Jillian Van Allen

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order to validate and extend the time to serve the statement of claim on the defendants, to substitute the named defendant from "Boyce Stewart" to "Stewart Boyce" due to misnomer, and to extend the set down date from June 19, 2025 to June 19, 2027.

The defendants opposed the motion.

The court found that the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation for the delay caused by departure of counsel and subsequent misunderstanding about file carriage.

The court further found that the defendants suffered no prejudice or unfairness, as the parties had exchanged information through their insurers within days of the accident and continued to do so for approximately two years before the claim was issued.

The court granted the motion, validating service and extending the set down date, while ordering each party to bear its own costs.

The court dismissed Dana Proctor’s action against Penske Truck Leasing as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The claim, arising from a truck rental dispute, included wide-ranging and implausible allegations and relief, including conspiracy, electronic harassment, and requests for judicial review of Alberta court decisions.

The court found the action lacked legal merit, repeated issues from prior proceedings, and was marred by irrelevant and repetitive content.

The court considered a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff’s action as frivolous and vexatious.

The registrar referred the matter to the judge following a request from the defendant’s counsel.

The court reviewed the statement of claim and found it may be frivolous and vexatious, but allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to make submissions before dismissal.

The action was stayed pending the outcome of the written hearing, and the registrar was directed to provide notice and restrict further filings except for the plaintiff’s submissions.

The decision addresses cross-motions to remove counsel for conflict of interest in a privacy action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff sought to remove the defendant’s counsel, Ms. Schultz, due to her dual role as counsel for the accident benefits insurer and for the defendant in the privacy action.

The court found a conflict and ordered her removal.

The defendant’s motion to remove the plaintiff’s counsel, the Campisi firm, was dismissed as there was no real basis to believe the firm could provide material, non-privileged evidence.

This decision addresses interim parenting, decision-making, and the enforceability of a cohabitation agreement in a family law dispute.

The court declined to change the existing parenting schedule or grant unilateral health decision-making to the mother, instead ordering the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The court found the cohabitation agreement to be a valid domestic contract barring property and spousal support claims, subject to statutory exceptions under the Family Law Act.

The issue of the respondent’s earning capacity and unconscionability of the support waiver was left for trial.

The plaintiff brought an action for solicitor's negligence against his former lawyer, alleging the lawyer negligently advised him to settle his statutory accident benefits claim for an inadequate amount and failed to investigate a potential catastrophic impairment designation.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the lawyer's investigation and negotiation of the settlement met the standard of a reasonably competent lawyer given the plaintiff's need for immediate funds, poor compliance with treatment, and the risk of benefits termination.

The court also found the plaintiff failed to prove that he would have rejected the settlement or achieved a better outcome had a catastrophic impairment assessment been recommended.

The defendants, a law firm and its lawyers, brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss an action brought against them by the plaintiff, a frequent litigation adversary of their client.

The plaintiff alleged professional misconduct and actionable wrongs, including conspiracy and misleading the court, stemming from the defendants' representation of their client.

While the plaintiff conceded that lawyers do not owe a duty of care to opposing parties, he argued his amended claim, which included new allegations, established a genuine issue for trial.

The court considered the amended claim but found that the plaintiff failed to provide specific facts or evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their action for delay, which arose from a 2011 property flood.

The court applied the four-factor test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., assessing the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found significant unexplained delays by both plaintiffs and their counsel, that the missed deadline was not mere inadvertence, and that the motion to set aside was not promptly brought.

Crucially, the defendants suffered actual prejudice due to the death of a key plaintiff (James Freure) and the dementia of another (Fae Freure), which prevented full discoveries and expert examinations, and resulted in the loss of relevant medical records.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the dismissal, emphasizing the need for finality in litigation.

A separate motion to appoint Catherine Chapman as litigation guardian for Fae Freure was granted.

This endorsement addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the scope of judicial review when a limited statutory right of appeal exists.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to intervene to the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC), finding they offered unique perspectives on the implications of the Divisional Court's decision for other statutory schemes.

The motion for leave to intervene by the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) was dismissed as its submissions were largely duplicative of the appellant's and granting a third intervener would be unfair to the respondent.

The Applicant father sought supervised parenting time with his three children after the Respondent mother alleged sexual and physical abuse against him.

Two police investigations and two Children's Aid Society (CAS) investigations found the allegations not credible, and no charges were laid.

The mother opposed the motion, citing the children's disclosures and a need for more counselling.

The court granted the father interim supervised parenting time, emphasizing the lack of corroboration from police and CAS, and the mother's failure to provide specific particulars of the children's statements.

The court ordered incremental supervised visits with the assistance of mutual friends as supervisors and requested CAS support for logistics and child preparation.

The parties made a consent request to adjourn the pretrial and fixed trial dates in a solicitor's negligence action.

The request was based on a recent order allowing the defendants to amend their Statement of Defence.

The court noted that the plaintiff had failed to serve an expert report on the standard of care despite the passage of eight years and a consent timetable.

The court dismissed the request, holding that fixed trial dates in Toronto are only adjourned in exceptional circumstances and that breaching timetabling orders does not justify an adjournment.

The plaintiffs sought costs for their successful Fresh Evidence and Mareva Injunction motions against the Grillone Defendants, and the defendant Lisa Gatto sought costs for the Mareva Injunction motion that was withdrawn against her.

The court awarded Gatto $7,500 in partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiffs.

The court found the Grillone Defendants engaged in dishonourable conduct deserving of censure and awarded the plaintiffs substantial indemnity costs totaling $44,500, which included the amount the plaintiffs were ordered to pay Gatto.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's dismissal for delay in a Simplified Procedure action concerning an alleged breach of a commercial lease.

The action was dismissed after five years due to a combination of prior counsel's inaction, misguided procedural steps including an improperly obtained default judgment, and current counsel's inadvertence in tracking the five-year anniversary.

Applying the Reid Factors, the court found the motion was brought promptly, the delay was largely explained by counsel changes and errors, and the defendants failed to establish non-compensable prejudice.

Emphasizing the policy of resolving disputes on their merits, especially when dismissal results from counsel's error, the court granted the motion, setting aside the dismissal.

No costs were awarded, as the defendants' costs were deemed unreasonable and avoidable.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a sixth timetable order to avoid dismissal of her action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The defendants opposed, arguing the action should be dismissed due to the plaintiff's repeated failures to move the litigation forward over ten years.

The court found the plaintiff's explanations for delay largely unacceptable but declined to dismiss the action because the defendants maintained a closely linked counterclaim and had also been dilatory.

The court granted the motion, imposing a strict peremptory timetable to ensure the action proceeds to trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants to freeze their assets pending the resolution of an action for recovery of nearly $1.9 million in loan monies.

After the motion was argued, the plaintiffs sought leave to introduce fresh evidence regarding the defendants' attempts to sell property and hide assets.

The court granted leave to admit the fresh evidence, finding it could not have been discovered with due diligence and was highly relevant to the risk of asset dissipation.

The court granted the Mareva injunction in part, ordering a freezing of the defendants' assets and disclosure of their worldwide assets, finding a strong prima facie case of misrepresentation and misappropriation.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's dismissal order and extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The court applied the Reid factors, finding the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, missed the deadline through inadvertence, and rebutted the presumption of prejudice.

The defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, as the unavailability of certain witnesses was not caused by the delay.

The motion was granted and the dismissal order was set aside.

The applicant mother sought the immediate return of children under a 2-2-3 parenting schedule or, alternatively, a week on/week off schedule, and child support.

The respondent father sought temporary custody and supervised visits for the mother, alleging non-compliance with COVID-19 directives and past parenting issues.

The court found it in the children's best interests to maintain shared parenting and ordered a week on/week off schedule due to the pandemic, limiting parent contact and travel.

The court also ordered the father to pay interim child support of $1000 per month, pending a full motion.

The court issued an amended ruling on costs following a personal injury civil jury trial.

The plaintiff succeeded on liability but was awarded only $10,000 in general damages, falling below the statutory threshold, and his claim for loss of earning capacity was dismissed.

Neither party's Rule 49 offer triggered cost consequences.

The defendant was substantially successful and was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court assessed costs under Rule 57.01, reducing trial preparation hours and expert witness fees, and adjusting accommodation and meal expenses.

The defendant's motion for the plaintiff's lawyers to personally pay costs under Rule 57.07 was dismissed, as their conduct did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court also addressed the suspension of the plaintiff's third-party costs insurance policy.

Following a personal injury jury trial where the plaintiff established liability but recovered zero damages due to the statutory threshold, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant also sought an order under Rule 57.07 that the plaintiff's lawyers personally pay the costs.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs, finding no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court dismissed the request for costs against the plaintiff's lawyers, finding their conduct did not meet the high threshold of exceptional circumstances.

The court significantly reduced the defendant's claimed fees and disbursements, including expert witness fees and counsel's hotel expenses, ultimately fixing costs at $189,298.68.