Jennifer Scott

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The applicant had complained about the Children's Aid Society's failure to respond to his request to correct records and facilitate access to his children.

The Board ordered the CAS to comply with complaint review procedures, which the CAS subsequently did.

When the applicant attempted to complain further about the CAS's response, the Board closed its file.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the Board was functus officio after issuing its final decision and had no jurisdiction to hear further complaints on the matter.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended the respondent mother's children and placed them in foster care.

While a child protection application was pending before the court, the mother filed a service-related complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the Society's failure to place the children with willing family members and its refusal to provide reasons.

The Society challenged the Board's jurisdiction, arguing all matters should be heard by the court.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board correctly assumed jurisdiction, as the specific service-related complaints had not been decided by and were not before the court, interpreting section 68.1(8) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board had rescinded the Society's decision to refuse an adoption application by the respondent foster parents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's mandate under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act allows it to make substantive determinations regarding the best interests of the child, rather than being limited to procedural fairness.

The Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Board's decision to place the children for adoption with the respondents was reasonable.

The applicant children's aid society sought judicial review of a tribunal decision that overturned the society's removal of a child from prospective adoptive parents.

The society had removed the child after medical evidence indicated that the child's younger sibling suffered non-accidental trauma consistent with shaken baby syndrome while in the sole care of the prospective adoptive parents.

The court found the tribunal's decision unreasonable because it failed to determine whether the prospective adoptive parents had caused the severe injuries to the sibling, which was highly relevant to assessing the risk of harm to the child.

The tribunal's decision was quashed.

The Children's Aid Society applied for a prohibition or stay of a hearing before the Child and Family Services Board regarding the removal of a special needs Crown ward from his foster parents.

The Society argued the foster parents were not entitled to notice because the child had not lived with them continuously for two years due to a temporary treatment placement.

The court found the temporary placement did not interrupt the continuous care period and that the foster parents were entitled to notice.

The court dismissed the Society's application for judicial review as premature and ordered the child to remain with the foster parents pending the Board's hearing.

The third party consultants appointed to oversee the implementation of the Tribunal's orders regarding workplace discrimination and harassment prevention (WDHP) at the Toronto East Detention Centre submitted their First Quarterly Report of 2006.

The consultants recommended three modifications to the Tribunal's previous rulings: allowing managers to take action on WDHP matters they witness directly, permitting external investigators to handle multiple complaints simultaneously, and enabling senior managers to conduct initial fact-finding for WDHP complaints.

The Tribunal adopted the recommendations with certain modifications, emphasizing the need for management accountability and proper training while ensuring the protection of complainants' rights.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Special Education (English) Tribunal.

As a preliminary matter, the Divisional Court ruled that a new assessment prepared following the tribunal hearing could not be considered on the application for judicial review.

Both parties agreed to proceed with the application without the new assessment.

The Tribunal issued interim rulings regarding a third-party report on the selection of external investigators for workplace discrimination and harassment complaints at the Toronto East Detention Centre.

The Tribunal approved the consultants' criteria for selecting investigators and rejected the Ministry's and Commission's requests for a 'balanced' roster of complainant-side and respondent-side lawyers.

The Tribunal also ruled that draft investigation reports should only be provided to the parties to the complaint, not exclusively to the Ministry, and that investigators should not include recommendations in their final reports to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process.

The complainant sought interim orders regarding the handling of workplace discrimination and harassment complaints at the Toronto East Detention Centre.

The Tribunal clarified that all complaints made at the Centre must be subject to external investigation.

The Tribunal ruled that the third party consultants, rather than the Compliance Committee, are responsible for formulating recommendations regarding the external investigation process, including the roster of eligible investigators and selection criteria.

The complainant's request to order the reprocessing of previously commenced investigations was denied.

The parties sought clarification of the Tribunal's 2002 implementation orders regarding systemic remedies for a racially poisoned workplace at the Ministry of Correctional Services.

The Ministry argued that the independent consultants appointed to develop and oversee anti-racism training were exceeding their mandate by proposing pilot projects, monitoring compliance, and addressing racism towards inmates.

The Tribunal rejected the Ministry's narrow interpretation, confirming that the consultants have broad authority to design and implement a comprehensive change plan to eradicate workplace racism.

The Tribunal also denied the Ministry's motion to call an expert witness to challenge the consultants' proposal, granted limited intervenor standing to the union, and extended the timeline for completing the change process to the end of 2009.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario sought judicial review of an interlocutory order made by its Discipline Committee.

The Committee had ordered the production of confidential third-party medical and counselling records relating to several complainants who alleged sexual abuse by the respondent physician.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Committee reasonably applied the principles from R. v. Mills by analogy to balance the physician's right to make full answer and defence against the complainants' privacy rights.

The Court upheld the disclosure orders for four of the five complainants.

The respondent, Dofasco Inc., sought costs against the Ontario Human Rights Commission following the dismissal of a human rights complaint.

The Tribunal found that the complaint was made in bad faith and that the Commission acted irresponsibly in its post-referral conduct.

The Tribunal also found that the long-term disability allegation, which was dismissed as an abuse of process, caused undue hardship to the respondent.

The Tribunal ordered the Commission to pay $210,000 in costs to the respondent pursuant to subsection 41(4) of the Human Rights Code.

The appellant Ministry appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Human Rights Tribunal's supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation of its previous orders.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry acted in bad faith in attempting to comply with an order mandating a human rights training program to address a poisoned work environment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal retained jurisdiction under s. 41 to recast its orders and impose system-wide remedies.

The Court also rejected the Ministry's argument that it was denied procedural fairness, concluding it had sufficient notice of the allegations of bad faith.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion to strike an affidavit from the appeal book in an appeal from a human rights tribunal decision.

The affidavit contained notes and subjective observations regarding the tribunal's conduct during the hearing, which the Commission argued went beyond permissible gap-filling evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the affidavit was not fresh evidence but was relevant to the issues of bias and partiality raised on appeal.

The moving parties (respondents on the appeal) brought a motion to lift the statutory stay of several orders made by a Board of Inquiry regarding a racially poisoned workplace at a detention centre.

The Board had ordered the Ministry to publicize its decision, implement organizational reforms, and conduct anti-racism training.

The court applied the RJR-Macdonald test and lifted the stay of the order requiring publication of the decision, finding irreparable harm to the complainant if he was kept out of the workplace.

However, the court declined to lift the stays on the orders requiring organizational reforms and training, finding that the balance of convenience favoured leaving them in place until the appeal was decided, given the substantial public funds involved and the Ministry's pending appeal.

The appellants, a commercial printer and its president, refused to print letterhead and business cards for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives due to the president's religious beliefs regarding homosexuality.

A Board of Inquiry found this constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation and ordered the appellants to provide printing services to gays, lesbians, and their organizations.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the finding of discrimination but found the Board's order overly broad, as it could compel the printing of materials directly conflicting with the president's core religious beliefs.

The Court amended the order to exempt the appellants from printing materials that reasonably conflict with the core elements of the president's religious beliefs, while affirming the order in all other respects.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a board of inquiry's pre-hearing disclosure order.

The board had ordered the complainant, who alleged discrimination based on a physical handicap, to produce various medical, workers' compensation, and pension files, as well as a list of all other treating medical practitioners.

The Court of Appeal held that the board had the authority to order the complainant to provide an affidavit of documents for the specified files, allowing for claims of privilege and irrelevance to be adjudicated.

However, the Court found that the board exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the complainant to provide a list of all other treating doctors and their treatments without any relevance screening, as this unjustifiably infringed her privacy rights.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside that specific paragraph of the board's order.

In an ongoing human rights hearing regarding a racially poisoned work environment, the respondents moved to disqualify the Commission's proposed expert witness.

The respondents argued that the expert was bound by a confidentiality agreement from his consulting work for the Ministry and that his prior lawsuit against the Ministry for unpaid fees created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The adjudicator dismissed the motion, finding that the confidentiality agreement did not apply to evidence of human rights infractions or expert opinions on systemic change, and that the fee dispute did not compromise the expert's independence.

However, the adjudicator ordered that the expert testify after the respondents' evidence to avoid prejudice.

In an ongoing human rights proceeding regarding a racially poisoned work environment, the respondents brought a motion to disqualify the Commission's proposed expert witness, Dr. Ralph Agard.

The respondents argued that the expert was bound by a confidentiality agreement from his prior consulting work for the Ministry and that his previous lawsuit against the Ministry for unpaid fees created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The adjudicator dismissed the motion, finding that the confidentiality agreement did not protect evidence of human rights infractions or evaluations of the workplace atmosphere.

Furthermore, the prior fee dispute did not compromise the expert's independence or transform him into an advocate.

The expert was permitted to testify, though his evidence was ordered to be heard after the respondents' factual evidence.

The respondent employer brought a motion to dismiss or permanently stay a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap, arguing that the complainant's receipt of Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits estopped her from claiming she was capable of working.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the abuse of process motion, finding that the issues and parties before the CPP adjudicative structure were not the same as those before the Board, and thus issue estoppel did not apply.

The respondent also moved to strike portions of the Commission's amended pleading.

The Board granted this motion in part, striking allegations that fell outside the specific subject-matter of the individual complaint, while noting that similar fact evidence might still be admissible if relevant and probative.