John Laskin

The appellant recruitment agency sued the respondent trucking companies for breach of contract after its services were terminated.

The trial judge found only the subsidiary company liable for failing to provide six months' notice, but that company subsequently went bankrupt.

On appeal, the appellant argued the parent companies were liable for inducing breach of contract and under the common employer doctrine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the inducing breach claim was not pleaded at trial and lacked the requisite intent, and upholding the trial judge's finding that the contract was solely with the subsidiary.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding a Sanderson costs order was also dismissed.

Following the release of the main appeal decision, the appellants and respondents settled the issue of costs.

The respondents sought an additional $5,000 in partial indemnity costs against the interveners.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs against the interveners, finding that the respondents had already recovered substantial costs from the appellants and incurred only nominal costs from the intervention.

The appellant was originally charged with indictable offences and elected trial by judge and jury in the Superior Court of Justice.

On the trial date, the Crown re-elected to proceed by summary conviction, and the appellant pleaded guilty before the Superior Court judge.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Crown had the authority to re-elect the mode of proceeding, the Superior Court of Justice is not a summary conviction court and lacked jurisdiction to take the guilty pleas and impose sentence.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence and pleas were quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's refusal to restore an action that had been dismissed for delay by the registrar.

The Court of Appeal found that the registrar had no jurisdiction to dismiss the action because the 90-day period following the status notice had not elapsed.

Furthermore, the motion judge erred in finding prejudice to the respondent based on the disposal of a fuel tank prior to the dismissal, as this was not prejudice arising from the dismissal itself.

The appeal was allowed, and the registrar's dismissal order was set aside.

The young person appealed a custodial sentence of 300 days followed by 14 months' probation for the sexual assault of a friend.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his trial testimony as an aggravating factor and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's lack of empathy and remorse, as evidenced by text messages sent after the assault, rather than his trial testimony.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break, enter and theft of a dwelling house and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, less 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by declining to grant enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of demonstrating that enhanced credit was warranted.

The appellant appealed his convictions on nine counts of sexual offences involving two minors.

He argued that the trial judge's interventions during witness examinations created an appearance of unfairness and that the trial judge improperly minimized the impact of a false statement made by one of the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions, while numerous, did not create an appearance of unfairness or suggest he had pre-judged the appellant's credibility.

The court also held that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant were entitled to deference.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims against Royal Trust for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence regarding an option agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the option agreement was unambiguous and had become null and void after the sale of the business.

The Court also agreed that Royal Trust acted prudently in selling the estate assets and that summary judgment was appropriate under the Hryniak framework.

Following the dismissal of appeals and motions for leave to appeal regarding the appointment of a trustee for an inter vivos trust, the successful parties sought their costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the normal loser-pays regime applied to the appeals, rather than costs being paid out of the estate, as the uncertainty regarding the trust's administration had been resolved by the application judge.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful beneficiaries and full indemnity costs to the trustee, payable jointly and severally by the appellants.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment setting aside a transfer agreement on grounds of undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.

The appellants argued the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction under a bifurcation order and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's order was within the scope of the bifurcation order and his factual findings were well-supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claims for oppression and civil conspiracy against the respondents.

The appellants alleged the respondents unlawfully provided their share ownership information to a third party, leading to an injunction that froze their shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondents' conduct was not oppressive, there was no intent to injure to support a conspiracy claim, and the appellants suffered no damages because they had consented to the injunction.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention on a secure forensic unit.

He argued the Board erred by rejecting a hybrid disposition that would have allowed discretion to transfer him to a general forensic unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that a hybrid disposition was premature to be reasonable given the early stages of the appellant's treatment.

Although the Board improperly relied on the appellant's request for an absolute discharge to buttress its findings, the error was of no consequence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for robbery with an imitation firearm, arguing he should receive enhanced credit for his 15 months of pre-trial custody.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Summers, the Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, awarding enhanced credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis, reducing the remaining sentence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The respondent conceded the sentence was illegal, as the offence is a 'serious personal injury offence' under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, precluding a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court granted one-for-one credit for the five months and ten days the respondent had already served under house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 12 months.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conditional sentence, and substituted a sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred by not permitting him to address the court before sentencing and by finding a conditional sentence inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to allow the appellant to speak was an inadvertent procedural error that would not have changed the outcome, as the judge was already aware of his remorse.

The court further found the sentence was fit given the monetary amount, breach of trust, and lengthy duration of the fraud.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to extend the time to appeal a Crown wardship order regarding her 14-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no explanation for the lengthy delay, no merit to the appeal, and that it was not in the best interests of the child, who had been placed for adoption, to upset her current arrangements.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, arguing the trial judge failed to scrutinize the complainant's evidence with the same rigour as his own.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not unfairly reject the appellant's evidence and was entitled to accept the complainant's explanation for her incremental disclosure.

The court concluded the trial judge's reasons were adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.

The moving party brought a motion pursuant to Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The court found the motion had no merit, declined to grant an oral hearing, and dismissed the motion.

The court also ordered that the moving party may not file any further documents or communicate with court staff regarding the appeal.