J. M. Spence

The appellant, owner of a commercial plaza, was sued after a worker was electrocuted while working on a pylon sign.

The appellant sought a declaration that the respondent insurer, who issued a policy to one of the appellant's tenants naming the appellant as an additional insured 'as landlord only', had a duty to defend the claim.

The application judge dismissed the application, declining to consider extrinsic evidence regarding who hired the worker.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extrinsic evidence was not undisputed and, even if admitted, would not trigger a duty to defend because the true nature of the claim was against the appellant as owner of the plaza, not as landlord.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing an adjournment in an oppression remedy proceeding under the Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision not to adjourn was an order ancillary to the OBCA proceeding and therefore appealable to the Divisional Court under s. 255 of the OBCA.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment, arguing that the motion judge displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias through his comments during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the transcript and found that while the motion judge used colourful language, his comments did not demonstrate bias or prejudgment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant landowner sued the Town of Newmarket for negligence after its tenant allowed third parties to deposit significantly more fill on the demised land than the appellant had authorized.

The source of some of the fill was a subdivision within the municipality.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the municipality owed no duty of care to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal agreed, distinguishing the case law relied upon by the appellant, and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against the defendants relating to cosmetic facial surgery.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The plaintiff alleged breaches of the standard of care, lack of informed consent, battery, fraud, and vicarious liability.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to tender any admissible expert evidence to support her claims, while the defendants provided uncontradicted expert evidence that the standard of care was met and the procedures were appropriate.

The court applied the 'full appreciation test' under Rule 20 and concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant argued it should be exempt from costs as a public interest litigant.

The court rejected this argument, finding the applicant had a material interest in the proceeding, as success would have halted an underlying police disciplinary hearing and an abuse of process motion against the applicant.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs in the amount of $33,434.93.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police applied for judicial review to prohibit an adjudicator from continuing to hear a police discipline matter, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondents moved to quash the application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the respondents were properly named.

On the merits, the Court reviewed several instances of the adjudicator's conduct, including remarks about wasted time, rulings on disclosure of counsel's notes, and comments regarding the timing of the recusal motion and the involvement of the Attorney General.

The Court concluded that, viewed contextually and cumulatively, the adjudicator's actions and remarks did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision declaring that the applicant and a predecessor school board were a single employer under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act.

The applicant argued that the Public Sector Labour Relations Transition Act and its regulations precluded the Board from making such a declaration and limited the geographic scope of the unions' bargaining rights.

The Divisional Court held that the appropriate standard of review was patent unreasonableness.

The majority found that the Board's interpretation of the interplay between the statutes, which preserved its discretion under s. 1(4), was not clearly irrational.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry that allowed the Commission to hear evidence from alleged victims of historical sexual abuse.

The applicant argued that hearing such evidence would convert the inquiry into a substitute police investigation and exceed its mandate by requiring findings of civil or criminal responsibility.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commissioner clearly understood his mandate to assess the institutional response rather than determine individual liability, and that he appropriately balanced the need for the evidence against the applicant's reputational interests.

The plaintiff sought costs on a solicitor and client basis following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal a summary judgment decision.

Applying the test from Smyth v. Waterfall, the court found the defendants failed to show that bringing the motion for leave to appeal was reasonable.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a solicitor and client basis, fixed at $4,742.00.

The appellant company sought payment of a $5 million key-man life insurance policy following the death of its principal from colon cancer.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the deceased materially misrepresented his medical history at the time of application and failed to disclose a change in insurability before the policy was delivered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the failure to disclose relevant medical information rendered the policy voidable by the insurer under section 183 of the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the limitation period for claiming no-fault benefits.

The insurer had terminated benefits but had not provided a clear and unequivocal refusal to pay.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period under s. 281(5) of the Insurance Act applies, which commences only upon a refusal to pay.

The six-year limitation period under s. 45(1)(g) of the Limitations Act does not apply because the Insurance Act specially limits the time for bringing an action.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant builder appealed a trial judgment that allowed the respondent purchasers to refuse to close a real estate transaction and recover their $20,000 deposit.

The trial judge found that changing the location of the attached garage from the side to the front of the house was a fundamental change, and that the builder failed to clearly convey this change to the purchasers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions.

The appellants, anchor tenants in shopping centres, challenged the constitutionality of shortfall recovery provisions in the Municipal Act.

These provisions allowed commercial landlords to recoup property tax shortfalls from tenants.

The appellants argued this constituted indirect taxation, which is ultra vires the Province under section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions merely regulate the pre-existing transferability of a true land tax, which remains a valid direct tax.

The appellant agreed to purchase a property from the respondents for $106,000, paying an $8,000 down payment and assuming the monthly mortgage payments.

When the appellant sought to pay off the mortgage and obtain the deed, the mortgage balance had been reduced to $71,000.

The respondents argued the appellant still owed the original $98,000 balance, with the difference going to them.

The motions judge agreed with the respondents.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred, as his interpretation would result in the appellant receiving no credit for the mortgage payments made and paying substantially more than the agreed $106,000 purchase price.

The appeal was allowed, and the court declared the appellant was only required to pay the amount owing on the mortgage on the closing date.