Jillian Van Allen

The plaintiff brought a motion for a sixth timetable order to avoid dismissal of her action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The defendants opposed, arguing the action should be dismissed due to the plaintiff's repeated failures to move the litigation forward over ten years.

The court found the plaintiff's explanations for delay largely unacceptable but declined to dismiss the action because the defendants maintained a closely linked counterclaim and had also been dilatory.

The court granted the motion, imposing a strict peremptory timetable to ensure the action proceeds to trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants to freeze their assets pending the resolution of an action for recovery of nearly $1.9 million in loan monies.

After the motion was argued, the plaintiffs sought leave to introduce fresh evidence regarding the defendants' attempts to sell property and hide assets.

The court granted leave to admit the fresh evidence, finding it could not have been discovered with due diligence and was highly relevant to the risk of asset dissipation.

The court granted the Mareva injunction in part, ordering a freezing of the defendants' assets and disclosure of their worldwide assets, finding a strong prima facie case of misrepresentation and misappropriation.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's dismissal order and extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The court applied the Reid factors, finding the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, missed the deadline through inadvertence, and rebutted the presumption of prejudice.

The defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, as the unavailability of certain witnesses was not caused by the delay.

The motion was granted and the dismissal order was set aside.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary a temporary order regarding custody, child support, and spousal support.

He sought to change the primary residence of one child to himself, reduce his imputed income of $100,000 based on new financial disclosure, and increase the applicant mother's imputed income.

The court granted the change in primary residence but deferred the effective date to trial.

The court dismissed the motions to vary the imputed incomes, finding the father's new financial disclosure contradictory and lacking credibility, and the mother's income accurately reflected her circumstances.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found her claims for income replacement benefits and housekeeping benefits were statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in its findings regarding the insurer's denial letters and the inclusion of the Right to Dispute Form.

The Adjudicator dismissed the reconsideration request, affirming that the January 7, 2011 correspondence constituted a valid denial that included the required dispute resolution form, and therefore the limitation period had lapsed before the application was filed.

The applicant mother sought the immediate return of children under a 2-2-3 parenting schedule or, alternatively, a week on/week off schedule, and child support.

The respondent father sought temporary custody and supervised visits for the mother, alleging non-compliance with COVID-19 directives and past parenting issues.

The court found it in the children's best interests to maintain shared parenting and ordered a week on/week off schedule due to the pandemic, limiting parent contact and travel.

The court also ordered the father to pay interim child support of $1000 per month, pending a full motion.

The applicant sought an extension of the two-year limitation period under section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act to dispute the termination of his income replacement benefits.

The Tribunal applied the four-part test from Manuel v. Registrar, considering the applicant's intention to appeal, the length of the delay, prejudice to the insurer, and the merits of the appeal.

Finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate a clear intention to appeal within the limitation period and provided little evidence on the merits, the Tribunal declined to extend the time.

The claim for income replacement benefits was dismissed as out of time.

Following a personal injury jury trial where the plaintiff established liability but recovered zero damages due to the statutory threshold, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant also sought an order under Rule 57.07 that the plaintiff's lawyers personally pay the costs.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs, finding no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court dismissed the request for costs against the plaintiff's lawyers, finding their conduct did not meet the high threshold of exceptional circumstances.

The court significantly reduced the defendant's claimed fees and disbursements, including expert witness fees and counsel's hotel expenses, ultimately fixing costs at $189,298.68.

The court issued an amended ruling on costs following a personal injury civil jury trial.

The plaintiff succeeded on liability but was awarded only $10,000 in general damages, falling below the statutory threshold, and his claim for loss of earning capacity was dismissed.

Neither party's Rule 49 offer triggered cost consequences.

The defendant was substantially successful and was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court assessed costs under Rule 57.01, reducing trial preparation hours and expert witness fees, and adjusting accommodation and meal expenses.

The defendant's motion for the plaintiff's lawyers to personally pay costs under Rule 57.07 was dismissed, as their conduct did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court also addressed the suspension of the plaintiff's third-party costs insurance policy.

The plaintiff, a process serving and litigation loan company, brought a motion for substituted service on several unserved defendants who had defaulted on litigation loans.

Alternatively, the plaintiff sought a Norwich Order compelling the co-defendant, the lawyer who represented the unserved defendants and negotiated the loans, to disclose their addresses.

The court dismissed the request for substituted service as premature because the defendants' whereabouts were unknown.

However, the court granted the Norwich Order, finding that the clients' addresses were administrative information not protected by solicitor-client privilege, and ordered the lawyer to disclose them.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found that the applicant's dispute of the termination of his income replacement benefit was filed within the two-year limitation period.

The Vice-Chair found that the adjudicator made a significant error of law and fact by failing to apply the deemed receipt provisions for the denial letter and by ignoring the date the applicant's counsel received the insurer's claims file.

The Vice-Chair determined the actual denial date was February 15, 2015, meaning the application was filed late.

The Vice-Chair also rejected the argument that the limitation period was extended by a pending mediator's report.

However, as the applicant raised the issue of a limitation extension under section 7 of the LAT Act for the first time in responding submissions, the insurer was granted 15 days to provide written submissions on that issue.

The applicant sought to change a final order regarding access to his five-year-old daughter, requesting immediate full-day unsupervised access.

The respondent opposed due to concerns about the applicant's alcohol use and parenting skills, proposing supervised access.

The court ordered a graduated resumption of access, starting with four hours weekly, increasing over time, with initial 30-minute supervision by the respondent at drop-off, and all visits to occur in a public place without the applicant driving the child.

The court emphasized the child's best interests and the applicant's past conduct.

The applicant sought income replacement and housekeeping benefits following a 2010 motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the benefits in 2011.

The applicant filed an application with the Licence Appeal Tribunal in 2018, more than seven years after the denial.

The Tribunal found that the insurer's denial was valid and contained the required dispute resolution information.

The Tribunal held that the application was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, which had lapsed in April 2014.

The application for these benefits was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her negligence action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant was injured by a physiotherapist on August 12, 2011, but did not know his correct name at the time.

The motion judge found that the appellant could have reasonably discovered the physiotherapist's identity through due diligence more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence, particularly after receiving a July 25, 2012 letter from Toronto Poly Clinic indicating that no one from that clinic had treated her on the date in question.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful motion brought by Lexfund Inc. The court fixed Lexfund's partial indemnity costs, payable by the Ferro defendants, in the amount of $22,477.94, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

No other costs orders were made.

Lexfund Inc. brought a motion seeking to extend a timetable for several actions, extend time to elect to proceed with counterclaims, and to proceed against the estate of Lucio Anthony Ferro.

These actions, primarily debt collection for litigation funding loans, had been administratively dismissed for delay.

The court considered Lexfund's explanations for delay, the lack of prejudice to the defendants regarding the principal debt, and the principles of justice and proportionality.

While acknowledging Lexfund's counsel's "sloppy practice" the court found no deliberate intention to abandon the files and that the litigation should proceed on its merits.

The court granted the extensions and permission to proceed against the estate, but imposed conditions to mitigate prejudice to the individual defendants regarding interest, setting a simple interest rate of 5% per annum and limiting the period for which interest could be charged.

The plaintiff, Pelivan Muscaj, brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his action for delay, issued due to failure to set the action down for trial by the deadline under Rule 48.14.

The court applied the four-part Reid factors (satisfactory explanation for delay, intention to prosecute, timeliness of motion, and prejudice to defendant) using a contextual approach.

The court found the plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the 17-month litigation delay and did not offer satisfactory evidence of a continuing intention to prosecute the action diligently.

Furthermore, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the defendant would not suffer significant prejudice.

Consequently, the motion to set aside the dismissal was denied.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from successful motions by the plaintiffs and the Gomez defendants to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The Danikas defendants had opposed setting aside the dismissal order against them and also opposed paying costs to the Gomez defendants.

The court ordered the Danikas defendants to pay $3,500 in costs to the plaintiffs (by consent) and $5,000 in costs to the Gomez defendants, finding the latter successful and that the "Reid factors" for setting aside the dismissal were satisfied.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time for service of its Notice of Action and Statement of Claim nunc pro tunc to February 14, 2017, following a two-month delay.

The defendant insurer opposed, arguing prejudice due to the expiry of the policy's one-year limitation period and an inadequate explanation for the delay.

The court found the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation (inadvertence and desire not to disrupt settlement negotiations) and successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice, noting the insurer had early notice and access to information.

The court clarified that issuing a Notice of Action within the limitation period stops the limitation clock, mitigating prejudice from subsequent late service of the Statement of Claim.

The motion was granted, validating service and ordering the defendant to file a Statement of Defence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add Kristen McLean as a defendant to an action arising from an incident on a slide ride at Blue Mountain Resort.

The proposed defendant opposed the motion, arguing the two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff argued the identity of the proposed defendant was not discoverable until the resort provided an unredacted incident report.

The court granted the motion, finding the plaintiff had met the low evidentiary threshold to show the identity was not discoverable with due diligence, and added the proposed defendant without prejudice to her right to plead a limitation defence.