John Kukurin

Supplementary reasons following a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act concerning three children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

These reasons address the placement and access determinations for the youngest child, P., who was placed in extended society care.

The court considered statutory provisions governing access for children in extended society care and determined that access orders should be made in the child's best interests, applying a holistic analysis that considers the child's wishes, relationships, and overall circumstances rather than applying a blanket policy approach.

Supplementary reasons following a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act concerning three children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

These reasons address the placement and access arrangements for the child M., a 16-year-old girl.

The court determined that placement with the maternal grandmother was appropriate, subject to a nine-month supervision order with tailored conditions.

The court rejected the Society's concerns regarding the grandmother's suitability as a caregiver and granted M. access to her mother as the access holder, with conditions permitting both supervised and unsupervised contact.

The decision emphasizes the statutory obligation to consider placement with relatives and the importance of respecting a mature minor's wishes and best interests.

This is a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning three sibling children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

The children have been in society care for over five years following apprehension in November 2014 based on allegations of inappropriate discipline.

The court conducted a contested trial to determine whether the children should be returned to their mother, placed with their maternal grandmother, or remain in extended society care.

The judgment addresses complex evidentiary issues regarding hearsay statements of children, the credibility of witnesses, and the application of the best interests test under the CYFSA.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault following a five-day trial.

The Crown sought an 18-month custodial sentence followed by probation and ancillary orders.

The defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence with house arrest for the first 270 days, followed by graduated curfew conditions, probation for 18 months, mandatory DNA order, SOIRA registration for 10 years, and completion of the Sexual Offender Relapse Prevention-I program.

The court found that while denunciation and deterrence remain primary objectives for sexual assault, a conditional sentence was appropriate given the offender's youth, first-time offender status, lack of aggravating features such as violence or threats, and the need to reduce reliance on incarceration.

This is a summary judgment motion in a child protection case involving three children and allegations of risk of sexual harm by their father.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the children are in need of protection under section 74(2)(d) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act based on risk of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation.

The case involved complex evidentiary issues, including the admissibility of hearsay evidence, police interview recordings, and expert assessments.

The court conducted a careful screening of evidence and made specific rulings on admissibility, ultimately finding that sufficient admissible evidence existed to conclude there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on the risk of sexual harm ground.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

This is a ruling on a voir dire held in a summary judgment motion in a child protection application.

The Children's Aid Society sought findings that two children were in need of protection, an order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised paternal access.

The voir dire addressed the admissibility of two letters from Office of the Children's Lawyer counsel containing the views and wishes of the children.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to determine which statements were admissible, requiring that statements describe the contemporaneous emotional state of the children without describing the cause of that state.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a four-year-old child during an interview at an Ontario Provincial Police detachment.

The child's statements concerned alleged discipline practices in the home, including kneeling with nose to wall and siblings having hands tied behind their backs.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, examining both necessity and threshold reliability.

While the court found necessity was established, it concluded that threshold reliability was not met due to multiple concerns including the child's age and distracted state, lack of oath or affirmation, absence of questioning about understanding truth versus lies, destruction of audio and video recordings, incomplete case notes, and contradictions with statements from older siblings.

Sentencing decision for an Indigenous offender convicted of escape from lawful custody, breach of recognizance under section 810.2 of the Criminal Code, and failure to attend court.

The offender had an extensive criminal history including violent offences and numerous breaches of court orders.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence with credit for pre-sentence custody at a 1.5:1 ratio, followed by a two-year probation order with conditions for monitoring and protection of the public.

The court rejected the Crown's request for a three-year probation term, finding that two years was sufficient given the proportionality principle and the offender's circumstances.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of child hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by three children to clinical social worker Carrie-Lynn Wilton during a child protection proceeding.

The court conducted three separate voir dires to determine whether statements from each child met the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, requiring both reasonable necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the first child's statements did not meet the necessity requirement as the child had already testified at trial.

The second child's statements also failed the necessity test as the court had gathered sufficient additional evidence demonstrating the child could testify.

The third child's statements, however, met both criteria and were admitted as trial evidence, as they were more recent, made at a more mature age, and sufficiently documented.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child to a child services worker.

The child was apprehended from parental care and made statements to the worker about discipline in the home.

The applicant society sought to introduce these statements through the worker's testimony using the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, which requires establishing both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court ruled that the statements did not meet the necessity requirement, as the child was capable of testifying and the court had heard sufficient evidence demonstrating the child's ability to communicate and participate in proceedings.

The court found that direct testimony from the child was preferable, particularly given inconsistencies in the child's various statements to different individuals.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of child hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by two children during an access visit supervised by a Children's Aid Society worker.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, requiring both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the society failed to establish necessity for admitting the children's hearsay statements, as both children were capable of testifying viva voce at trial.

The court also addressed state of mind statements and found that only one statement by one child met the criteria for admission under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

This is a ruling on a voir dire regarding the admissibility of child hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by an eight-year-old child to his foster mother regarding being locked in his bedroom and having the light bulb removed.

The Children's Aid Society sought to introduce these statements through the foster mother's testimony under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility.

The court rejected the application, finding that the society failed to establish sufficient necessity for the hearsay evidence, as the child was capable of testifying viva voce at age twelve.

The court noted that while threshold reliability was satisfied, the necessity requirement was not met, particularly given that the statements were made to a foster mother rather than to investigators or police, and were explanatory rather than responsive to interrogation.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child during a police interview.

The child's statements were recorded by a society worker and sought to be introduced at trial through that worker's testimony.

The court ruled that while the statements were hearsay, they met the twin requirements of necessity and threshold reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court admitted the evidence as trial evidence, noting that the child could not be expected to recall events from years prior and that the handwritten notes and their verbatim transfer to case notes provided sufficient reliability.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child during a school interview by child protection workers.

The court considered whether the statements met the twin requirements of necessity and threshold reliability under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility.

The court found that threshold reliability had not been met due to multiple weaknesses in the interview process, including lack of recording, absence of specific questions, unclear temporal information, and the child's behavioral difficulties.

The hearsay statements were excluded from trial evidence.

The applicant society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of three First Nations children (ages 13, 10, and 7) following their apprehension by warrant due to domestic violence in the home.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion.

The court applied the statutory framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, determining that reasonable grounds existed to believe the children were at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a non-removal order.

The court considered placement with the maternal grandfather as a relative under the statutory preference for kinship placements and found it to be in the children's best interests, subject to conditions including the removal of adult siblings from the grandfather's home.

This is a ruling on two voir dires concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child (M.) during interviews conducted on November 28, 2014.

The child was interviewed first at her school by child protection workers, and subsequently at the Ontario Provincial Police station by a constable.

The Children's Aid Society sought to introduce these statements through the testimony of a society worker to establish the truth of their contents.

The court applied the principled approach to child hearsay admissibility, requiring both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that neither requirement was satisfied and ruled the hearsay statements inadmissible.

This is a ruling on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by a child during a school interview by child protection workers.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, examining whether the evidence met the twin requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the statements were admissible as trial evidence, noting that the dangers associated with hearsay could be attenuated and that admission would permit valuable comparisons between accounts from multiple interviewers and interviews.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred on June 26 and June 27, 2017.

The complainant and accused met through an online dating website and spent a night together at the accused's home.

The case involved a "he said/she said" credibility assessment.

The court found the accused not guilty on the first count (hot tub incident on June 26) but guilty on the second count (midnight sexual encounter and shower incident on June 27).

The court emphasized that consent must be affirmatively communicated and must apply to each specific sexual activity at the time it occurs.

The accused failed to take any steps to ascertain the complainant's consent.

A maternal grandmother sought interim access to her two grandsons (ages 2 and 10 months) pending trial.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for dismissal.

The court dismissed the grandmother's motion for interim access, finding insufficient compelling circumstances relating to the children's best interests, a genuine issue for trial, and reliance on the parental autonomy approach established in Chapman v. Chapman.

The court granted the mother's cross-motion for dismissal and awarded her costs.