out of the class proceeding.

The court emphasized the importance of opt-out rights as substantive rights.

The defendants in two related class actions brought motions to compel the representative plaintiffs to answer questions refused during examinations for discovery.

The refused questions related to the plaintiffs' individual medical and employment histories, reasons for detention, and other individual experiences.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions, holding that discovery prior to a common issues trial is limited to the common issues.

The court found that the individual damages questions were not relevant to the common issues of systemic negligence or aggregate damages, which must be determined without reference to the circumstances of individual class members.

The Defendant brought a summary judgment motion which was subsequently abandoned after the Plaintiff's expert report was produced.

The court was asked to determine whether to award immediate costs to the Plaintiff for the abandoned motion or to order costs payable in the cause.

The Defendant argued that the motion was reasonable at the time it was brought and that the work done by the Plaintiff would have been necessary for trial anyway.

The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant's abandonment of the motion warranted immediate cost consequences.

The court found that while costs typically follow an event, the timing and motivation for bringing the motion weighed against an immediate costs award.

Costs were fixed at $7,000, payable in the cause.

The plaintiffs brought a civil action arising from a pretrial detainee's placement in the same correctional unit as an inmate who had previously committed a violent home invasion against him.

The court held the Crown vicariously liable for correctional staff negligence extending beyond the admitted inmate-tracking error, including inadequate supervision, failure to protect, and degrading conduct by officers, and rejected contributory negligence and mitigation defences.

The court accepted the treating psychologist's evidence, rejected the defence psychological opinion, found serious and permanent psychological injury, and awarded substantial non-pecuniary, income loss, future care, special, and Family Law Act damages.

The court also found violations of ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and awarded separate Charter damages for vindication and deterrence.

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a negligence action brought by the estate and family members of a deceased man who died in a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge applied the doctrine of emergency to find that the driver, who was engaged in a drug deal, acted reasonably when he drove away while the deceased was attempting to enter the vehicle, resulting in the deceased's death.

The majority upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the application of the emergency doctrine.

Justice Pepall dissented, arguing that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the elements of the emergency doctrine and that material inconsistencies in the evidence should have precluded summary judgment.

During a trial for damages arising from an inmate assault due to a cell placement error, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling the Crown to produce the notes and testing results of a vocational rehabilitation specialist.

The Crown had retained the specialist but later decided not to call her as a witness or request a formal report.

The Crown argued the plaintiffs waived their right to the report by not requesting it earlier.

The court held that Rule 33.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the production of such reports and ordered the Crown to produce the specialist's notes and testing results forthwith.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his battery claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant was charged with assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest following an incident on June 1, 2014, and was acquitted on February 17, 2016.

He commenced an action on June 2, 2016, two years and one day after the alleged battery.

The central issue was whether the appellant discovered his potential battery claim within the meaning of section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, which requires knowledge that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek remedy.

The majority held that the discoverability date was February 17, 2016 (the date of acquittal), not June 1, 2014, because the battery claim and negligent investigation claim were inextricably intertwined and it was reasonable for the appellant to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings before deciding to pursue the civil battery claim.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's claim in battery as statute-barred.

The claim arose from an incident on June 1, 2014, where the plaintiff alleged excessive force by police during his arrest.

The plaintiff was acquitted of criminal charges on February 17, 2016, and issued a notice of action on June 2, 2016.

The court found that the tort of battery, being an intentional act with immediate harm, was discoverable on June 1, 2014.

The plaintiff's arguments that the limitation period should run from his acquittal, his release from custody, or due to his alleged incapacity were rejected.

The court distinguished battery from negligent investigation/malicious prosecution claims, where discoverability is tied to the termination of criminal proceedings.

Consequently, the battery claim was dismissed as statute-barred, having expired on June 1, 2016, while the negligent investigation claim was allowed to proceed.

The plaintiff sought damages for false imprisonment and Charter violations after being denied accelerated parole review due to the retrospective application of the Abolition of Early Parole Act, which was later found unconstitutional.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the claim, arguing government immunity for legislative acts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff pleaded sufficient material facts that, if true, could establish the government acted in bad faith by knowingly enacting unconstitutional legislation in violation of s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in an action alleging excessive force by police officers.

The plaintiff argued that because the Woodstock Police Services Board is funded by the municipality, the action constitutes relief against a municipality, which precludes a jury trial under section 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the Police Services Board maintains independence from the municipality and that an action against the Board is not equivalent to an action against the municipality.

The motion to strike the jury notice was dismissed.

The defendants and a statutory third party moved for summary judgment to dismiss a Family Law Act claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Glen Isaac.

The court considered the doctrines of volenti non fit injuria and emergency, and the deceased being the author of his own misfortune.

The motion was granted, finding that the deceased's aggressive actions initiated the confrontation and led to his death, thus precluding the derivative claims.

The plaintiffs, former inmates of the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre, brought a motion to certify a class action against the provincial Crown alleging systemic negligence and Charter breaches resulting from overcrowding and inadequate supervision.

The Crown opposed certification and moved to strike portions of the claim and evidence.

The court struck the claim for breach of fiduciary duty but found the pleadings otherwise disclosed reasonable causes of action in systemic negligence and Charter breaches.

The court admitted the plaintiffs' evidence for the limited purpose of the certification motion and concluded that all criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act were met.

The motion for certification was granted.

The applicant requested to reactivate his human rights application, which had been deferred pending the conclusion of other related proceedings.

The respondents consented to the reactivation, provided they were given reasonable time to file a response.

The Tribunal granted the request, reactivated the application, and directed the respondents to file their response within 35 days.