Kenneth L. Campbell

In a prosecution for historic and recent sexual offences against two young relatives, the Crown sought to admit several hearsay statements made by a four‑year‑old complainant who was later found incompetent to testify under s. 16.1(3) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court considered the principled exception to the hearsay rule under R. v. Khan and subsequent jurisprudence, assessing necessity and threshold reliability.

The judge held that the complainant’s statements to her mother shortly after the alleged incidents and again several weeks later were reasonably necessary and sufficiently reliable, given their timing, spontaneous nature, lack of motive to fabricate, child‑like language, and corroborative circumstances including the accused’s response when confronted.

Statements made by the complainant to her brother and to a SickKids interviewer were excluded because they were not reasonably necessary, as they added little beyond the more detailed statements already admitted.

The ruling admitted the mother’s evidence of the child’s disclosures while excluding other hearsay evidence.

The accused was tried on multiple sexual offences alleged against two child complainants who were his great‑grandchildren while he and his wife provided daycare.

The court acquitted the accused on two counts relating to the older complainant, finding the delayed disclosure, reliability concerns, and possible memory contamination created reasonable doubt.

However, the court admitted and relied upon hearsay statements from the younger complainant under the principled exception established in R. v. Khan after finding threshold reliability and necessity.

The statements, corroborating surrounding evidence, and the accused’s own statements and conduct satisfied the court beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual offences occurred against the younger complainant.

The accused’s testimony was rejected as fabricated and unreliable.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to quash a telewarrant and exclude firearm evidence obtained during a police search of his apartment.

The Information to Obtain relied heavily on information from an alleged confidential informant, and the Crown provided a heavily redacted version of the ITO claiming informer privilege.

The court addressed procedural issues at step six of the Garofoli framework concerning whether the excised material could be considered to support the warrant.

The judge held that the Crown must provide sealed written explanations justifying each proposed redaction and must file sealed evidentiary materials establishing the existence of the claimed confidential informant privilege.

These materials would be reviewed by the court alone to determine whether the privilege and redactions were justified.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

Upon his arrest at an apartment, the police advised him of his right to counsel.

The accused declined to call a lawyer immediately, stating 'not right now.' The police then cautioned him and asked if he wished to say anything, prompting the accused to provide a spontaneous exculpatory statement claiming self-defence.

The accused sought to exclude the statement, arguing it was involuntary and obtained in violation of his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the police complied with their Charter obligations, as the accused's decision to delay contacting counsel did not trigger an immediate police duty to hold off questioning.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty mid-trial to assaulting his spouse with a weapon by forcing her onto a heated stove element.

At sentencing the trial judge refused the appellant’s request for a conditional discharge and instead entered a conviction, suspended the passing of sentence, and imposed one year of probation.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider mitigating factors including pre-sentence custody, rehabilitation efforts, and the severe immigration consequences of conviction.

The court held that even considering the matter afresh, a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the seriousness of the domestic violence offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal against sentence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision acquitting the accused of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg and staying an impaired driving conviction due to an alleged Charter breach.

The trial judge had excluded the certificate of analysis because police made only an approved screening device demand rather than the required approved instrument demand, and had stayed the impaired driving charge due to the accused being detained for approximately ten hours after providing breath samples.

The appellate court held that the acquittal on the over‑80 charge was correct because the statutory presumption required strict compliance with the approved instrument demand under the Criminal Code.

However, although the extended detention constituted an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, the trial judge erred by imposing a stay of proceedings without applying the correct legal framework for such a remedy.

The appropriate response to the Charter breach was a lesser remedy, such as sentence reduction.

The stay was therefore set aside, a conviction entered for impaired driving, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

A registered nurse was sentenced after being convicted of voyeurism and sexual assault committed against two hospital patients while they were receiving emergency medical treatment.

The offences involved photographing and recording a patient in various states of undress and taking a photograph of another unconscious patient without consent.

The court emphasized the profound breach of trust by a healthcare professional exploiting vulnerable patients.

After considering aggravating factors including multiple victims and abuse of a position of authority, as well as mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record and professional consequences, the court imposed a custodial sentence.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody and lengthy restrictive bail conditions.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving arising from a high-speed police stop on the Don Valley Parkway.

The trial judge had found that audio and video recordings from a police in-car camera contradicted key aspects of the arresting officer’s testimony regarding aggressive driving and road conditions, leading to concerns about the reliability of the officers’ evidence.

The trial judge concluded that the evidence did not establish a marked departure from the standard of care required for dangerous driving and that the Crown had not proven the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by comparing testimony with recordings that did not capture the entire driving sequence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge understood the limited scope of the recording and committed no palpable and overriding error in assessing credibility and reliability.

Deference to the trial judge’s factual findings required dismissal of the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the police officer failed to make the approved instrument demand "as soon as practicable" as required by s. 254(3) due to an approximately 11‑minute delay after arrest.

The court held that the governing standard requires a reasonably prompt demand assessed in light of the entire chain of events and whether police acted reasonably.

Reviewing the audio‑video evidence and the trial judge’s findings, the court concluded the officer’s actions during the delay—including search incident to arrest, managing the scene, and advising the accused of rights—were reasonable.

The trial judge committed no error in concluding the demand was made as soon as practicable.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for two counts of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon arising from a domestic relationship, as well as the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider consent and self-defence, misapprehended evidence, and provided legally insufficient reasons.

The court held that neither consent nor self-defence were live issues at trial, the alleged misapprehension did not constitute reversible error, and the reasons satisfied the functional requirements for appellate review.

However, the Crown conceded that the sentencing judge should have apportioned pre-sentence custody across the convictions.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal in part to apportion pre-sentence custody equally among the assault convictions.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside demand during a RIDE program.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.) and improperly relied on demeanour evidence when rejecting her explanation that nervousness prevented her from providing an adequate breath sample.

The appellate court held that the trial judge correctly applied the W.(D.) principles and reasonably preferred the officer’s testimony that the appellant repeatedly provided inadequate breath samples despite clear instructions and numerous opportunities.

The reasons demonstrated that the credibility assessment was based on the totality of the evidence, not solely on demeanour.

No error in law or misapprehension of evidence was established.

The accused was convicted by a jury of four counts of fraud over $5,000 and two counts of possession of proceeds of crime after receiving and withdrawing funds transferred from a large-scale electronic fraud targeting a construction company.

Approximately $14,937 was deposited into the accused’s bank accounts and quickly withdrawn through ATM and point-of-sale transactions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the scale and sophistication of the broader fraud scheme, as well as the accused’s significant criminal record.

Although a conditional sentence was legally available, the court found that a custodial sentence was required to achieve specific deterrence.

The accused was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation, with restitution ordered to the corporate victims.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the nearly two‑year period between the laying of charges and sentencing violated the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the analytical framework from R. v. Morin, the court examined the length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Most of the delay was attributable to neutral intake time, systemic delay, or the inherent time requirements of litigating an automatism defence with expert evidence.

Only a brief period of delay was attributable to the Crown and it remained within constitutionally acceptable limits.

The court concluded the accused suffered only modest prejudice and that the societal interest in adjudicating the sexual assault charge outweighed the delay concerns.

Summary conviction appeals from conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The accused argued the trial judge erred in accepting the complainant’s evidence and rejecting his testimony.

The court found the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and that the guilty verdict was reasonable on the record.

However, the Crown’s sentence appeal succeeded because the trial judge erred in principle by failing to give adequate weight to denunciation and by overemphasizing rehabilitation when imposing a conditional sentence.

The conditional sentence was set aside and replaced with a custodial sentence followed by probation.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and related offences after a police officer observed a hand-to-hand drug transaction inside the accused's parked motor vehicle.

The officer made the observation while standing on a public sidewalk, looking through the open passenger window.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing that the officer's visual observation constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, holding that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his observable activities inside a motor vehicle parked on a public street, and therefore the observation did not constitute a search.

The accused, a 34-year-old first offender with serious health issues including HIV and Hepatitis C, was found guilty by a jury of possession of cocaine, and possession of ketamine and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the accused sought a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court considered the accused's strict compliance with house arrest bail conditions for nearly three years as a significant mitigating factor.

The court imposed a 16-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, followed by two years of probation, finding this would satisfy the principles of denunciation and deterrence while promoting rehabilitation.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking exclusion of a handgun seized during execution of a search warrant at his residence, arguing violations of s. 8 of the Charter relating to the sufficiency of the information to obtain the warrant, use of the telewarrant procedure, and the manner of the dynamic nighttime entry.

The court held that the issuing justice could reasonably have granted the warrant based on credible information from a confidential informant corroborated in part by police investigation.

The court further found that resort to the telewarrant procedure was justified because it was impracticable to appear before a justice in person late on a Sunday evening.

The dynamic nighttime entry using a tactical police team was also reasonable given the risk posed by firearms and the potential destruction or relocation of evidence.

In the alternative, even if a Charter breach had occurred, the firearm would have been admitted under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and central to the prosecution.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the Ontario Court of Justice on charges of obstructing a peace officer and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge had excluded certified court documents establishing the recognizance conditions on the basis that the Crown failed to provide adequate notice under s. 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court held that exemplifications of judicial records are admissible at common law without notice and that the trial judge erred by relying on contrary lower‑court authority rather than binding appellate precedent.

The court also held there was some evidence capable of supporting the obstruct police charge and that the directed verdict of acquittal was therefore improper.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered on all charges.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for uttering a death threat under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the accused’s mens rea.

The trial judge had accepted that the words were spoken but concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended the threat to be taken seriously or to intimidate the correctional officer.

On appeal, the court held that acquittals grounded in the presumption of innocence and the Crown’s failure to meet the burden of proof are not findings of fact but conclusions based on the standard of proof.

Such determinations are generally not amenable to appellate intervention absent legal error or palpable and overriding error.

Finding no misapprehension of evidence or other reviewable error, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of probation arising from threatening text messages sent to his estranged spouse while subject to a no-contact probation condition.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.), applied unequal scrutiny to defence evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof, did not apply differential scrutiny to the defence evidence, and reasonably rejected the purported alibi evidence.

The court concluded the verdicts were reasonably supported by the evidence and that the appellant failed to establish reversible error.