James Wilson

The plaintiff, who travelled from Ireland for a pre-trial conference regarding a motor vehicle accident, sought costs after the conference failed to result in a settlement.

The defendant maintained a 'no liability' position contrary to their stance at mediation, without communicating this change in advance.

The court found the defendant's behavior obdurate and the pre-trial conference substantially a waste of time.

Pursuant to Rule 50.12 and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's out-of-pocket travel expenses and counsel fees, as well as the fees of the other defendants' counsel in the cause.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from driving contrary to section 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed a vehicle with a disqualified owner enter a dealership parking lot and detained the defendant standing beside the vehicle.

Without informing the defendant of the reason for detention or his right to counsel, the officer obtained admissions that the defendant had no driver's licence and had been driving that day.

The court found that the detention was lawful based on reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence, but the officer breached sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to advise the defendant of the reason for detention and his right to counsel before questioning.

The court excluded the defendant's statements under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the defendant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

With the Crown's essential evidence excluded, the charge was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the Director's refusal to approve two wind turbines as part of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind facility.

The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement to amend a condition of the approval relating to the protection of Blanding's turtles during construction and maintenance activities, and the appellant proposed to withdraw the appeal.

The Environmental Review Tribunal accepted the settlement, finding the amendment to be in the public interest and consistent with the Environmental Protection Act, and dismissed the proceeding.

The appellants appealed the Director's decision to issue a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind facility, arguing it would cause serious and irreversible harm to the Little Brown Bat and Blanding's turtle.

In the remedy phase, the Approval Holder proposed mitigation plans to address the Tribunal's previous findings of harm.

The Tribunal found it had jurisdiction to consider the mitigation plans and applied the precautionary principle.

The Tribunal accepted the bat mitigation plan with a modification to extend turbine curtailment to sunrise.

However, the Tribunal found the proposed road restoration measures for Blanding's turtle were novel and unstudied, and therefore removed the turbines associated with those road upgrades from the approval.

During the remedy phase of an appeal regarding a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind facility, the appellant brought motions to qualify a witness as an expert, admit new documentary evidence, and control the cross-examination of a respondent's witness.

The Tribunal granted the expert qualification in part, admitted some of the new evidence that was not previously obtainable, and dismissed the motion regarding the cross-examination, finding no improper conduct by opposing counsel.

The moving party brought a motion seeking an order directing that the continuation of the cross-examination of a witness for the approval holder take place before the Tribunal, or alternatively, directing counsel to refrain from further objections.

The Tribunal reviewed the submissions and the transcript of the cross-examination and dismissed the motion, with reasons to follow.

The appellant brought three motions in an appeal of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind project.

The motions sought to qualify a witness as an expert and to admit new evidence.

The Environmental Review Tribunal granted the motions in part, qualifying the witness as an energy consultant and admitting specific documents attached to the affidavits of the witness and another expert into evidence, while allowing the respondents to cross-examine the affiants on the newly admitted documents.

The appellants appealed a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind turbine project.

Following a finding that the project would cause serious and irreversible harm, the Tribunal adjourned the hearing to consider remedies.

The appellants brought a motion requesting that the continuation of the hearing be held in person rather than in writing.

The Tribunal denied the motion, finding that receiving evidence in writing was fair, would prevent further delay given the statutory six-month deadline, and would provide the best evidence to fulfill its mandate.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $6,156.71 following the dismissal of the appellant's motion for a stay.

The appellant argued that as a public interest litigant, no costs should be awarded, noting it had ultimately obtained the interim remedy from the Environmental Review Tribunal.

The court agreed with the appellant and ordered no costs for the motion.

The appellant meat processing company sued the respondent energy retailer for rescission of a fixed price electrical contract and damages for negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the respondent had fully explained the contract terms, including the risk that the appellant would pay more if electricity prices dropped, and that the respondent had not misled the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a renewable energy approval for a wind project.

Under the Environmental Protection Act and O. Reg. 359/09, the Tribunal must dispose of the hearing within six months, failing which the approval is deemed confirmed.

Due to delays in completing the evidence and final submissions, the Tribunal, on its own initiative, ordered a 32-day adjournment to allow sufficient time to deliberate and secure a fair and just determination on the merits.

In an appeal of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind facility, the appellants brought several procedural motions.

The Tribunal dismissed a motion for further disclosure but granted summonses for two Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry employees to testify regarding species at risk.

The Tribunal dismissed a motion to adjourn the hearing, finding it unnecessary to secure a fair determination.

The Tribunal ruled on multiple motions to exclude reply witness statements, admitting those that properly responded to new evidence and excluding those that merely bolstered previous evidence or introduced new issues.

Finally, the Tribunal dismissed a motion for recusal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias based on the Members' prior statements or their conduct during the hearing.

The appellants, owners of several hotel properties, brought a motion seeking disclosure from MPAC of financial and performance information regarding comparable hotel properties to assist their valuation experts in an assessment appeal.

MPAC consented to the motion subject to the execution of confidentiality undertakings.

The Assessment Review Board granted the motion, ordering MPAC to produce the requested information upon receipt of executed undertakings of non-disclosure, while adjourning the motion with respect to two disputed properties to allow for further submissions.

The Approval Holder brought a motion for direction in an appeal of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind turbine project.

The Director had approved 27 of the 29 proposed turbines.

The Approval Holder sought a direction that the parties submit evidence regarding the potential impacts of the full 29-turbine project, arguing it would be more efficient if they succeeded in a separate appeal to reinstate the two refused turbines.

The Tribunal denied the motion, finding that its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the Director's decision as issued, and declined to make advance rulings on the relevance of specific evidence.

The Ontario Energy Board appealed a decision that had required it to apply a mandatory prudence framework when assessing Ontario Power Generation compensation costs in rate-setting.

The majority held tribunal participation in defending its own decision was proper in this regulatory context and found no impermissible bootstrapping on appeal.

The Court held the governing statute did not require a single prudence methodology and permitted the Board to use a mixed approach for costs that were partly committed and partly subject to managerial discretion.

The Board’s disallowance of $145 million in compensation costs was found reasonable, and its original decision was reinstated.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the auditors’ appeal and confirmed that an expert witness must be able and willing to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan assistance to the court as a threshold admissibility requirement, with remaining concerns about independence generally addressed at the gatekeeping weighing stage.

The appellant, Barclays Bank PLC, appealed a trial judgment finding its Notice of Early Termination of a complex asset-backed commercial paper transaction invalid and the respondent Devonshire Trust's Notice of Early Termination valid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that Barclays' notice was invalid due to its fraudulent misrepresentation, bad faith, and the principle that a party cannot benefit from its own wrong, as Barclays' failure to make liquidity payments contributed to Devonshire's insolvency.

The Court also upheld the validity of Devonshire's notice.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the calculation of Barclays' Settlement Amount, substituting a figure of $264 million for the trial judge's $12,000 valuation, subject to deductions for mitigation.

The self-represented applicants brought a motion for an extension of time to file their Notice of Appeal.

The court found that while the delay was lengthy, the applicants had served the Notice of Appeal within the prescribed time limits but failed to file it with the court.

Finding no undue prejudice to the respondent and that the appeal was not entirely without merit, the court granted the extension of time and set a strict timetable for perfection.

The self-represented applicants brought a motion for an extension of time to file their Notice of Appeal.

The court found that the applicants had served a Notice of Appeal within the prescribed time limits but failed to file it with the court.

Despite a lengthy delay, the court was satisfied that the applicants intended to proceed with the appeal and that the respondent would not suffer undue prejudice.

The motion was granted, with strict timelines imposed for perfecting the appeal.

Following a prior decision staying a motion for summary judgment pending discovery, the court addressed costs of the motion.

The responding party sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the motion had been unreasonable and premature, while the moving parties requested partial indemnity costs payable in the cause.

The court considered Rule 20.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the circumstances surrounding the premature motion.

Although the motion had disrupted the orderly discovery process, the court concluded that much of the work product would remain useful in the continuing litigation.

The court exercised its discretion to award a fixed costs amount rather than substantial indemnity or costs in the cause.