Katherine E. Swinton

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board arbitration award that ordered rectification of a collective agreement's recognition clause.

The Board found that exclusionary language regarding office and technical staff had been inserted by mistake.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for an arbitrator's application of the equitable doctrine of rectification is reasonableness.

The Court upheld the Board's decision to rectify the agreement by removing the mistakenly inserted language.

However, the Court found the Board's subsequent interpretation of the rectified clause and its order for the parties to draft new language to be unreasonable, and set aside that portion of the award.

The appellant employer appealed decisions of the Financial Services Tribunal ordering a partial windup of its pension plan following a plant closure.

The Tribunal found that a reorganization had occurred prior to the closure and included employees laid off during that period in the windup group.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's determination that a reorganization occurred and its definition of the windup group were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the Tribunal's jurisdictional rulings regarding the Superintendent's authority.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his claim to rescind $75,000 in child support arrears enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the claim exceeded the $50,000 statutory limit under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal, noting the appellant's failure to move expeditiously, his history of using proceedings to delay payment, and the lack of legal merit in the appeal.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant law firm appealed an order dismissing its motion to set aside a requisition obtained by the respondent client under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act for the assessment of legal accounts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the accounts were interim and the requisition was properly made within one month of the delivery of the final account.

The court also upheld the motions judge's exercise of inherent jurisdiction to permit the assessment and his refusal to order security for costs.

The appellant sought to vary an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court that quashed her appeal and judicial review regarding her eviction from a co-operative housing unit.

The underlying proceedings were quashed because the appellant failed to comply with a prior order requiring her to pay monthly rent and produce documents related to her claim for a rent subsidy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to vary, finding no error in the single judge's decision and noting the appellant's persistent failure to pay rent or comply with court orders.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding him liable for unregistered and illegal trading of securities and imposing sanctions.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commission's findings on liability, concluding it was reasonable to find the appellant engaged in acts furthering trade and received commissions.

However, the court found the Commission erred in its sanctions analysis by misapprehending the timing of a previous ban imposed on the appellant in Alberta.

The appeal was allowed in part, with the trading bans and administrative penalty set aside and remitted to the Commission for a fresh determination.

The self-represented appellant sought to enforce three New York State judgments in Ontario under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application because New York is not a reciprocating state and the materials were insufficient to support a claim based on judicial comity.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim rather than converting it into an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment debt.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside, and the application was converted into an action under the Simplified Rules with a timetable for pleadings.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel which upheld a finding of professional misconduct for facilitating mortgage fraud in ten real estate transactions.

The Appeal Panel had substituted a three-month suspension for a reprimand and increased the costs award against the appellant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Panel's decisions on misconduct, penalty, and costs were all reasonable.

The representative plaintiff in a class action sought leave to appeal an order refusing to approve a settlement and class counsel fees.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision.

The motions judge arguably erred by adding a new criterion of 'institutional fairness', mischaracterizing a non-exclusive licence as a property right, failing to consider the high-risk nature of the litigation, and incorrectly concluding he had no authority to alter class counsel fees.

The appeal raises important issues regarding settlement approval factors and copyright law.

The plaintiffs in two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motions to add the driver and owner of the vehicle they were passengers in as defendants.

The Master found that the two-year limitation period had expired and that the plaintiffs had sufficient facts to allege negligence against the proposed defendants within the limitation period, or alternatively, failed to exercise due diligence to discover those facts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the Master's application of the discoverability doctrine.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the suspension of his Ontario Works benefits.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Tribunal held a telephone hearing rather than an in-person hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal had discretion to hold an electronic hearing, the appellant suffered no prejudice, and he failed to demonstrate any error of law in the Tribunal's decision.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award dismissing a grievance for unjust termination and denial of benefits.

The grievor, who was off work on workers' compensation, claimed ongoing benefits from the predecessor employer after the entire business was sold to a successor employer.

The arbitrator held that the predecessor employer had no ongoing liability under the collective agreement except for crystallized entitlements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion that the successor employer replaced the predecessor employer for ongoing benefits was reasonable and consistent with labour relations jurisprudence.

The appellant lien claimants appealed an order refusing to confirm a Master's report under the Construction Lien Act.

The Master had found that the lien claimants were entitled to the full value of their claims from security posted by a mortgagee to vacate the liens, rather than just the deficiency in the holdback.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in principle by ignoring binding precedent (stare decisis) which limits recovery from posted security to the holdback deficiency.

The Court also upheld findings that the mortgagee was not an 'owner' at the relevant time, that holdbacks must be calculated individually for direct contractors rather than pooled, and that certain funds were not 'advances' made prior to the liens being vacated.

Two competing groups of plaintiffs, KMG and RGG, brought class actions against Barrick Gold Corporation for securities misrepresentations related to environmental violations at a Chilean mine.

The motion judge granted carriage to RGG, finding their broader claims and superior state of preparation were in the best interests of the class.

KMG appealed the carriage order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge articulated the correct test, did not err in law or principle, and committed no palpable and overriding factual errors in his assessment of the carriage factors.

The appellant courier company appealed a class action certification order, arguing the motions judge erred in certifying a common issue regarding whether its customs brokerage services were 'unsolicited' under the Consumer Protection Act.

The appellant contended that determining whether services were unsolicited required an individualized inquiry into each consumer's knowledge and intent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was systemic and based on standard form contracts that did not mention brokerage fees, meaning the issue could be determined on a common basis without individualized inquiries.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director to screen out his complaint regarding alleged police misconduct.

The respondent screened out the complaint under s. 60(2) of the Police Services Act because it was filed more than six months after the events occurred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent's reasons were adequate and its decision not to exercise its discretion to extend the time limit was reasonable given the 40-month delay and the nature of the allegations.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed attendant care and housekeeping benefits for services provided by his former wife, daughter, and a lawn care company.

The insurer denied the claims on the basis that the caregivers did not sustain an 'economic loss' as required by s. 3(7)(e) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

A FSCO arbitrator and Director's Delegate upheld the denial, finding that mere loss of time did not constitute an economic loss.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness, despite the concurrent jurisdiction of courts and arbitrators under the Insurance Act, and found the Delegate's interpretation of 'economic loss' as requiring a financial or pecuniary loss to be reasonable.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration board's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a policy grievance regarding probationary faculty workload.

The union argued the board's reasons were inadequate and incomprehensible.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the board failed to engage with the union's arguments or explain its conclusion regarding the collective agreement's exception for policy grievances.

The application for judicial review was granted, the arbitration award was quashed, and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted board.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that found it contravened the Human Rights Code and ordered compensation to the respondent, a former employee.

The applicant argued the Tribunal unreasonably ignored the employment contract's termination clause and unearned commission in calculating lost wages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's power to order compensation under the Code is not limited by common law wrongful dismissal principles, and the Tribunal reasonably refused to consider the commission issue due to lack of documentation.

The applicant sought judicial review of an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal regarding its application for registration as a vendor under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the pre-hearing order did not compel the Registrar to register the applicant, but only to consider the application.

The Court also held that judicial review was inappropriate because the applicant had an adequate and preferable alternative remedy through a statutory appeal to the Licence Appeal Tribunal, which provides a hearing de novo.