David Bayliss

The applicant, charged with two counts of first degree murder and one count of aggravated assault arising from two separate shooting incidents hours apart, applied to sever the counts.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, including the use of the same firearm and an alleged confession linking the two homicides.

The court concluded that the interests of justice required a joint trial, as evidence from one homicide would likely be admissible in the trial of the other even if severed.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after stabbing a highly intoxicated neighbour who mistakenly arrived at his door late at night.

The offender, who had a history of being harassed by the victim's associates, reasonably but mistakenly believed his home was under attack, though his use of a lethal sword was found disproportionate.

The court assessed his moral culpability at the low end of the scale, sentencing him to 2 years' imprisonment, reduced to 7 months after crediting pre-trial custody and house arrest, followed by 2 years of probation.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused were charged with second-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, two of the accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of a street encounter with police the day after the homicide, arguing their rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the accused were psychologically detained when four officers approached them, separated them, and questioned them without advising them of their right to counsel.

The court held that the officers' failure to properly record the encounter and their attempts to minimize it as a 'social call' exacerbated the breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the court also noted the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to the lack of a reliable record.

The offender was sentenced after a jury convicted him of multiple firearm and drug offences, including possession of restricted and prohibited handguns with ammunition, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of heroin, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The offender committed the offences while subject to multiple lifetime firearm prohibition orders and while on probation, and had an extensive prior record involving firearms and drug trafficking.

The court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, and public protection, noting the offender’s escalating pattern of reoffending and mid‑level cocaine trafficking involving over one kilogram of drugs.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of ten and one‑half years’ imprisonment for firearms, trafficking, and related offences.

Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 was granted for pre‑sentence custody pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in Summers.

The accused brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a search warrant that led to the seizure of firearms and narcotics, alleging breaches of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The dispute focused on the procedural steps governing redactions of the information to obtain (ITO), the role of judicial summaries, and whether the Crown must elect between relying on the redacted ITO or the original unredacted ITO.

The court held that judicial summaries at steps two and six of the Garofoli procedure are not evidence but procedural tools designed to allow meaningful participation by the accused where disclosure must be limited to protect a confidential informant.

The court further held that steps five and six are sequential rather than mutually exclusive, allowing the Crown to first rely on the redacted ITO and, if necessary, subsequently seek to rely on the unredacted ITO.

Procedural directions were issued to govern the conduct of the Garofoli hearing prior to trial.

The accused applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder arising from a drive-by shooting that killed a bystander.

Because the charge was a s. 469 offence, the application proceeded on a reverse onus.

The court found no significant risk on the primary or secondary grounds, emphasizing the accused’s lack of criminal record, educational background, community ties, and voluntary surrender to police shortly after the incident.

On the tertiary ground, the court concluded that although the offence was extremely serious, the strength of the Crown’s case on the accused’s prior knowledge of the shooting was not overwhelming and multiple reasonable inferences remained available.

Given the proposed stringent surety plan and the accused’s circumstances, the court held that public confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined by release.

The accused brought a pre‑trial disclosure motion seeking police disciplinary records under McNeil and additional confidential informant materials under Stinchcombe in relation to a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of firearms and drugs.

The court held that the accused failed to establish any evidentiary basis that McNeil records existed regarding the investigating officers and declined to compel production.

A subpoena issued to the Chief of Police seeking disciplinary materials was quashed as improperly issued because there was no basis to conclude it would produce material evidence.

Most requested disclosure regarding the confidential informant was denied due to informant privilege and lack of relevance beyond the investigative file.

However, the Crown was ordered to disclose a properly redacted copy of the original Information to Obtain rather than an edited version.

The accused applied to exclude a loaded firearm seized by police, arguing his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.

The court previously found that the accused was arbitrarily detained at gunpoint for a split second and that a subsequent search of his residence was unreasonable.

Applying the section 24(2) framework, the court found the police conduct was not deliberate or in bad faith, and the evidence was highly reliable and essential to serious charges.

The court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application.