Kathleen A. Baker

A motion for mistrial was brought by the respondent father in a child protection status review application involving two children.

The father and the Office of the Children's Lawyer sought to overturn the trial on grounds including the agency's failure to promptly disclose a new investigation commenced during trial, alleged Charter rights violations, sequential and redacted disclosure, failure to produce police records, the children's expressed preference for a new trial, and potential judicial bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the agency's failure to promptly disclose the investigation was imprudent, the prejudice could be remedied through recalling witnesses for cross-examination.

The court found no fatal wounding of the trial process and determined that a mistrial should only be granted as a last resort in the clearest of cases.

This endorsement addresses costs following a child protection trial where the primary dispute was between paternal (A.H. and B.H.) and maternal (D.T. and A.T.) grandparents for custody of a child, M. The paternal grandparents, who were ultimately granted deemed custody, sought costs against the maternal grandparents.

The court found that while the maternal grandparents had a legitimate case, their conduct, including obstructing access and breaching court orders, was unreasonable and unduly prolonged the proceedings.

Applying principles that allow for costs against parents/parties in child protection cases for unreasonable conduct, the court awarded $3,000 in costs to the paternal grandparents to sanction the maternal grandparents' behaviour and partially indemnify the successful litigants.

The Child and Family Services of Grand Erie brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for extended society care and limited access for the child, Z.S. The respondent mother, J.L.S., opposed, seeking custody or joint/sole care with a proposed support person, A.G. The court applied the summary judgment test in child protection cases, emphasizing the "trial worthy evidence rule" and the child's best interests.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the mother failed to demonstrate a viable plan to address long-standing drug abuse and unstable housing concerns.

The proposed plan involving A.G. was deemed speculative and unviable due to A.G.'s own history and lack of cooperation.

The motion for extended care was granted, and the mother's access was limited to the agency's discretion, with a minimum of six visits per year.

The applicant, P.L., sought to adopt his seven-year-old stepson, L., and applied to dispense with L.'s consent to the adoption under section 180(9) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The grounds for dispensing consent were that obtaining it would cause emotional harm or that L. lacked capacity due to developmental disability (Autism, ADHD).

The court reviewed expert evidence from Dr. Knoll and testimony from the applicant and L.'s mother, J.L. The court found the evidence equivocal regarding L.'s capacity to consent and insufficient to demonstrate that seeking consent would cause serious emotional harm as defined by the Act.

The application to dispense with consent was dismissed, and the adoption application was held for 60 days for L.'s consent to be filed, failing which it would be dismissed for want of prosecution.

The accused, J.C., was sentenced for criminal negligence causing the death of his six-month-old son.

The child sustained severe burns from a butane torch and died due to the burns and lidocaine toxicity from an ointment applied by J.C., who failed to seek medical attention for two days.

The court accepted a joint submission for an eight-year sentence, emphasizing the high moral blameworthiness, prolonged abdication of parental responsibility, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, despite mitigating factors like a guilty plea and remorse.

The court also noted the inadequate care of the other children.

This case concerns a temporary care hearing for a 13-month-old child, G.R., whose parents are J.R. (mother) and S.J. (father).

The Children's Aid Society intervened due to the mother's continued relationship with an individual facing sexual assault charges, her lack of insight into the associated risks, and her inability to meet the child's basic needs, including medical care and safe sleeping arrangements.

The court found the child to be at high risk if returned to the mother's care and determined that a supervision order would be insufficient to mitigate this risk due to the mother's unreliability and repeated breaches of the safety plan.

The court also addressed the interpretation of "charge" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, concluding that both parents shared charge.

The child remained placed with the father, and the mother's access was ordered to be supervised, removing the Society's discretion for unsupervised access, as the court found unsupervised access incongruent with the child's best interests given the mother's credibility issues and non-compliance.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding and an order for extended care for the child.

The parents opposed, arguing the Society's evidence was deficient.

The court found the Society's affidavits largely inadmissible hearsay and not specifically prepared for a summary judgment motion, failing to meet the evidentiary standard for disposition.

However, the court did make a protection finding under section 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, based on the mother's admitted illegal drug use, which was undisputed.

The motion for summary judgment regarding disposition (placement and access) was dismissed, and the matter was adjourned for a trial management conference.

M.S. brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed, as the expected completion date of his trial for historical sexual offences exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued for deductions for defense delay and exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no deductible defense delay but determined that the delay caused by the adjournment of the first trial date due to COVID-19 directives constituted an exceptional circumstance.

After deducting this period, the total delay fell below the Jordan threshold.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code seeking an order to permit the complainant to give evidence by videoconference.

The complainant, residing on the east coast with a young child, faced significant travel burdens and health concerns due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the factors enumerated in section 714.1, including the witness's personal circumstances, the broad interpretation of "costs" (encompassing non-financial burdens like childcare and anxiety), the suitability of video technology for credibility assessment, and the accused's right to a fair and public hearing.

The court found that the public health emergency constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying remote testimony and that modern video technology adequately preserves the ability to assess witness evidence.

The application was granted, with a preference for the witness to testify from an official location rather than her home.

The respondent father applied for a mistrial in a child protection proceeding, alleging numerous procedural irregularities and disclosure failures by the applicant agency.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer joined the application, while other parties opposed it.

The court reviewed the established test for mistrial, emphasizing it as a measure of last resort for fatally wounded trial processes.

While acknowledging the applicant's chaotic and haphazard disclosure practices and inefficient trial management, the court found that the cumulative effect of the issues did not fatally compromise trial fairness.

The court ordered certain evidence struck and mandated further disclosure from the applicant, but ultimately dismissed the mistrial application, prioritizing the child's best interests and avoiding further delay.

The applicant child protection agency sought to qualify an expert in child maltreatment.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the expert's opinion evidence.

The court found that "child maltreatment" as a general field of scientific inquiry lacked threshold reliability as a novel science, as there was no evidence of tested theories/techniques, peer review of the general discipline, or established standards for information quality.

Furthermore, the court determined that the expert was engaged for litigation purposes, not as a "participation expert," and thus failed to comply with Rule 20.2(2) of the Family Law Rules.

Consequently, the expert was not qualified, and his report was not admitted, as the risks of admitting unreliable evidence outweighed any benefit.

Motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The applicant Society sought preliminary findings regarding the child's First Nations status, protection findings under section 74(2)(b)(i), and an order for extended care with no access.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence and procedural deficiencies.

The court emphasized the Society's failure to make timely inquiries regarding the child's First Nations status and native community identification, contrary to section 90(2) of the CYFSA.

The court also found the Society's evidence regarding the parents' ability to care for the medically fragile child to be inadequate, lacking sufficient detail and failing to demonstrate that the Society had provided individually appropriate services to address protection concerns.

This is a motion to dismiss a child protection application for want of jurisdiction.

The respondent parents challenged whether the court retained jurisdiction to hear the protection application following alleged failures by the Children's Aid Society to comply with statutory prerequisites for removal of children to a place of safety.

The parents argued that two removals—on April 30, 2018 and June 1, 2018—were warrantless removals without proper grounds and that the Society failed to bring the matter to court within the required five-day statutory period.

The court found that while the April 30 removal lacked proper consent and statutory authority, the children were returned to parental care on May 15, 2018, creating a discrete event.

The June 1 removal was brought to court within the statutory timeframe and was supported by exigent circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion to dismiss, finding jurisdiction was retained.

A child protection application brought by Brant Family and Children's Services seeking Crown wardship without access for two young Indigenous children was resolved by consent order.

The children's mother sought their return to her care subject to supervision.

The court approved a staggered reintegration plan whereby the younger child would immediately return to the mother's care under supervision for twelve months, and the older child would be reintegrated over a two-month period.

The central legal issue concerned the interpretation of section 70 of the Child and Family Services Act, which imposes time limits on society wardship.

The court held that the statutory time limits should be viewed as presumptive ceilings rather than hard caps, allowing for extensions consistent with the child's best interests.

A child protection agency sought to apprehend a child based on allegations of parental alcohol abuse and impaired driving.

The respondent mother challenged the apprehension on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the agency failed to comply with statutory prerequisites under the Child and Family Services Act, specifically the requirement to bring the matter to court within five days of apprehension and the requirement to obtain a warrant or demonstrate grounds for warrantless apprehension.

The court found that the agency unlawfully suspended the mother's court-ordered custodial time without consent, that this suspension constituted an apprehension, and that the agency failed to bring the matter to court within the statutory five-day period.

The court held that this breach of statutory requirements deprived it of jurisdiction and dismissed the protection application.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to rescind its appointment as legal representative for a medically fragile infant subject to a child protection proceeding and to remove its assigned counsel.

The child, born with serious cardiac defects, was in the care of the Society and subsequently suffered a life-threatening infection.

A dispute arose between the child's mother and the hospital regarding medical treatment, including a potential do-not-resuscitate order.

The court dismissed the OCL's motion, finding that legal representation remained desirable to protect the child's interests despite the child's inability to provide instructions.

The court awarded costs against the OCL for failing to properly re-evaluate its position in light of changed circumstances.

This is a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a medically fragile 13-month-old child with significant cardiac defects.

The Society sought authority to make medical decisions for the child, including potential do-not-resuscitate orders.

The mother sought to retain authority to consent to medical treatment.

The court found that the mother had consistently demonstrated sound judgment in making medical decisions for the child throughout her hospitalization and post-discharge care.

The court granted the mother authority to consent to and authorize any medical treatment for the child, finding that absent compelling evidence of parental incapacity, the least intrusive intervention consistent with the child's best interests is to preserve parental decision-making authority, particularly regarding critical medical decisions such as do-not-resuscitate orders.

This is a temporary care hearing under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning three children.

The Children's Aid Society sought placement determination among three competing family plans: the maternal grandmother, the mother, and the father.

The court determined that the maternal grandmother had acquired "charge" of the children through a series of voluntary relinquishments by the parents beginning in March 2015, and that this status was maintained through subsequent kinship and temporary care agreements.

The court found that a supervision order was sufficient to mitigate risk and placed the children with the maternal grandmother subject to supervision terms.

The court also directed the Society to update its Plan of Care to address services for the children and adjourned the matter to permit parties to negotiate terms of parental access.

This is a child protection trial under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving three children.

The Children's Aid Society sought findings of protection and Crown Wardship for all three children.

The court found that the mother inflicted physical harm on the children through hitting them with a stick and other harsh discipline, causing complex trauma and emotional harm.

The court made findings of protection for all three children.

For the two older children, the court ordered Crown Wardship with no access to the mother.

For the youngest child, the court placed him in the custody of his father with no access to the mother, finding that the father was providing appropriate care and that the child was thriving in his care.

The Mississaugas of the New Credit Band Council brought a motion for release of records held by Waterloo and Brant Family and Children Services relating to the current caregiver and potential alternative caregivers in a child protection proceeding.

The motion arose in the context of an upcoming trial involving competing plans for the child's placement.

The court established a two-stage test for disclosure of kin records, requiring the moving party to first demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the records are likely relevant, followed by judicial review to weigh probative value against privacy interests and public policy considerations.