Jasmine T. Akbarali

The plaintiff, Sarah Nahum, was terminated without cause by the defendant, Honeycomb Hospitality Inc., after four and a half months of employment while five months pregnant.

On a summary judgment motion, the court addressed the reasonable notice period, specifically considering the impact of pregnancy on its calculation.

The court found pregnancy to be a Bardal-type factor affecting employability and awarded the plaintiff five months' notice, resulting in damages of $34,194.87.

This motion concerned a failed asset purchase agreement for a homecare franchise.

The applicant, 2712349 Ontario Incorporated, sought to recover a $65,000 "down payment" made to the personal respondent, Crystal Louis, after failing to secure financing.

The court addressed whether the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith in terminating the agreement based on the financing condition, whether the payment was refundable, and if the personal respondent was jointly and severally liable for its repayment on the basis of unjust enrichment.

The court found that the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith, the $65,000 payment was refundable as a down payment (not a non-refundable deposit), and Crystal Louis was jointly and severally liable with the corporate respondent for its return due to unjust enrichment.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an appeal and underlying arbitration concerning child vaccination decisions.

The appellant father had successfully appealed an arbitrator's decision, gaining sole final responsibility for vaccination-related decisions for the children.

The court considered the principles governing costs awards, including the presumptive entitlement of the successful party, the treatment of pro bono counsel for costs recovery, and the assessment of offers to settle.

The court found the appellant was the successful party but did not beat his offer to settle.

It concluded that costs on a partial indemnity scale were appropriate, ordering the respondent to pay the appellant $52,000 all-inclusive for costs of both the appeal and arbitration.

The plaintiff employer sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain a former employee from competing, soliciting customers, or using confidential information.

The court applied the strong prima facie case standard because the injunction would restrict the employee's livelihood.

The court found the restrictive covenant had expired years prior, the employee was not a fiduciary, and the customer list was not proprietary confidential information.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed, but a sealing and protective order was granted on consent.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's award that determined it was not in the best interests of the parties' two children to be vaccinated.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator erred in his gatekeeping function by qualifying the respondent's experts, whose evidence on vaccine safety was unreliable and outside their expertise.

The arbitrator also erred by failing to admit government immunization guides under the public documents exception to the hearsay rule.

Having excluded the respondent's expert evidence and admitted the public documents and fresh expert evidence, the court found that the children's best interests required vaccination.

The appellant was granted sole decision-making responsibility for the children's vaccinations, and the respondent was ordered not to tell the children that vaccines are unsafe.

The appellant husband appealed an arbitrator's award dismissing his claim to a 50 percent beneficial ownership interest in the matrimonial home.

The husband had transferred his jointly-held interest in the home to the respondent wife to protect it from potential creditors.

The arbitrator found the transfer was a gift, not a resulting trust.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator correctly applied the presumption of resulting trust, properly considered the husband's intention to defeat creditors, and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the husband intended to gift his interest and divested himself of control over the property.

The respondent husband brought a motion to change his child and spousal support obligations following a 2018 trial decision.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the children entering and exiting post-secondary studies in the United States.

The court determined the appropriate section 7 expenses, calculated the respondent's income using a pre-tax corporate income approach, and continued to impute $50,000 in income to the applicant.

The court declined to adjust the spousal support payable to account for the fact that the applicant, having relocated to the United States, no longer paid tax on spousal support, finding the respondent was no worse off and the applicant remained entitled to high-end support.

The respondent husband brought a motion to change an interim consent support order, arguing his income had substantially decreased and seeking to impute income to the applicant wife.

The court excluded the husband's RRSP withdrawals from his income for support purposes, finding he used them to pay debts and support obligations.

The court imputed a minimum wage income of $30,000 to the wife prospectively, noting she had made no efforts to become self-supporting three years post-separation, but declined to impute income retroactively due to her childcare responsibilities for three children, including one with autism.

Interim spousal support was ordered at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines based on the recalculated incomes.

The moving party (respondent mother) brought a motion seeking the recusal of the case management judge from hearing an appeal regarding the vaccination of the parties' children.

The moving party argued that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed based on the judge's prior preliminary rulings in the case, decisions in unrelated family law cases involving public health guidelines, and media coverage of those decisions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prior decisions were based on existing law and did not demonstrate that the judge had entered the fray or predetermined the issues.

The court also held that a reasonable person would not rely on provocative media articles to conclude the judge could not decide the appeal fairly.

The applicant father and respondent mother disagreed on whether their six-year-old child should return to in-person learning or continue online learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the risks of exposure to COVID-19, the lack of underlying health conditions for the child, the child's social development needs, and the safety measures implemented by the school.

The court concluded that the benefits of in-person learning outweighed the risks and ordered the child to return to school in person.

No costs were awarded due to the novelty of the issue.

The appellant mother, M.H., brought a motion for state-funded counsel for her appeal of a child protection order that placed her child in extended care.

The court applied the five-part test for funding, finding that the mother's s. 7 Charter rights were engaged, she could not have a fair hearing without counsel due to the complexity of the proceedings and her limited capacity, she had exhausted all legal aid avenues, and she was unable to afford a lawyer.

Crucially, the court determined that her appeal had the requisite minimum threshold of merit, particularly concerning arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel and the significant imbalance of evidence at the original summary judgment motion.

The motion was granted, and the Attorney General of Ontario was ordered to provide state-funded counsel and reasonable disbursements for both the appeal and the present motion.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking interim custody, parenting orders, and restraining orders against the respondent father.

The dispute arose from the father's rejection of COVID-19 pandemic seriousness and his active disobedience of public health guidelines, including organizing protests.

The court granted the mother temporary sole decision-making authority for the child's health, schooling, and extra-curricular activities, and restricted the father's parenting time to video access, conditional on his adherence to public health protocols.

The court also issued a tailored restraining order prohibiting the father from making social media posts denigrating the mother or referring to the litigation or the child in relation to the pandemic, but dismissed the request for a no-contact order and GoFundMe page removal.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The applicant sought summary judgment to dismiss the respondent's claims, primarily concerning a Florida condominium, arguing lack of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, or no genuine issue for trial based on a domestic contract.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to amend her answer.

The court granted the respondent leave to amend her answer, found that it had jurisdiction over the dispute, and determined that Ontario was the convenient forum.

The court also found a genuine issue for trial regarding the interpretation of the domestic contract and declined to sever the divorce from corollary issues, as it would disadvantage the respondent.

This decision addresses the determination of costs for the second of two related actions, following an appeal that dismissed both actions in their entirety.

The Court of Appeal remitted the costs determination to the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs, who were unsuccessful in both actions, did not participate in the costs submissions.

The court awarded the defendant, St. Paul’s Fire and Marine Insurance Company, $75,588 in costs on a partial indemnity scale, after adjusting the claimed amount to account for costs from a preceding action.

The court affirmed that partial indemnity costs are not strictly limited to a percentage of actual fees if a favourable rate was negotiated, and considered factors such as the substantial damages claimed, the defendant's long-term costs, the plaintiffs' non-participation, and the defendant's appropriate conduct in managing litigation.

This decision addresses a motion for leave to intervene brought by the Medical Officer of Health (City of Toronto) (MOH) in an appeal concerning the vaccination of children.

The appellant sought to overturn an arbitrator's decision that declined to order the children's vaccination, while the respondent opposed vaccination.

The court determined it had jurisdiction to hear the intervention motion remotely and in writing during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the test for intervention, the court found that the MOH had a substantial public interest in the issues of vaccine efficacy, expert evidence gatekeeping, and judicial notice of public health policy.

The MOH's distinct public health perspective was deemed a useful contribution without causing injustice to the parties.

Leave to intervene was granted.

The applicant brought a motion seeking to suspend the respondent's parenting time with their four-year-old daughter or, alternatively, an order that the respondent adhere to strict COVID-19 protocols.

The applicant, a family physician with stage 3 breast cancer, was part of a high-risk group and alleged the respondent was not following public health directives by self-isolating with his new partner's parents and daughter at a cottage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the respondent's arrangements were reasonable, consistent with public health guidelines, and in the child's best interests to maintain existing parenting arrangements.

The court emphasized the presumption that existing parenting orders should be respected during the pandemic and the need for parents to communicate responsibly.

The applicant, Eirini Flesias, brought an urgent motion seeking exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, a primary parenting order for the youngest child (J), conduct orders, and the return of her government documents.

She also sought a certificate of pending litigation.

The court found the motion urgent due to the applicant's homelessness and inability to see her child during a public health crisis, exacerbated by the respondents' tactical conduct.

The court granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the applicant, established a primary residence for J with the applicant and a specific parenting schedule for the respondent Paul Flesias, issued conduct orders, and ordered the return of the applicant's documents.

The motion for a certificate of pending litigation was adjourned pending the commencement of the main application, but a "no dealing" order was issued for the property in the interim.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the applicant, with Paul Flesias solely responsible for parenting-related costs and Paul and Basile Flesias jointly and severally responsible for property-related costs.

The respondent mother sought urgent temporary sole custody, primary residence, and an order to travel with the parties' child (Y, under three) to Vancouver, B.C., for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic, along with a suspension of the applicant father's in-person parenting time and a restraining order.

The applicant father brought a cross-motion for an equal parenting schedule and a prohibition on removing the child from Ontario.

The court, finding the matter urgent, dismissed the mother's request to travel, citing public health risks, the federal advisory against non-essential travel, and the child's need for stability and continued contact with both parents.

The court set aside a prior joint custody order due to concerns about the father's conduct towards the mother but declined to grant sole custody, requiring further testing of allegations.

A temporary parenting schedule was established, granting the father parenting time from Thursday evening to Sunday evening weekly, with exchanges facilitated by his sister.

Requests for a s. 30 assessment, Office of the Children's Lawyer referral, and a new restraining order were dismissed without prejudice, noting the impracticality of assessments during the pandemic and the existence of a criminal restraining order.

The applicant wife brought a motion seeking production and answers to refusals related to the respondent husband's financial disclosure during marriage contract negotiations.

The wife argued that the husband's reliance on his professional advisors, including his lawyer, to prepare his financial disclosure constituted an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege over his lawyer's file.

The court dismissed the wife's motion, holding that merely stating reliance on a lawyer to perform their job in preparing disclosure does not put the legal advice itself in issue, and therefore does not amount to an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege, which is considered to be as close to absolute as possible.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking interim sole custody, a change of school, and a s. 30 assessment for the parties' four-year-old child.

The applicant mother opposed the relief and sought a restraining order against the father.

The court ordered temporary joint decision-making and expanded the father's parenting time to six nights out of fourteen, finding both parents capable despite their high conflict and mutual allegations.

The court dismissed the father's requests to change the child's school and for a s. 30 assessment, noting the assessment would cause unnecessary delay and was not required.

The mother's request for a restraining order was also dismissed for lack of objective evidence supporting a reasonable fear for her safety.

No costs were awarded.