James Harbic

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to edit portions of his video-recorded police interview.

The defence argued that certain statements made by the interviewing officer expressing certainty of guilt and urging the accused to speak should be redacted as they would act as a 'voice for the Crown' and undermine the accused's right to silence.

The court agreed to redact segments where the officer suggested the accused had an option to explain himself or where the officer expressed disbelief at the accused's denials, finding these could undermine the right to silence or suggest undisclosed evidence.

Other segments providing context to the accused's admissions were retained.

The defence in a first-degree murder trial brought a pre-trial application requesting that the jury be permitted to take a view of the crime scene.

The Crown consented to the view, but an issue arose regarding whether the accused could waive his right to attend under s. 652(3) of the Criminal Code.

Declining to follow conflicting Ontario jurisprudence, the court held that s. 652(3) must be read in conjunction with s. 650(2)(b), permitting the accused to waive his attendance.

The application was granted with specific logistical conditions to protect the integrity of the trial.

The Crown applied for orders to exclude the public, ban publication of a witness's identity, and allow the witness to testify via closed circuit television (CCTV) during a first-degree murder trial.

The witness, the accused's former girlfriend, expressed stress about testifying and concerns for her child's privacy.

The court dismissed the requests for public exclusion and a publication ban, emphasizing the strong presumption of open courts and the importance of public scrutiny given the witness's credibility issues.

However, the court granted the request for the witness to testify via CCTV to facilitate her evidence while allowing the accused to face his accuser.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of a videotaped statement made by the accused, Mathew Hayes, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive circumstances and police trickery, including alleged threats regarding the accused's girlfriend, use of an intimidating term ("goof"), a story undermining confidence in lawyers, a "non-confrontational" comment, a statement about not incriminating oneself, and the prolonged interview length despite attempts to end it.

The court found that none of the defence's concerns, individually or collectively, raised a reasonable doubt about the statement's voluntariness.

The statement, which contained denials contradicting video evidence, was deemed admissible as post-offence conduct.

In this pre-trial application, the defence sought leave to introduce evidence of alternate suspects in a murder trial.

The court granted the defence's request to introduce evidence regarding Vanessa Tracey, finding a sufficient connection between her and the victim's death to establish an "air of reality" for the defence.

However, the court dismissed the application concerning Roger Busch and Laura Heavens, concluding that the evidence presented for them was insufficient to create the necessary connection to the crime and would lead to impermissible speculation by the jury.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to introduce evidence of the accused's post-offence conduct, specifically an alleged threat to set his pregnant girlfriend on fire, as evidence of consciousness of guilt and to explain the girlfriend's delay in reporting a confession.

The court found that the evidence lacked probative value, as the inferences sought by the Crown (consciousness of guilt or intimidation) were not logically supported by the facts presented.

The court noted there was no evidence linking the alleged threat to the confession or to the girlfriend's silence.

Furthermore, even if the evidence had some probative value, its highly prejudicial effect, given the nature of the alleged threat, vastly outweighed its evidential worth.

The Crown's application was dismissed.

The accused, jointly charged with first degree murder in the death of his wife, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Crown's theory was that the accused set the stage for his co-accused, with whom he was having an affair, to carry out the killing.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence regarding motive, planning and deliberation, and post-offence conduct.

The court concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence was capable of supporting the inferences sought by the Crown and dismissed the motion.

The court issued two rulings during a murder trial.

First, it rejected the defence's argument that if one co-accused was acquitted, the other must also be acquitted based on conspiracy law, clarifying that the old common law rule for conspirators is no longer valid and, in any event, the accused were charged with murder, not conspiracy.

Second, the court denied the request to leave second-degree murder as an included offence to the jury, finding no air of reality in the evidence to support a conclusion of intentional but spontaneous killing, given the pre-meditated actions of the assailant.

The accused, Gurpreet Ronald and Bhupinderpal Gill, charged with first-degree murder, sought to edit their voluntary exculpatory statements given to police.

The Crown alleged the accused acted in concert to kill the victim.

The court reviewed legal principles for editing voluntary statements, emphasizing the balance between relevance, prejudicial effect, and the right to a fair trial in a joint proceeding.

The judge ruled that segments where the officer commented on the accused's credibility, advised them to tell the truth, or expressed opinions on co-accused's guilt should be excised as they are not probative and are prejudicial.

The accused, jointly charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to sit with their counsel at trial rather than in the prisoner's dock.

The court reviewed the divided judicial approaches to this issue, including the Kaufman Commission's recommendation and the Ontario Court of Appeal's guidance in *R. v. Lalande*.

Despite the accused presenting no particular security risks and being in custody, the application was dismissed.

The court found that practical courtroom limitations prevented the accused from being adequately visible to the jury and witnesses from the counsel table, and that any potential stigma associated with the prisoner's dock could be addressed through jury instructions.

The accused sought an order permitting challenges for cause of prospective jurors based on race, religion, pre-trial publicity, marital infidelity, and employment bias.

The court permitted challenges for cause on the grounds of race, religion (by agreement), and pre-trial publicity, finding a realistic potential for bias that might prevent jurors from being impartial despite judicial instructions.

However, the court denied challenges for cause based on marital infidelity and employment bias, as the applicants failed to demonstrate widespread community bias or that potential jurors would be incapable of setting aside such biases.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit hearsay statements of the deceased and evidence of prior discreditable conduct of the accused.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and the test for prior discreditable conduct, assessing relevance, necessity, reliability, and prejudicial effect.

Certain hearsay statements regarding the deceased's state of mind and marital unhappiness were admitted, as were some instances of the male accused's controlling behaviour.

However, vague allegations of physical abuse and a statement about visiting family were deemed unreliable and inadmissible.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, defence counsel for co-accused Bhupinderpal Gill brought a motion to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct by Gurpreet Ronald, specifically four incidents where she brandished a kitchen knife during domestic disputes with her husband.

Gill's defence was that Ronald acted alone and the killing was spontaneous, not planned.

Ronald's counsel argued the evidence was irrelevant, not probative, and highly prejudicial.

The Crown argued for modest probative value but admission.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of planning and deliberation, but not to the identity of the killer (as Gill's non-involvement was conceded).

The court balanced probative value against prejudicial effect, finding the risk of moral prejudice low and reasoning prejudice manageable with a limiting instruction.

The application was granted, admitting the evidence solely on the issue of planning and deliberation.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by two accused, Gurpreet Ronald and Bhupinderpal Gill, who were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

The defence disputed the voluntariness of specific videotaped interviews, arguing that the accused were suspects who should have been cautioned earlier or that the interviews were conducted oppressively.

The court applied the R. v. Oickle test for voluntariness, considering promises, threats, inducements, lack of operating mind, oppressive atmosphere, and police trickery, with a focus on oppression and the timing of suspect status.

The court found that the police did not have sufficient information to consider the accused as suspects requiring caution during their initial interviews and that the later interview of Gill, while forceful, was not oppressive.

All disputed statements were found to be voluntary and admissible.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion seeking disclosure of the wording of an anonymous Crimestoppers tip suggesting another person may have committed the homicide.

The Crown resisted disclosure on the basis of informer privilege.

The court reviewed the strict doctrine of informer privilege and the narrow “innocence at stake” exception, requiring proof that disclosure is the only way the accused can raise a reasonable doubt.

Although the case against the accused was circumstantial and the defence proposed an alternate suspect theory, the court found that other evidentiary avenues remained available to advance that theory.

Because the accused could potentially raise a reasonable doubt through other evidence, the threshold test for the exception was not met.

Sentencing decision for an offender who pleaded guilty to unlawful confinement and break and enter to a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence arising from a planned home invasion of an elderly victim.

The offender and accomplices forcibly entered the residence at night, bound the victim, threatened her with a machete, and stole cash and valuables.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the elderly victim, the planned nature of the offence, threats of violence, and the serious psychological impact described in the victim impact statement.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, limited criminal record, guilty plea, demonstrated rehabilitation through a residential addiction treatment program, and sustained sobriety.

Applying sentencing principles emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while recognizing rehabilitation, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence reduced to account for pre‑trial custody and partial credit for time spent in a structured treatment facility.

The applicant, a 51-year-old Innu man from Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, sought an exemption from a mandatory firearm prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to sexual assault.

The applicant argued that the prohibition would constitute a virtual prohibition on his only realistic means of employment—operating an outfitting and hunting guide business—and that he would need firearms for sustenance hunting.

The court granted the exemption under section 113(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, finding that the applicant had satisfied the necessity requirement on the balance of probabilities.

The court emphasized that the necessity requirement need not be permanent and that a realistic, contextual approach must be taken when assessing employment prospects in remote communities.

The court also noted that satisfying the necessity condition is necessary but not sufficient; the court must also be satisfied that granting the exemption does not pose an undue risk to public safety.

Sentencing following a jury conviction for fraud over $5,000, perjury by affidavit in a land transfer tax affidavit, and breach of recognizance.

The offences arose from the accused’s attempt to fraudulently transfer his elderly mother’s condominium parking space using a forged deed and false affidavit while she was suffering from dementia and residing in long‑term care.

The court found significant aggravating factors including breach of trust against a vulnerable family member, financial abuse, planning and sophistication, and the accused’s lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility.

A conditional sentence was rejected because denunciation and deterrence were paramount and the accused demonstrated poor prospects for community supervision.

The accused was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration followed by two years’ probation with strict no‑contact conditions with siblings.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample under the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting statements to persons in authority, misapprehended the medical evidence regarding a possible concussion, applied unequal scrutiny to defence and Crown evidence, assumed an adversarial role during questioning, and misapplied the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal judge held that the trial judge correctly applied the voluntariness test and reasonably rejected the medical evidence suggesting the accused’s mind was not operating.

The court further held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and evidence and that appellate review of factual findings on summary conviction appeal is limited to unreasonable or unsupported findings.

Finding no reversible error, the court upheld the convictions.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in crack cocaine after selling multiple quantities to an undercover officer over several weeks.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 30 to 36 months given the offender’s prior record for similar offences, while the defence sought a conditional sentence based on rehabilitation, family responsibilities, and the needs of a child with significant care requirements.

The court acknowledged the serious aggravating factors, including repeated trafficking and prior convictions, but also recognized substantial mitigating circumstances including genuine rehabilitation, stable employment, family dependency, and a guilty plea.

Applying the principles of proportionality and the objectives in ss. 718 and 718.1 of the Criminal Code, the court concluded that a sentence under two years was appropriate.

A conditional sentence of two years less one day with strict house arrest conditions, followed by three years of probation, was imposed.