Jeffrey William Strype

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case brought a motion to exclude potential jurors who pay auto insurance premiums, arguing they have an inherent conflict of interest.

The plaintiff sought to introduce survey evidence suggesting residents would limit damages to lower their premiums.

The court excluded the survey evidence as inadmissible hearsay that failed the threshold test for expert evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no statutory basis in the Juries Act to exclude such jurors or permit a broad challenge for cause, and no evidence of widespread bias to justify striking the jury notice.

The plaintiff, a class member in a class action arising from a 1999 VIA Rail train derailment, sought over $60 million in damages, primarily for past and future loss of income and future care costs.

The plaintiff claimed the accident caused severe, debilitating injuries that destroyed his highly lucrative consulting business in Poland and Eastern Europe.

The court found the plaintiff and many of his lay and medical witnesses lacked credibility, noting significant inconsistencies, lack of documentary evidence (such as tax returns and banking records), and evidence of extensive post-accident travel and business activities.

The court rejected the income loss and future care claims entirely, awarding only $50,000 in general damages for minor soft tissue injuries.

Appellant suffered a traumatic brain injury and severe back injury during a company-sponsored event while employed by respondent.

Appellant was unaware of the permanent and disabling nature of the brain injury until after resignation.

Appellant subsequently applied for long-term disability benefits under the employer's policy approximately five years after the injury occurred.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that coverage terminated upon cessation of active employment.

The trial court upheld the denial.

On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the policy language, when read as a whole, provides coverage for claims arising from incidents occurring during the currency of employment, regardless of when the claim is subsequently filed.

The court also granted relief from forfeiture for the late filing of proof of claim and addressed the applicability of contractual and statutory limitation periods.

Aviva appealed an arbitrator's decision that the respondent's Long Term Disability (LTD) benefits were 'gross employment income' and thus deductible from his Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) at 70% of the gross amount.

The Director's Delegate allowed the appeal, finding that the arbitrator breached procedural fairness by deciding the issue on a basis not argued by the parties.

Furthermore, the Delegate held that LTD benefits are 'other income replacement assistance' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, not 'gross employment income', and therefore the gross amount of the LTD benefits must be deducted from the IRBs.

Following an arbitration where the insurer successfully defended against the applicant's claim for income replacement benefits, the insurer sought its expenses against the applicant and/or her litigation guardian.

The arbitrator dismissed the insurer's claim for expenses.

The arbitrator found no authority to assess expenses against the litigation guardian and noted that the litigation guardian did not act in a frivolous or vexatious manner.

Furthermore, the arbitrator declined to award costs against the applicant, a vulnerable person with severe psychiatric issues, finding that doing so could have a detrimental effect on vulnerable persons attempting to access accident benefits.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement benefits (IRBs).

At the time of the accident, the applicant was receiving Long Term Disability (LTD) benefits.

The parties disputed how the LTD benefits should be deducted from the IRB quantum under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued for a net deduction, while the insurer argued for a gross deduction.

The arbitrator determined that, based on the language of the Schedule and the treatment of LTD benefits as gross employment income, the insurer may deduct 70% of the gross income received for LTD benefits when calculating the weekly IRB quantum.

The applicant sought Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) beyond the 104-week mark following a motor vehicle accident in November 2011.

The insurer had paid IRBs up to February 2015 but terminated them.

The applicant argued that the accident caused a traumatic brain injury and exacerbated her pre-existing Borderline Personality Disorder and substance abuse issues, rendering her unemployable.

The insurer argued that the applicant was already unemployable prior to the accident due to her severe mental health and addiction issues, and that the accident did not materially contribute to her impairment.

The arbitrator reviewed extensive medical records and expert testimony, concluding that the applicant's downward spiral began well before the accident.

The arbitrator found that the applicant failed to prove causation under either the 'but for' or 'material contribution' tests, as her inability to work was entirely attributable to her pre-existing conditions.

The application for ongoing IRBs was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to exclude potential jurors or permit challenges for cause in a civil motor vehicle accident case, arguing that jurors who pay automobile insurance premiums have an inherent conflict of interest.

The court adjourned the motion, directing the plaintiff to serve the Attorney General and inviting The Advocates' Society to intervene as a friend of the court, recognizing the novel and broad implications of the issues raised regarding civil jury selection and impartiality.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for the settlement of a personal injury claim arising from a catastrophic motor vehicle accident caused by a defective General Motors ignition switch.

The injured plaintiff, a party under disability, received a substantial settlement through the GM Ignition Switch Claims Resolution Facility.

The court approved the settlement, including a sealing order to keep the settlement amount confidential, as required by the settlement terms.

The court also approved the plaintiffs' solicitors' contingency fee, finding it reasonable given the excellent result achieved, the initial risks of the litigation, and the solicitors' undertaking to cover future guardianship legal costs.

Finally, the court approved the proposed management plan for investing the settlement funds.

The plaintiffs successfully resisted a motion brought by the defendant to the counterclaim's insurer to remove the plaintiffs' lawyer for an alleged conflict of interest.

The plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale against the insurer and the insurer's lawyer personally.

The court declined to award costs against the lawyer personally, finding his conduct was not unreasonable or derelict.

However, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs directly against the non-party insurer, finding the motion was unnecessary, speculative, and caused needless expense to the plaintiff in preserving her choice of counsel.

Costs were fixed at $13,400 net of setoffs.

During a personal injury class action trial arising from a VIA Rail derailment, a class member sought to qualify a chartered accountant as an expert witness to quantify past and future wage loss.

The defendants opposed the qualification, arguing the expert lacked objectivity and his evidence was unnecessary.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the Mohan framework and found the expert's evidence was not necessary, as he merely accepted the class member's uncorroborated figures without independent analysis.

The court also found the expert failed to establish a basic threshold of objectivity, rendering him improperly qualified.

The expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

During a trial for damages arising from a railway accident, the plaintiff (a class member) sought to qualify an expert witness to provide opinion evidence on the profitability of a proposed European pipeline project, claiming a loss of opportunity.

The defendants objected to the expert's admissibility.

Following a voir dire, the court refused to qualify the expert.

The court found the expert's evidence lacked reliability due to an undisclosed prior business relationship with the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the court held the expert evidence was unnecessary because the plaintiff failed to produce admissible evidence or documentation demonstrating he could have obtained the financing required to build the pipeline.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action against the defendant lawyers, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should not be awarded due to the lead plaintiff's hardship as a paraplegic, the fact that the defendants were insured by LawPro, and the defendants' failure to make settlement offers.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that hardship does not displace the rule that costs follow the event, and that the presence of insurance is irrelevant to costs awards.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $250,000 for the main action and $7,500 for the abandoned Family Law Act claims.

During a lengthy personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought a motion to determine whether the plaintiff required leave under section 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three 'participant experts' (treating doctors) who intended to proffer opinion evidence.

The court held that while treating doctors testifying strictly to history, treatment, diagnosis, and prognosis do not require leave, those offering broader opinion evidence must comply with Rule 53.03 and are subject to the three-expert limit.

The court emphasized its gatekeeper function and the need for proportionality, ruling that the plaintiff must seek leave to call more than one expert per medical specialty.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a motorcycle accident in Jamaica.

She retained the defendant lawyer to investigate potential insurance claims.

The lawyer advised that her family's Ontario automobile insurance policy would not provide accident benefits due to a territorial restriction limiting coverage to North America, and thus did not file an application for benefits before the two-year limitation period expired.

The plaintiff sued the lawyer for professional negligence, arguing he should have filed the application to preserve her rights, especially given subsequent changes in case law.

The court dismissed the action, finding the lawyer met the standard of care of a reasonably competent expert in insurance law at the time, and that an application for benefits would likely have been denied anyway.

During a personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought mid‑trial motions seeking orders requiring certain foreign witnesses to testify in person in Canada rather than by video conference and restricting the plaintiff to evidence previously disclosed under an earlier discovery order.

The court considered Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broader access‑to‑justice principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The judge held that credibility concerns alone did not justify refusing video evidence and found the balance of convenience favoured permitting the witnesses, located abroad, to testify by video conference with interpretation.

The court also declined to limit the plaintiff’s evidence to earlier will‑say statements, finding that continuing disclosure obligations and fairness required allowing updated affidavit evidence while preserving the defendants’ opportunity to challenge it.

During a trial for damages arising from a train derailment, the plaintiff testified in-chief that he had no criminal record in Poland and filed a certified Polish document to that effect.

The defendants sought to cross-examine him using uncertified Polish court documents suggesting he had a criminal history.

The plaintiff objected, arguing the documents were uncertified and inadmissible under s. 23 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court ruled that s. 23 is permissive and does not preclude proving foreign documents at common law.

The court allowed the defence to use the uncertified documents in cross-examination to challenge the plaintiff's credibility, noting the plaintiff would have the opportunity to explain or challenge the documents' reliability.

The plaintiffs brought a motion shortly before trial alleging spoliation of video evidence by the defendant relating to a bus incident in which the plaintiff claimed injury due to driver negligence.

They sought to strike the defendant’s statement of defence, alternatively an adverse inference regarding the missing video, and exclusion of testimony from certain witnesses.

The court reviewed the governing principles of spoliation and emphasized that determinations regarding whether spoliation occurred and the appropriate remedy are generally best addressed by the trial judge.

Given the proximity of the trial and the intertwined nature of any potential remedy with the trial process, the motion was referred to the trial judge for determination.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the trial judge.

The court reviewed a motion record concerning the proposed resolution of a minor’s Family Law Act claim arising from injuries to his mother in a motor vehicle accident.

The record revealed that the adult plaintiffs had settled their claims for $600,000, while the minor’s claim was effectively treated as having no value and no payment had been made by the tortfeasor.

Funds had instead been placed into investment vehicles by the litigation guardian from his own settlement without court approval, and part of the funds were paid to counsel.

The court held that the minor’s claim could not be treated as settled in the absence of full disclosure, expert evidence, and proper court approval.

The matter was referred to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to investigate and advise regarding the proposed arrangement.

The plaintiffs appealed a Rule 21 motion decision determining that where a plaintiff is involved in two motor vehicle accidents and the actions are tried together, the statutory deductible under s. 267.5(7) of the Insurance Act applies to each action individually.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the plain meaning of the provision requires the court to determine general damages for each action and then reduce that amount by the statutory deductible.

The appeal was dismissed.