Jeffrey William Strype

Following a successful appeal from a master's order, the court was required to determine costs both for the appeal and for the underlying motion before the master.

The parties had agreed that costs of the appeal would be fixed at $5,000 but disputed whether that agreement encompassed the costs of the earlier motion.

The court held that the agreement related only to the appeal and that the master's prior costs disposition had been set aside when the order was reversed on appeal.

Considering the partial indemnity costs outline, the complexity of the motion, and the reasonableness principle governing costs, the court fixed additional costs of $3,000 for the motion before the master.

Following the dismissal of a civil action by another judge of the Superior Court of Justice, the court issued an endorsement raising procedural concerns regarding how the matter had been reassigned.

The judge noted that an earlier endorsement he issued had not been addressed by counsel and questioned whether it had been brought to the attention of the judge who subsequently dismissed the action.

The court directed that the file be sent to the judge who dismissed the action to clarify whether the earlier endorsement had been provided and to determine whether the reassignment may have constituted judge shopping.

The defendant physicians brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice claim on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action alleged negligent delay in diagnosing breast cancer, which later recurred and became terminal.

The court considered the discoverability principle and the requirement that a claim be based on material facts including causation and actionable damage.

It held that although the cancer was diagnosed in 2007, the plaintiff’s condition went into remission and actionable injury only became apparent when the cancer recurred in 2009.

The court concluded that the defendants failed to establish that the limitation period necessarily began earlier, and that the issue required a trial.

Following a motor vehicle accident jury trial resulting in a modest judgment after statutory deductions and collateral benefit credits, the court addressed liability for costs.

The defendant insurer argued that its Rule 49 offer to settle should trigger cost consequences because the plaintiff recovered significantly less than the offer.

The court held that the offer was ambiguous due to unexplained references to provisions of the Insurance Act and therefore could not trigger Rule 49 cost consequences.

Applying Rule 57.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the recovery fell within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction and determined that neither party should receive costs.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages for future loss of income in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to order disclosure of settlement amounts from two subsequent accidents and by failing to deduct those amounts from the damages award.

They also argued the statutory trust for future collateral benefits should extend to future pension benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global assessment method prevented double recovery and the claim regarding pension benefits was speculative.

The appellant, a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle, suffered severe injuries resulting in lymphedema.

At trial, liability was admitted, and a jury awarded her $290,000 in non-pecuniary damages, $30,000 for past income loss, and $43,300 under the Family Law Act, but zero for future income loss.

The appellant appealed the zero award for future income loss, arguing it was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was supported by evidence of the appellant's successful employment and promotions post-accident, and that the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's expert evidence regarding her future loss of competitive advantage.

The appellant passenger was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident and was found 35 per cent contributorily negligent by a jury for failing to wear an available shoulder harness, despite wearing a lap belt.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury's assessment was unreasonable, as contributory negligence solely for failing to wear a seatbelt should not exceed 25 per cent.

The court substituted an assessment of 5 per cent contributory negligence, noting the appellant complied with the statutory requirement to wear a lap belt and the shoulder harness was a non-retracting type that was commonly worn improperly.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits, including loss of earning capacity benefits, attendant care, and housekeeping.

The insurer terminated benefits based on a DAC report that relied on surveillance video to conclude the applicant was not disabled.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's argument that the applicant was malingering, accepting expert evidence that she suffered a traumatic brain injury resulting in severe major depression.

The arbitrator found the applicant was substantially unable to perform the essential tasks of her employment and awarded the claimed benefits, along with interest and arbitration expenses.

The appellant appealed an order staying her Ontario action.

On appeal, she raised a new issue regarding whether her claim against the respondents was barred by Quebec limitation periods, which would affect the juridical advantage analysis.

Because there was no evidentiary record on this issue, the Court of Appeal amended the lower court's order to provide for a conditional stay of the Ontario action pending the final determination of the limitation period question under Quebec law.

In a supplementary endorsement, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal as abandoned.

Costs for the cross-appeal were fixed at $1,500.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondent for a shoulder injury and resulting depression.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings of fact, the admission of late evidence, the assessment of damages for future care and wage loss, and the costs award based on a Rule 49 offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons that would justify intervention.

The court held that the factual findings were supported by evidence, the late admission of evidence did not warrant a new trial, the damages assessment appropriately accounted for contingencies, and the costs award was within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents $485,000 for economic loss.

The appellants argued they were denied a fair trial due to a lengthy delay in the delivery of the judgment, that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review, and that the trial judge erred in the standard of proof for calculating lost business profits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no active prejudice from the delay, sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions, and no error in the estimation of economic loss based on the evidence presented.

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured motorist.

They entered into a limits agreement with the tortfeasor, agreeing not to pursue damages beyond his policy limits, without notifying their own insurer.

The respondents then sought to recover the remainder of their damages from their insurer under the SEF 44 Endorsement.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the limits agreement interfered with its subrogation rights and meant the respondents were no longer 'legally entitled to recover' from the tortfeasor.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the limits agreement did not preclude the respondents' claim against their insurer, as 'legally entitled to recover' refers to the right of action at the time of the accident, and the insurer's subrogation rights had not yet arisen.

The Court of Appeal issued supplementary reasons regarding a costs order from a previous appeal decision.

The defendants (appellants) objected to the court's direction that an assessment officer determine whether the trial was prolonged by the defendants' failure to meaningfully respond to a request to admit, which would entitle the plaintiffs to solicitor-and-client costs for the additional time.

The defendants argued the assessment officer lacked the ability to make this determination without further instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the objection, finding that the assessment officer has the authority and experience to perform the task and that no further direction was needed.

The 14-year-old deceased was killed when a handball net toppled onto him during a physical education class.

His parents and sister successfully sued the school board.

The jury awarded $100,000 to each parent and $50,000 to the sister for loss of guidance, care, and companionship under the Family Law Act.

The trial judge also awarded the plaintiffs solicitor-and-client costs.

The school board appealed the damages and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the parents' awards as high but within the accepted range, but reduced the sister's award to $25,000 as inordinately high.

The costs order was varied to party-and-party costs, as the plaintiffs' settlement offers did not comply with Rule 49.10.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their contractual claim under the S.E.F. 44 Family Protection Endorsement after they had agreed to limit recovery against the tortfeasor to the tortfeasor's policy limits.

The Court of Appeal held that, in a direct action against the insurer, the phrase 'legally entitled to recover' requires proof only that the inadequately insured motorist was at fault and that damages exceed the available limits.

The continued enforceability of the claim against the tortfeasor was held to be a non-issue, consistent with prior authority recognizing a direct contractual cause of action against the insurer.

The appeal was allowed, the Rule 21 answer was changed to 'No', and costs of the motion and appeal were awarded to the appellants.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly caregiver benefits from the insurer.

The insurer terminated the benefits, and the applicant sought to elect to receive income replacement benefits instead.

The insurer argued that the applicant was deemed to have elected caregiver benefits under section 61(5) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because she failed to make an election within 30 days of receiving notice.

The arbitrator found that the insurer's letter did not constitute proper notice under section 61(2) because it did not advise the applicant of the requirement to choose between benefits or the consequences of failing to do so.

Therefore, the deemed election provision was not triggered, and the applicant was entitled to elect income replacement benefits.