Jill M. Copeland

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to Ontario's COVID-19 public health measures, specifically the proof of vaccination requirement enacted by Ont.

Reg 364/20.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the provincial government had ceased enforcement and subsequently revoked the Regulation.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding no practical effect for the declaratory relief sought and that the claim for nominal damages did not cure mootness.

Concerns about judicial economy and the utility of deciding fact-specific constitutional issues in the absence of a live controversy also weighed against exercising discretion.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a prior summary judgment order that set aside and unwound a corporate reorganization.

The appellants argued the order applied to only six of seven entities involved in rooftop solar projects, excluding one.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding that the original order intended to unwind the reorganization for all seven entities, as it would make no sense to exclude one given the context of the initial findings of oppression and the single reorganization event.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing child pornography, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that s. 8 of the Charter was not engaged when his wife voluntarily turned over computers containing evidence to the police, and by failing to find a s. 8 breach due to delayed reporting of the seizure.

The Court of Appeal found that s. 8 was engaged when police took control of the computers, constituting a seizure.

While the seizure of Computer 1 was found to be lawful under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code, the delay in filing the report to a justice for Computer 1 was a Charter breach.

The court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breaches were not serious and the evidence was reliable and essential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, C.L., appealed his sentence of six years and six months' imprisonment for violent sexual assault and other related offences.

The appeal raised two grounds: that the trial judge erred in tempering the mitigating factor of his guilty plea with a lack of insight, and that the trial judge erred in her analysis of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to either the guilty plea's mitigation or the pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant, a co-founder of a technology company, appealed the dismissal of his application for an oppression remedy under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The application judge had focused narrowly on the employment agreement, finding no reasonable expectation of indefinite employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred by failing to consider the appellant's reasonable expectations as a shareholder and director, and by focusing solely on the written agreements rather than the broader equitable context of the oppression remedy.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a trial to resolve factual disputes and credibility issues.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, attempting to adduce fresh medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test for admissibility as it would not have affected the Minister's assessment of the applicant's medical situation or the surrender decision.

Consequently, the application for judicial review was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing claims related to the validity of a 2002 estate freeze of a family business (Master Steaks) and an oppression remedy concerning the distribution of funds from a vendor takeback mortgage (VTB) related to other family businesses (Truckers Haven).

The Master Steaks estate freeze excluded the appellant daughter, benefiting her brothers.

The motion judge found the estate freeze was validly implemented in 2002, or alternatively, regularized in 2013.

The motion judge also found that the distribution of VTB proceeds was not oppressive, applying the business judgment rule to the directors' decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, deferring to his factual and credibility assessments, particularly his adverse findings against the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting a developmentally disabled woman.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to properly apply the Friesen principles, which dictate that sexual offences against vulnerable individuals akin to children are inherently wrongful and require substantial sentences.

The sentencing judge mistakenly reduced the respondent's moral culpability by considering factors such as the absence of overt sexual objectification and "generous" treatment of the victim.

The Court found the original sentence demonstrably unfit and increased it to six years, ordering the respondent's reincarceration despite his recent release on day parole.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for past offences, appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that ordered her detention in custody and rehabilitation at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

Previously, she had been on a conditional discharge but exhibited declining mental stability and inconsistent attendance at appointments.

Despite recommendations from her physician, hospital counsel, and the Crown for a continued conditional discharge, the ORB found she posed a significant public safety threat due to marked deterioration in her stability and past threatening behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the ORB's decision as reasonable, emphasizing the ORB's expertise and the need to consider future treatment beyond mere reattendance mechanisms.

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended defence evidence regarding sleeping arrangements and erred in the authentication of photographs.

The sentence appeal challenged the trial judge's consideration of a conditional sentence in light of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedents concerning sexual assault against children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and no error in principle in sentencing.

The appellant, R.K., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and an eight-year sentence.

The appeal raised nine grounds, including alleged errors in refusing production of the complainant's diary, improper use of the diary to enhance credibility, misapprehension of evidence, improper cross-examination on bad acts, overvaluing demeanour, improper corroboration by peripheral details, improper reliance on lack of motive to fabricate, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding both the conviction and the sentence, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and sentencing decision to be sound.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the trial judge's decision not to exclude computer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite a s. 8 breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the balancing of the Grant factors.

The court affirmed that the breach was not particularly serious, its impact limited, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was high, especially given the evidence's probative value for the first-degree murder conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the enforceability of Minutes of Settlement signed by family members to resolve three lawsuits involving property and personal injury claims.

The lower court dismissed motions to enforce the settlement, finding a misunderstanding regarding specific equipment (a tractor and snowmobiles) based on subjective intentions.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in principle by relying on subjective evidence rather than an objective interpretation of the contract.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation, the Court clarified the terms for the tractor (correcting a typographical error) and snowmobiles, concluding that a valid agreement existed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the nine-month imprisonment sentence and three years probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by not properly considering denunciation and deterrence, and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, despite being at the lower end for the offence.

The appellant, R.S., appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation and his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's decision to allow the Crown to amend the indictment to include "position of trust" and the reliance on circumstantial evidence to establish a trust relationship.

The sentence appeal contested the lifetime Sexual Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order and the mandatory victim fine surcharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no irreparable prejudice from the indictment amendment and no error in the trial judge's assessment of the trust relationship.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, varying the SOIRA order to 20 years and setting aside the victim fine surcharge, as conceded by the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in credibility assessments of a key defence witness, reversing the onus of proof in assessing circumstantial evidence, misinterpreting expert evidence, and failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding another witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings.

The court emphasized deference to trial judges' credibility assessments and affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the circumstantial evidence test, concluding that the defence's alternative theory was speculative and did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new trial for sexual touching due to insufficient reasons from the trial judge regarding whether the touching was over or under clothing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario admitted a Digital Court Recording (DCR) as fresh evidence to clarify the complainant's testimony.

The Court found that the trial judge's conclusion that the touching was under clothing was apparent from the record, despite not being explicitly articulated in the reasons for conviction.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, restored the conviction, and remitted the matter to the summary conviction appeal court to address remaining grounds of appeal, including intent and sentence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for theft, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order with community privileges, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Board found that an absolute discharge would pose a significant public safety threat due to likely medication non-compliance and substance abuse leading to decompensation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable.

The court rejected arguments that the Board failed to consider the appellant's improvements or misapprehended evidence regarding substance use, emphasizing that appellate review is limited to reasonableness and does not involve reweighing evidence.

Fresh evidence regarding recent decompensation reinforced the Board's conclusion.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the global sentence of 15 months' imprisonment for drug trafficking and breach of undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, clarifying that the sentencing judge's finding was factual and that addiction was properly weighed against aggravating factors, including the commercial motive, repeat offending, and breach of release conditions.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding it within the appropriate range and that a conditional sentence was insufficient for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant, Alexsander Budimirovic, appealed his conviction for two counts of fraud and one count of attempted fraud.

The appeal raised four grounds: the trial judge's failure to give a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning between counts, error in admitting videotaped hearsay statements (Hockett Statements) for their truth, failure to caution the jury about relying on the Hockett Statements without corroboration, and refusal to grant an adjournment after the appellant discharged his counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's instructions on propensity reasoning, the admissibility of the Hockett Statements based on procedural reliability, the adequacy of the caution regarding the statements, and the proper exercise of discretion in refusing the adjournment.