J. Thomas Curry

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent general surgeon.

The action arose from the respondent's post-operative care of the deceased following a gallbladder surgery, specifically the decision to take a 'wait and see' approach when signs of jaundice appeared.

The trial judge found the respondent's approach met the standard of care and that causation was not established, as there was no known treatment for the necrotising pancreatitis that ultimately caused the death.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of the law and dismissed the appeal.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing an application for judicial review of an adjudicator's refusal to recuse himself from a police disciplinary hearing.

The Commissioner alleged the adjudicator's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the adjudicator should have been named as a respondent and the Commissioner lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the adjudicator's conduct did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias and the procedural issues raised in the cross-appeal were without merit.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct for obstructing a College investigation into a complaint against another physician.

The appellant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction, erred in denying a stay of proceedings, and made an unreasonable finding of misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Executive Committee had broad statutory authority to refer the matter, the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process did not apply, and the finding that the appellant intentionally provided false information to mislead the investigation was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel which had quashed her appeal from a Hearing Panel's dismissal of her motion challenging jurisdiction.

The Law Society argued the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction because the Appeal Panel's decision was not a final order under section 49.38 of the Law Society Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the right of appeal is statutory and limited to final dispositions of disciplinary proceedings.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant sought leave to adduce fresh evidence on his appeal from a Discipline Committee's finding of professional misconduct.

The proposed fresh evidence was a subsequent Registration Committee decision refusing to permit him to be registered to practice due to the misconduct finding.

The Divisional Court applied the Palmer test and dismissed the motion, finding the evidence was not relevant to whether the appellant's actions constituted professional misconduct and could not reasonably be expected to affect the Discipline Committee's decision.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant argued it should be exempt from costs as a public interest litigant.

The court rejected this argument, finding the applicant had a material interest in the proceeding, as success would have halted an underlying police disciplinary hearing and an abuse of process motion against the applicant.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs in the amount of $33,434.93.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police applied for judicial review to prohibit an adjudicator from continuing to hear a police discipline matter, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondents moved to quash the application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the respondents were properly named.

On the merits, the Court reviewed several instances of the adjudicator's conduct, including remarks about wasted time, rulings on disclosure of counsel's notes, and comments regarding the timing of the recusal motion and the involvement of the Attorney General.

The Court concluded that, viewed contextually and cumulatively, the adjudicator's actions and remarks did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The parties sought resolution of three issues arising from the Court of Appeal's reasons regarding civil contempt sentencing.

The Court directed that the appellants be brought before the trial judge, and remitted the issues of credit for time served and passport retention to the trial judge for determination.

The appellant brought a motion for an immediate stay of the continuation of disciplinary proceedings commenced against her by the Law Society of Upper Canada, pending the hearing of her appeal and judicial review.

She alleged prosecutorial misconduct and a reasonable apprehension of bias by the Hearing Panel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to establish that the balance of convenience was in her favour or that she would suffer irreparable harm if the hearing progressed to its conclusion.

The court also declined to remit the matter to a previous judge for reconsideration.

The appellants, Jay and Christina Chiang, appealed a trial judge's finding that they had not purged their civil contempt by fulfilling undertakings to disclose financial information, as well as the resulting sentences of one year and eight months' imprisonment.

They also appealed the trial judge's decision to quash a Parole Board order granting Jay Chiang parole and to issue a replacement warrant of committal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of non-compliance and the decisions regarding parole jurisdiction and the replacement warrant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal against sentence, finding that the trial judge was bound by a 2003 consent order that limited the initial period of incarceration for non-compliance to seven days.

The sentences were reduced to seven days each.

The Director of the Ontario Racing Commission applied for judicial review of a Commission Panel's decision to exclude a statement made by the respondent licensee during an investigation into illegal drug use in horse racing.

The Panel had excluded the statement on the basis that the investigator wilfully deceived the respondent about his regulatory peril.

The Divisional Court found the Panel's decision unreasonable, as there was no evidentiary basis for the finding of wilful deceit, and quashed the decision, remitting the matter to the Commission for determination on the merits.

The Commissioner of the OPP sought to stay a disciplinary hearing pending an application for judicial review based on a reasonable apprehension of bias by the adjudicator.

A motion judge denied the stay, finding the Commissioner lacked standing and failed to meet the test for a stay.

On review, the Divisional Court set aside the motion judge's order, holding that the Commissioner has standing to seek judicial review on procedural fairness grounds and that the proper test for a stay was met, as irreparable harm would result from continuing a hearing tainted by an apprehension of bias.

The stay was granted and the respondents' cross-motion to quash the application was dismissed.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police moved to stay a disciplinary proceeding against two senior officers, alleging bias by the Adjudicator.

The motion was brought during an abuse of process hearing while the Commissioner was testifying.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Adjudicator's comments did not demonstrate bias but rather frustration with the prosecution's conduct.

The Court also noted that the Commissioner likely lacked standing to seek judicial review of a decision made by his own delegate in the disciplinary process.

The applicant, a lawyer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission prohibiting him from appearing as counsel before it until he provided an unqualified apology for his conduct during a hearing.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission's hearing raised a reasonable apprehension of bias because the panel had pre-judged the matter and prepared its reasons in advance.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively conducting a contempt hearing, a power reserved for the Divisional Court under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The matter was not remitted to the Commission, as the applicant's conduct had already been referred to the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission (ORC) decision suspending them for one year and imposing fines for 'tubing' horses prior to races.

The applicants argued they were denied natural justice because the ORC relied on general rules rather than a specific prohibition against tubing, and that the panel erred in excluding photographic evidence.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard, finding ample evidence that tubing was a known prohibited practice in the industry.

Although the panel erred in excluding the photographs, it did not cause a meaningful injustice.

The application was dismissed and the penalties upheld.

The cross-appellant lawyer appealed a 12-month suspension imposed by the Law Society Appeal Panel for professional misconduct involving sexual harassment.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the impact of the proceedings on his life.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it of limited value.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal on penalty, finding the 12-month suspension unreasonable given the historical context of the misconduct (1988-1993), comparable cases, and mitigating factors.

The penalty was reduced to a three-month suspension.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario moved for leave to appeal an order dismissing its motions to strike out applications brought by four physicians.

The physicians had applied to the Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The College argued the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction and the matters should be heard by the administrative tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the test for striking pleadings and properly concluded it was not plain and obvious the applications would fail, as the Superior Court retains residual jurisdiction over Charter challenges.

The plaintiff brought an action in Ontario against Ontario and non-Ontario defendants, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of mining opportunities in Peru.

The non-Ontario defendants brought a motion to stay or dismiss the action on jurisdictional and forum non conveniens grounds, and challenged the validity of service ex juris.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding a real and substantial connection to Ontario, that Ontario was the appropriate forum, and that service ex juris was valid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, clarifying that the real and substantial connection test is the exclusive framework for determining assumed jurisdiction over out-of-province defendants, subsuming remedy-specific tests.

The appellant, 407 ETR Concession Co., appealed a decision declaring it lacked statutory authority to charge tolls to the respondent trailer rental company when its trailers were towed by tractors owned by others.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a trailer is a 'vehicle' under s. 13(1) of the Highway 407 Act, 1998, and that a towed trailer is 'operated' on the highway.

The court applied the modern principle of statutory interpretation, finding that reading the Highway 407 Act harmoniously with the Highway Traffic Act supported this interpretation.

The court also set aside the application judge's order for an accounting.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their claim to wind up two family-owned companies under s. 207 of the OBCA.

The appellants argued that irreconcilable differences and a mutual loss of confidence required the court to intervene.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusion that the appellant had no reasonable expectation that the business would be wound up or that he would continue to exercise de facto control.