Charles Mota-Duarte

This endorsement arises from an urgent case conference concerning parenting issues during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Following the parties' inability to agree on a temporary parenting plan, the court issued procedural orders for the respondent father to bring a motion to determine the children's parenting arrangements and time with him during the pandemic, setting strict timelines and page limits for materials and submissions.

This endorsement followed an urgent case conference, initiated by the respondent father, concerning parenting issues for the parties' two young children amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court provided recommendations and directed counsel to ascertain the potential for agreement on the conferenced issues, with further directions to follow based on the parties' feedback.

The order emphasized its immediate enforceability due to the emergency circumstances.

This is a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a medically fragile 13-month-old child with significant cardiac defects.

The Society sought authority to make medical decisions for the child, including potential do-not-resuscitate orders.

The mother sought to retain authority to consent to medical treatment.

The court found that the mother had consistently demonstrated sound judgment in making medical decisions for the child throughout her hospitalization and post-discharge care.

The court granted the mother authority to consent to and authorize any medical treatment for the child, finding that absent compelling evidence of parental incapacity, the least intrusive intervention consistent with the child's best interests is to preserve parental decision-making authority, particularly regarding critical medical decisions such as do-not-resuscitate orders.

In a child protection proceeding involving a medically fragile infant hospitalized with severe cardiac complications, the Society sought authority over medical decision‑making after concerns arose about the mother’s refusal to consent to a potential do‑not‑resuscitate order.

The court held the matter should be determined de novo and that the Society bore the burden of showing why the parent should be deprived of decision‑making authority.

Evidence demonstrated the mother had consistently engaged with medical professionals and appropriately consented to prior treatments.

Applying the principle of least intrusive intervention under the Child and Family Services Act, the court concluded there was no basis to remove the mother’s authority.

The court therefore vested medical decision‑making authority in the mother pursuant to s.62 while the child remained in temporary Society care.