D. Michael Brown

The applicant, Andrew Campbell, sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court assessed the public safety, reviewability, and enforceability interests.

While the applicant's amended release plan addressed public safety concerns, the court found that the enforceability interest significantly outweighed the reviewability interest, as the grounds of appeal did not "clearly surpass" the minimal "not frivolous" standard, and the offences were very serious.

The applicant's delay in bringing the application and unwillingness to commit to a prompt appeal perfection date also weighed against release.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Microsoft Canada Inc., appealed a trial decision that awarded the respondent, a former employee, unvested stock awards after his termination without cause.

The trial judge had found the termination provisions in the Stock Award Agreement unenforceable because they were "harsh and oppressive" and not brought to the respondent's attention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the respondent received no notice, as the respondent had expressly agreed to the terms for 16 years by clicking an acceptance box, despite consciously choosing not to read the agreement.

The moving parties, who had commenced an action alleging fraudulent conveyance and seeking a certificate of pending litigation (CPL), appealed the dismissal of their CPL motion.

They brought two appeals (to Divisional Court and Court of Appeal) and two motions in the Court of Appeal: one to determine jurisdiction (final vs. interlocutory order) and another for an interim CPL under s. 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The single motion judge declined to rule on the interim CPL, citing reservations about jurisdiction given the pending determination by a panel.

The judge adjourned the interim CPL motion to be heard concurrently with the jurisdiction motion on an expedited basis and extended the appeal perfection date.

The judge also commented on the systemic confusion regarding appeal routes in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appellant's appeal and subsequently issued a costs endorsement.

The appellant conceded that the respondent was entitled to costs.

The court determined that this was not an exceptional case warranting full indemnity costs and awarded the respondent $5,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant, King Square Limited (KSL), appealed a trial judgment that found it liable to pay further commissions to the respondent mortgage broker, OMJ Mortgage Capital Inc. (OMJ), for additional loan advances obtained from Firm Capital Corporation (FCC).

KSL argued these were new loans made outside the commission agreement's term.

The Court of Appeal, applying a deferential standard of review to contract interpretation, upheld the trial judge's finding that the additional advances were not new loans but rather further advances under the original loan commitment, which was secured during the currency of the commission agreement.

The court found the trial judge's interpretation commercially reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

This appeal arose from a failed business venture to revive a bankrupt manufacturing company, involving a secured loan and asset transfer via a Quitclaim Deed.

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals: one concerning the enforceability of the Quitclaim Deed for asset transfer, and another regarding compensation for a former operator based on unjust enrichment.

The Court dismissed the appeal concerning the assets, affirming the Quitclaim's unenforceability due to lack of certainty.

However, it allowed the appeal regarding the former operator's salary, finding that unjust enrichment was not established and that the corporate veil could not be pierced to hold the appellant company liable for work done for a subsidiary.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action concerning a helicopter acquisition and operation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the initial agreements (Letter of Intent and July Letter Agreement) lacked sufficient material terms to constitute enforceable contracts for the "Buy-in Claim," particularly given the absence of a "definitive agreement" for co-ownership.

The court also dismissed other breach of contract claims (Aircraft Management Agreement and Internal Cost Claims) because the appellants failed to adduce evidence particularizing or supporting damages on the summary judgment motion.

The appellant challenged a trial judge's decision that the parties' religious marriage ceremony in Tennessee was a valid marriage under s. 31 of Ontario's Marriage Act.

The appeal raised questions about whether s. 31 applies to marriages solemnized outside Ontario and to purely religious ceremonies where no steps were taken to obtain a licence or register the marriage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that s. 31 can validate marriages solemnized outside Ontario if the parties intended to create a formally binding legal marriage and did not deliberately fail to comply with legal requirements.

The court emphasized the public policy favoring marriage validity and found the parties' subjective belief and subsequent conduct supported the trial judge's finding of intent to comply.

The appellant, Steve Maynard, appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his application to quash five municipal by-laws.

The application judge had found that the challenge to the by-laws, based on their alleged inconsistency with a provincial policy statement and non-conformity with an official plan, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT), now the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, holding that it was plain and obvious that the LPAT (or its successor) had exclusive jurisdiction over such matters under the Planning Act.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This endorsement concerns a request to reconsider a costs disposition made on July 27, 2021.

The moving party for the reconsideration (respondents in the underlying appeal) had their costs submissions filed late and not forwarded to the panel.

The court reviewed the submissions but found no reason to vary the original costs order, confirming the previous disposition.

The respondents (creditors) moved to quash an appeal brought by the appellant (debtor) from a garnishment order, arguing that the order was interlocutory and therefore not appealable to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the garnishment order was an interlocutory step in an ongoing oppression action, not a final disposition of the parties' rights or a discrete proceeding.

Consequently, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which properly lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant, Forest Meadows Developments Inc., appealed an order dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent, Narges Shahrasebi, breached an Agreement for Purchase and Sale (APS).

The core issue was whether the respondent had represented that she would not be able to close on the extended closing date of October 29, 2019, which the appellant argued constituted anticipatory breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding of fact that no such representation was made, and therefore, there was no anticipatory breach or reasonable reliance by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought a panel review of a chambers judge's order dismissing his motion for an extension of time to appeal, and the respondent moved to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The underlying application, dismissed by the lower court, involved unsubstantiated claims of organized crime and personal sabotage.

The Court of Appeal, finding no error in the chambers judge's discretionary decision, affirmed that the appeal was clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, dismissing the panel review request and allowing the motion to dismiss the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its decision on an appeal concerning leave to proceed under the Ontario Securities Act.

The appellants had challenged the motion judge's denial of leave for certain alleged financial misrepresentations.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in principle on this central issue, remitting it for redetermination.

As the appellants were substantially successful on the appeal, they were awarded $60,000 in all-inclusive costs for the appeal.

The costs of the original motion for leave were deferred to the judge determining the remitted issue.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action on a motion for summary judgment, which was found to be statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge concluded the claim was discovered by August 21, 2015, more than two years before the action was commenced.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the interpretation or application of the discoverability principle under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, specifically regarding when a proceeding is an "appropriate means to seek to remedy" a loss.

The court rejected the argument that the appropriateness of litigation includes an assessment of its prospect of success or the ability to marshal evidence.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the respondent, Bruce Boudreau, was entirely successful in opposing the appellant Randi Jakobsen's appeal.

The court ordered Ms. Jakobsen to pay Mr. Boudreau his costs of the appeal, fixed at $14,000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

AIG Insurance Company of Canada sought substantial indemnity costs against The Corporation of the City of Markham and Lloyd’s Underwriters following a motion for reconsideration of an appeal decision.

The court found the reconsideration motion to be entirely without merit, having put AIG to needless expense.

Consequently, the court awarded AIG $13,000 in substantial indemnity costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable forthwith.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring her to pay spousal support to the respondent, whom the trial judge found was her common-law spouse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the parties were spouses under the Family Law Act, despite the trial judge's erroneous reference to the Divorce Act criteria for spousal support.

The court found this error not material due to significant overlap in statutory criteria and ample evidence supporting the respondent's economic dependence.

The appeal regarding spousal support and trial costs was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction and sentence for willfully promoting hatred against identifiable groups (Jews and women) and bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds, including challenges to the videoconference hearing, findings on the elements of the offences, and application of aggravating factors, did not raise questions of law alone or lacked sufficient merit/significance to the administration of justice.

Consequently, the application for bail pending appeal was also dismissed.

The applicant, James Jahkyn Grant, sought release pending his appeal from a conviction for importing cocaine.

The Crown opposed on grounds of the proposed appeal's lack of merit, the applicant's likelihood of not surrendering into custody, and public interest considerations.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his appeal was not frivolous, that he would surrender into custody, or that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court noted the seriousness of the offence and the applicant's history of non-compliance and challenging court authority.