John Pearson

The appellant, a long-time bank employee, appealed her conviction for defrauding her employer of over $1.9 million using false purchase orders directed to family-owned companies.

She also appealed the $2,000,000 restitution order imposed at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings and credibility assessments.

However, on consent of the Crown, the sentence appeal was allowed and the restitution order was struck out due to manifest errors in law.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with sexual offences arising from a large-scale police investigation.

During the trial, it emerged that the Crown had failed to disclose notes and a will-say statement of a former police officer who had contacted the mother of one of the complainants.

The trial judge recused himself from hearing a stay application due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and another judge heard the application.

The application judge found that Crown counsel had wilfully withheld the materials and ordered a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction to hear the matter, but erred in finding wilful non-disclosure.

The evidence showed the non-disclosure was inadvertent.

The Court held that a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown were not justified for inadvertent non-disclosure.

The stay and costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of keeping gambling devices after the trial judge found insufficient evidence that the seized video machines were actually used for gambling.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal, ruling the trial judge erred in law by requiring proof of actual use.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's refusal to infer the machines were gambling devices was a finding of fact based on evidentiary sufficiency, not an error of law, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to intervene.

The appellant challenged a substituted conviction for driving-related alcohol offences on the basis that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was infringed when, after unsuccessful attempts to contact legal aid lawyers outside regular business hours, police proceeded with breathalyser testing.

The majority held that s. 10(b) does not constitutionally require governments to provide free and immediate duty counsel on request, but does require police to hold off from eliciting incriminatory evidence where a detainee has asserted the right to counsel, acted diligently, and remains unable to reach counsel because of institutional unavailability.

The court further held that the appellant had not validly waived the right to counsel and that the police were required to advise him of the continuing right to a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel before proceeding.

Applying s. 24(2), the majority excluded the breath samples as conscriptive evidence obtained in a manner that rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for defrauding a bank of a sum exceeding $1,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority agreeing with the Court of Appeal.

The dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on an amended indictment, finding that while the Crown established the appellant obtained an extension of credit by deceit, the indictment was not framed that way and the Crown failed to show the accused was not misled in his defence.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of house-breaking instruments contrary to s. 309(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge quashed the indictment, finding the section violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 309(1) does not create a reverse onus and does not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, as the Crown must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant operated a telephone sales 'boiler room' in Toronto, fraudulently inducing United States residents to purchase worthless shares in Central American mining companies.

The victims sent their money to Central America, and the appellant brought a portion of the proceeds back to Canada.

The appellant challenged his committal for trial on the basis that the essential element of the fraud (the deprivation) occurred outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, establishing that Canadian courts have jurisdiction over transnational offences if there is a 'real and substantial link' between the offence and Canada, which was satisfied by the scheme being devised and operated in Toronto.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his paramour during an altercation where both were intoxicated.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that excessive force in self-defence should lead to a manslaughter verdict, inadequately charged on provocation, and failed to relate intoxication to self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that excessive force defeats self-defence entirely, the provocation charge was adequate, and intoxication is irrelevant to the objective standard of reasonable apprehension required for self-defence under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.