D. Michael Brown

The appellants, Celine and Richard Pizale, sought to appeal orders approving the sale of their partially-renovated property by a receiver and an administration order.

They argued they had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) or, alternatively, should be granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal dismissed their panel review motion, affirming the chambers judge's decision that no automatic right of appeal existed as the sale approval order did not result in a loss beyond that already worked by the unappealed appointment order.

The court also found no basis to grant leave to appeal, concluding that the appeal did not raise an issue of general importance or prima facie merit, and would hinder the receivership process.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants, though not fully successful on the merits, significantly reduced the judgment amount against them.

The court considered the parties' respective cost submissions and awarded the appellants partial indemnity costs of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, while denying the respondent's request for costs.

The court did not interfere with the cost award made by the motion judge.

R.H. appealed sentences totaling six years for sexual interference, making child pornography, and accessing child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge, who properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

The court, however, modified a lifetime internet prohibition order to align with previous jurisprudence and granted credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a trial decision concerning spousal support, equalization payment, imputation of income, and the dismissal of a fresh evidence motion.

The respondent cross-appealed regarding an error in the equalization calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal on all five grounds, affirming the trial judge's decisions on interpreter competency, lump sum child support, income imputation, spousal support, and the refusal to admit fresh evidence.

The court allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not deducting the value of a date of marriage asset from the respondent's net family property in the equalization calculations, leading to an increased equalization payment owed by the appellant.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by Subway against the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in an anti-SLAPP motion.

Subway sought partial indemnity costs of $61,291.30.

CBC requested reconsideration of the costs award based on Supreme Court of Canada anti-SLAPP decisions (Pointes and Bent) or a reduction to $17,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld its decision to award partial indemnity costs, distinguishing the case from Bent due to the availability of substantial judicial guidance on s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act prior to CBC's motion, and the significant costs incurred by Subway.

The court awarded Subway $40,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The appellant, Darren Pearce, sought leave to appeal a five-year global sentence for aggravated assault and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately address the principle of parity between Mr. Pearce's sentence and that of his co-accused, Terrance Goodwin, who received a substantially shorter sentence for the same crime.

The court substituted a sentence of "time served," equivalent to approximately three and a half years, to achieve appropriate parity, considering Mr. Pearce's pre-sentence custody and credits.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal concerning the interpretation of a commitment letter for real estate financing and the calculation of damages.

The lender (MarshallZehr Group Inc.) terminated the commitment letter before any funds were advanced to the borrower (Ideal (BC) Developments Inc. et al.), citing the borrower's failure to satisfy initial funding conditions.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to the lender, upholding the termination and awarding damages including a lender fee.

The appellate court affirmed the motion judge's interpretation that the cancellation provision in the commitment letter allowed for termination in the pre-closing period when no funds had been advanced.

However, the court found that the lender fee was not recoverable as the commitment letter stipulated it would be deducted from the initial advance, which never occurred.

The damages award was reduced accordingly.

The appellant, Andrew Bielli, appealed his conviction for possession of proceeds of crime for the benefit of a criminal organization.

The case centered on a police ruse designed to search the appellant and his vehicle without disclosing the true nature of the investigation, leading to the seizure of evidence.

The application judge found breaches of the appellant's Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding no s. 8 or s. 9 breach and police good faith.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding there was a de facto arrest, thus finding a s. 8 breach.

The Court also found errors in the s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the police's good faith and reliance on prior case law, as the Charter violations were planned and deliberate.

The Court concluded that the impugned evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant sought a panel review from the Court of Appeal for Ontario of a single judge's decision refusing an extension of time to appeal a summary conviction dismissal.

The applicant had been convicted of breach of undertaking and assault.

His initial summary conviction appeal was dismissed due to a lack of transcripts.

Subsequent applications for extensions of time and panel reviews were dismissed by single judges of the Court of Appeal (MacPherson J.A. and Coroza J.A.) on grounds of unexplained delay, lack of bona fide intention to appeal, and absence of apparent merit.

The panel upheld the previous decisions, finding no error of law and no justification to depart from the prior rulings.

The application for review was dismissed.

This motion was brought by the appellant for a review of a single judge's decision dismissing his application for court-appointed counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was appealing his conviction and sentence for robbery and related offences, including a dangerous offender declaration.

The single judge had dismissed the application, finding little merit to the appeals and that counsel was not necessary given the straightforward nature of the grounds and the appellant's ability to present his arguments.

The panel of the Court of Appeal found no reason to differ from the single judge's conclusions and dismissed the motion for review.

The Court of Appeal allowed Her Majesty the Queen's appeal, remitting the case for a new trial due to insufficient reasons from the lower court.

In this costs endorsement, the Crown sought $25,000 in appeal costs, while the respondents requested no costs.

The court awarded no costs for the appeal, citing the regrettable outcome of a new trial and the respondent's limited resources compared to the state.

The costs of the first trial were remitted to the judge hearing the new trial.

The appellant, convicted of speeding, appealed the dismissal of his provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial justice of the peace made a palpable and overriding error by failing to consider a significant discrepancy between the officer's oral testimony regarding time and distance and the radar reading, which could have raised reasonable doubt about the radar's functioning.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating it would withdraw the charge.

Costs were not awarded, consistent with the general rule for Provincial Offences Act proceedings.

The appellant, Terry LeBlanc, was the high bidder at a Sheriff's auction for a residential property.

His winning bid of $260,000 was less than 60% of the lowest appraised value ($320,000), leading to the sale's cancellation based on an internal Attorney General policy.

LeBlanc sued the Crown for breach of contract.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the contract permitted unilateral cancellation, section 142 of the Courts of Justice Act shielded the respondent, and equitable principles allowed declining enforcement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the auction terms, as announced and posted at the courthouse, allowed for unilateral cancellation up to the time of satisfaction of sale terms, making it unnecessary to address the other grounds.

McDonald's sought to declare North Elgin Centre Inc. (NEC) in contempt of a prior court order requiring NEC to provide "all reasonable cooperation" to obtain Planning Act consent for a renewed lease.

NEC filed a report with the Town's Committee of Adjustment proposing conditions for consent approval, which McDonald's argued was a breach.

NEC also brought a cross-motion for declaratory relief and directions.

The court dismissed McDonald's contempt motion, finding that NEC's report, including its proposed conditions, reflected legitimate concerns as the property owner and did not constitute a failure to provide "all reasonable cooperation." NEC's cross-motion was also dismissed as unnecessary given the contempt motion's dismissal, and because a single judge could not vary a panel order.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will regarding the disposition of a cottage property and its sale proceeds.

The estate trustee sought directions on how to distribute the proceeds among the testator's grandchildren.

The motion judge ruled for equal distribution among the four surviving grandchildren.

The appellant, a grandchild, appealed, seeking a larger share based on a different interpretation of the will's clauses.

The respondents cross-appealed on the motion judge's reasoning, not the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the proceeds should be distributed equally among the four grandchildren alive at the end of the life interests, based on the testator's intention as determined through the "armchair rule."

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal by an insurer, Co-operators General Insurance Company, finding it had no duty to defend its insureds, Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville (FCS) and Laridae Communications Inc., against a class action and a third-party claim.

The claims arose from a data breach where a confidential report was hacked from FCS's website and posted online.

The court held that the data exclusion clauses in both the Commercial General Liability (CGL) and Professional Liability policies were unambiguous and clearly excluded coverage for claims arising from the electronic distribution or display of data.

The court rejected arguments that the exclusion clauses nullified the policies or that there were non-electronic claims, emphasizing that the substance of the claims solely related to online data dissemination.

The accused, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's improper use of judicial notice, including drawing on personal experience as counsel and relying on external social science research (a magazine article and parallels to battered woman syndrome from *R. v. Lavallee*), to assess the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial notice and violated procedural fairness by relying on information not put into evidence or subject to submissions.

The errors materially infected the credibility findings, which were central to the trial.

The curative proviso was not applicable due to the procedural unfairness.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This appeal concerns a defamation action initiated by AA against his former partner CC and her friend BB, following a false report to a children's aid society.

The trial judge initially found BB and CC liable for conspiracy and slander related to the initial false report, awarding $25,000.

However, the trial judge dismissed AA's claim against CC for defamatory statements made during a subsequent interview with the Society, citing qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by not assessing whether CC's statements during the interview were made with malice, which would defeat qualified privilege.

The appellate court found that CC's statements were indeed made with malice, awarded AA nominal damages of $500 for this slander, and increased AA's awarded disbursements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to use lettered names for the parties to protect the children's identities, affirming the court's inherent jurisdiction to do so.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.

The Participating Nursing Homes (PNH) appealed a Divisional Court decision that upheld a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had directed the PNH and unions to negotiate a gender-neutral comparison system (GNCS) for maintaining pay equity, specifically to address changes in job duties and ensure ongoing compliance with the Pay Equity Act.

The PNH argued that the Act did not require them to tie their maintenance obligation to the proxy employer's historical valuation of male jobs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's authority to ensure compliance with the Act and the necessity of ongoing comparison, including through the proxy method, to maintain pay equity.