Carson Coughlin

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry justice committed jurisdictional error by relying on insufficient circumstantial evidence of identity.

The reviewing judge found no jurisdictional error, concluding that the preliminary inquiry justice properly engaged in a limited weighing of the evidence, including DNA on a glove, video surveillance, clothing similarities, and association with the co-accused, to determine that a reasonable inference of guilt was available.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after stabbing a highly intoxicated neighbour who mistakenly arrived at his door late at night.

The offender, who had a history of being harassed by the victim's associates, reasonably but mistakenly believed his home was under attack, though his use of a lethal sword was found disproportionate.

The court assessed his moral culpability at the low end of the scale, sentencing him to 2 years' imprisonment, reduced to 7 months after crediting pre-trial custody and house arrest, followed by 2 years of probation.

The accused brought pre-trial applications challenging the Superior Court's administrative decision to transfer his manslaughter trial from Brampton to Kitchener due to a severe courtroom shortage.

The accused argued the transfer order was subject to judicial review and violated administrative law principles of procedural fairness.

The court dismissed the applications, holding that the Chief Justice and Regional Senior Judges have statutory authority under the Courts of Justice Act to transfer cases within and outside a region.

The court further held that administrative decisions made in the course of criminal proceedings are not subject to judicial review, and that the accused failed to establish grounds for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, charged with manslaughter alongside two co-accused, applied for an adjournment of the trial to find more experienced counsel after his counsel of choice was removed from the record due to medical issues and a change of venue.

He also applied for severance from his co-accused, offering to waive his s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the accused had retained competent counsel, that an adjournment would jeopardize the co-accused's s. 11(b) rights, and that the interests of justice strongly favoured a joint trial.

The accused, charged with manslaughter, brought an application for the case management judge to recuse himself.

The accused argued that the judge's prior involvement in administrative decisions to transfer cases out of Brampton due to courtroom shortages created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to provide cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The court noted that the administrative transfer process and the court's commitment to managing resources efficiently would not lead a reasonable, informed person to conclude the judge had a closed mind.

The accused, charged with manslaughter alongside two co-accused, sought to bring several pre-trial applications, including a recusal motion, a jurisdictional challenge against transferring the trial out of Brampton, a section 10(b) Charter application, and an application for removal of counsel.

Due to counsel's medical issues and scheduling conflicts, the court had to set a firm timetable for the filing of materials and the hearing of these applications to ensure the scheduled trial date could be maintained.

The court ordered strict deadlines for the filing of application records and factums, scheduling the recusal application first, followed by the substantive applications.

The case involves three accused charged with manslaughter.

Due to courtroom shortages in Brampton, the trial was scheduled to be held in Kitchener.

Counsel for one of the accused suffered medical issues, leading to an adjournment.

Counsel subsequently indicated an intention to bring motions to transfer the trial back to Brampton or be removed from the record, but later attempted to unilaterally delay bringing these motions.

The case management judge rejected this delay, emphasizing the need for efficiency under the Jordan framework, and ordered strict deadlines for the defence to perfect any such applications.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been breached.

The case involved charges of kidnapping, extortion, and assault arising from a violent abduction.

The court conducted a detailed Morin analysis of delay, allocating periods to inherent requirements, defence delay, institutional delay, and Crown delay, including delay caused by a mistrial following disclosure failures.

The court determined that total Crown and institutional delay amounted to approximately 14 months and 27 days, falling within the Morin guidelines.

Although some prejudice was established, it did not reach the level required to justify a constitutional remedy, and the seriousness of the offences weighed strongly in favour of a trial on the merits.