Jill M. Copeland

The mother (C.V.F.), as appellant, sought a review of a prior order refusing a stay of a trial decision concerning parenting time and decision-making authority, and a further extension of time to perfect her appeal.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the motion for review, finding no basis to interfere with the previous order, which was deemed to be in the child's best interests given the extensive and prolonged litigation.

The panel also refused any further extensions for perfecting the appeal, citing multiple delays and the mother's failure to address deficiencies in her appeal materials or even read the trial decision.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on two grounds: the constitutionality of the amended s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code regarding provocation, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge on the Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The Court of Appeal declined to rule on the constitutional question, finding it was raised tactically for the first time on appeal and lacked an air of reality.

The court also found no reversible error in the NCR instructions, clarifying that the jury was properly guided on the disjunctive nature of the s. 16 test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, U.K. and R.P., appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding fabrication as post-offence conduct and the application of the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on fabrication of trial evidence without independent evidence, and by providing a deficient fabrication instruction that failed to distinguish between disbelieved and fabricated evidence, explain independent evidence, or require consideration of alternative explanations.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in the W.(D.) instruction by conflating the appellants' evidence and treating defence evidence as an all-or-nothing proposition.

These errors were deemed prejudicial, going to the heart of credibility assessment and the burden of proof.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of William Whatcott on a charge of willfully promoting hatred against gay men, stemming from the distribution of flyers at the 2016 Toronto Pride Parade.

The trial judge had acquitted Whatcott, finding the flyers did not constitute hate speech and excluding expert evidence on anti-gay discrimination tropes and evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in excluding the expert evidence, which was necessary to understand how the flyers perpetuated negative stereotypes and promoted hatred in a broader social and historical context.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Jasper Atienza, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He raised three grounds of appeal concerning the trial judge's jury instructions: (1) whether the evidence showed only one vehicle at the shooting scene; (2) the probative value of post-offence association with co-accused Laurie Phan regarding planning and deliberation; and (3) inferring guilt from his failure to disclose his destination when leaving an apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The court affirmed the trial judge's discretion in reviewing evidence, noting the weakness of the two-car theory and that Ms. Phan's acquittal rendered any potential error regarding post-offence association harmless as it negated a joint planning theory.

The court also found no prejudice from the brief reference to the appellant's undisclosed destination.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant, Assignment Credit Corp., was ordered to pay costs to several respondents (MCAP Financial Corporation, Dorr Capital Corporation, and Cherniak Law Professional Corporation).

The court rejected the appellant's argument that prior costs agreements should stand, as they were made before the appellant's non-disclosure of a material fact (that the Mesbur Judgment was obtained on consent) was revealed.

This non-disclosure, which impacted the second issue of the appeal, justified an elevated costs award on a solicitor-client basis for the affected respondents.

The 167 respondents were denied costs due to their own failure to disclose the consent judgment and their underlying financial obligations.

This endorsement addresses the costs of appeals and a cross-appeal that were previously dismissed.

The appellants proposed an aggregate payment of $300,000 as partial indemnity costs.

The respondents sought higher amounts, with one group seeking full indemnity.

The court found the amounts sought by the respondents to be reasonable and proportionate, noting cooperation among counsel and no duplication of effort.

The court awarded specific partial indemnity costs to each respondent group, totaling $549,082.93.

The Bank of Montreal, a creditor, sought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property by Roufat Iskenderov to Elena Lazareva.

The motion judge applied a ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The appellants appealed, arguing the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, holding that the two-year limitation period from the date of discovery under the Limitations Act, 2002 applies to fraudulent conveyance actions, not the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court found its previous decision in Anisman (ONCA) was wrongly decided due to a lack of historical context.

The discoverability issue was ordered to be tried together with the fraudulent conveyance claim.

The appellant, Andrew Campbell, appealed his convictions for kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and assault causing bodily harm, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included the trial judge's failure to recharge the jury on the reasonable doubt standard (R. v. W.(D.)) and failure to charge on the racial and cultural context of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury charge or the decision not to recharge.

The sentence appeal challenged the calculation of credit for restrictive bail conditions (Downes credit).

The Court found no error in principle or calculation regarding the Downes credit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant, Elaine Nairne, appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support quantum and duration, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the significant income disparity and differing marital contributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's holistic assessment of the spousal support award, which included a substantial interest-free mortgage benefit to the appellant on the matrimonial home.

The court affirmed the principle of significant deference to trial judges in spousal support decisions, while noting that the trial judge's approach to assessing compensatory and needs-based entitlement was arguably narrow.

A minor modification was made to the order regarding the specific employer reference for the respondent's retirement.

The appellant was convicted of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The police arrested him based on a mistaken identity, relying partly on observations from a warrantless covert hallway camera.

The Crown conceded breaches of the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to the unlawful camera installation and subsequent arrest and search, as well as a late Report to Justice.

The trial judge admitted the fentanyl evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith based on their understanding of the law at the time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the police's mistaken belief as to the appellant's identity did not, in itself, render the arrest unlawful, and that the s. 24(2) analysis for admitting the evidence was sound, particularly regarding police good faith.

The appellant, V.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault against his ex-wife and two counts of assault against his daughter, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and failed to apply the test from R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the unorthodox delivery, the trial judge's reasons revealed a clear basis for conviction, demonstrating an understanding and application of the W.(D.) principles.

The court upheld the trial judge's credibility findings, which were based on a holistic assessment of the evidence, including the consistent testimony of the daughter and the partial reliability of the appellant's own evidence.

The appellant, Ivan David Lira, appealed his convictions for robbery and firearms offences, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal centered on an alleged s. 10(b) Charter breach due to delayed access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified under the *Rover* exception due to police and public safety concerns and preservation of evidence, and that even if there was a breach, the evidence seized prior to the delay would not be excluded under s. 24(2) due to lack of causal link.

The sentence appeal argued insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence confinement conditions.

The Court affirmed the trial judge's approach of applying 1.5:1 *Summers* credit and treating harsh conditions as a mitigating factor in the global sentence calculation, consistent with *Marshall*, without a specific mathematical quantification.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Fournier, appealed his conviction for trafficking fentanyl-carfentinil and manslaughter in connection with the overdose death of a fellow inmate.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of duress and in finding legal causation for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly found the appellant acted willingly, had safe avenues of escape, and that his trafficking was a significant contributing cause of the victim's death, despite the victim's voluntary drug consumption.

The appellant, a representative plaintiff in a class action, appealed the dismissal of his motion to certify a class action against Olympia Trust Company.

The action alleged that Olympia Trust, as a custodial trustee for syndicated mortgage loans (SMLs) held in registered savings accounts, breached trust and fiduciary duties by failing to ensure the SMLs were "qualified investments" under the Income Tax Act.

The motion judge found it plain and obvious that the claims for breach of trust and fiduciary duty could not succeed, and that other certification criteria were not met.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the Income Tax Act provisions and the Declaration of Trust did not impose the extensive "gatekeeping" or "watchdog" duties alleged by the appellant on Olympia Trust.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This appeal concerned the priority of various creditors in a garnishment hearing involving payments owed by the City of St. Catharines and Region of Niagara to 1671379 Ontario Inc. under a Brownfield Tax Increment Based Incentive Grant Program Agreement (BTIG).

The primary dispute was between MCAP Financial Corporation, holding a perfected General Security Agreement (GSA), and Assignment Credit Corp. (ACC), asserting priority based on an assigned consent judgment (Mesbur Judgment).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that MCAP's perfected GSA had priority for its shortfall judgment over ACC's claim, finding no inconsistency in MCAP's position.

However, the court remitted the issue of priorities among ACC and other unsecured judgment creditors to the motion judge, as it was revealed post-hearing that the Mesbur Judgment was a consent judgment, a fact not disclosed to the motion judge or other creditors, raising new legal arguments regarding the Personal Property Security Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The appellant, S.M., appealed convictions on eight counts related to human trafficking for sex work and assault causing bodily harm, as well as the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

Key issues included the application of the s. 276 screening procedure to sex trafficking offences and the trial judge's credibility findings.

The court also addressed the appellant's argument regarding the trial judge's failure to consider systemic anti-Black racism in sentencing, finding no error as the issue was not raised at trial and no foundation was laid.

The appellant, Mario Inacio, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, assault, threatening death, and extortion.

He argued the trial judge erred by finding a pattern of repetitive aggressive behaviour, concluding the behaviour was intractable, and imposing an indefinite term of imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly identified a behavioural pattern based on the appellant's consistent use of weapons, threats, and violence for financial gain, and that the finding of intractability was supported by compelling expert testimony regarding his high risk of reoffending violently.

The indeterminate sentence was upheld based on the totality of evidence, including the appellant's poor insight, lack of remorse, and long history of anti-social and violent conduct.

The appellant appealed his sentence for convictions including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

His primary grounds were that the trial judge failed to consider his Indigenous roots (Gladue factors), the impact of contracting COVID-19 in pre-sentence custody, and his rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal found that the record did not support these submissions, as the trial judge had indeed considered these factors when accepting a lenient joint submission.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mario Inacio, appealed his convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, assault, threatening death, and extortion, stemming from a dispute over a $400 rent payment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately assess the reliability of the complainant's evidence, given her admitted drug use and memory problems.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of reliability, noting that the judge was aware of the complainant's issues but nonetheless accepted her evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.