Michael A. Code

Police officers convicted of assault causing bodily harm arising from an arrest for public intoxication appealed their convictions and conditional sentences.

The appeal court found that the trial judge misapprehended key medical evidence by concluding the complainant’s injuries independently proved repeated blows, when the medical evidence was equally consistent with a fall during the arrest.

Applying the stringent misapprehension-of-evidence test, the court held the error was material and formed an essential part of the reasoning process leading to conviction.

The Crown argued the convictions could still stand on an alternative theory of unlawful arrest, but the court found the trial judge had not clearly analyzed or relied on that theory.

The convictions were therefore unsafe and a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The Superior Court conducted a fresh analysis of the delays after finding that the trial judge had mistakenly omitted a two‑month period when calculating delay.

The court concluded that most delays were attributable to inherent time requirements of the case or institutional delay, with only one month attributable to the Crown.

The total unjustified delay of approximately eight months fell within the Morin guidelines and did not justify an inference of prejudice.

Balancing the limited delay, weak evidence of prejudice, and the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court found no Charter breach.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to appear under s. 145 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s explanation that he mistakenly attended the wrong courthouse and then attempted to travel to the correct location.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by assessing the appellant’s evidence in isolation and by failing to consider corroborating evidence from the appellant’s mother, whose credibility was acknowledged by the Crown.

This omission constituted both a misapprehension of evidence and a failure to consider relevant evidence on a material issue.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for breach of a probation order under s. 137 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act involving a prohibition on contact with a co‑accused subject to limited exceptions for vocational, educational, employment, or counseling purposes.

The trial judge acquitted after concluding the Crown bore the burden of proving the accused was not within the counseling exception and had failed to investigate whether counseling was occurring.

The appeal court held the trial judge erred in law by treating the exception as an element of the offence despite no evidentiary foundation giving it an “air of reality.” The evidence established the accused and the co‑accused were simply sitting and walking together outside a building, which could not fall within the counseling exception.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction entered, with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against two young boys.

The Crown alleged the accused sexually assaulted the boys during the summer and fall of 2009 while spending time with their family.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming a close father-son bond with one boy and denying any inappropriate contact.

The court found the boys' evidence credible and reliable, supported by circumstantial evidence including anal injuries and behavioral changes.

The court also admitted the boys' accounts as similar fact evidence, finding they mutually corroborated each other.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault causing bodily harm against one boy and sexual assault simpliciter against the other.

The applicant, having been acquitted of criminal harassment, initiated a private prosecution against the complainant for perjury and other offences.

After a justice of the peace issued process, the Crown intervened and entered a stay of proceedings, citing no reasonable prospect of conviction and public interest.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the stay, alleging abuse of process and flagrant impropriety by the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's decision to stay proceedings is a core prosecutorial discretion immune from judicial review absent flagrant impropriety, which the applicant failed to establish.

In a judge-alone retrial involving historical allegations of sexual abuse by a mother's intimate partner against two child complainants, the court separately assessed the allegations because evidence of collaboration undermined the force of similar fact reasoning.

The court found the evidence relating to one complainant insufficiently reliable to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given inconsistencies, frailties in disclosure, and surrounding family dynamics.

However, the allegations of the other complainant were accepted as credible and reliable, supported by circumstantial evidence and, most significantly, a surreptitious tape-recorded conversation treated as containing implicit admissions.

Convictions were entered on two counts, with acquittals on the remaining two.